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Abstract 
The goal o f copyright law has always been to balance society's interest in access to 
information against the right o f the creators to profit f rom the fruits o f their labour. 
However, every so often copyright law comes up against a new technology that 
threatens the ability o f copyright holders to enforce their rights. 
Initially, these new technologies seem to be the death knell to copyright protection, 
but in nearly every case copyright law has adjusted to the new technology. In the 
process often creating a lucrative source o f revenue for the copyright holders who had 
initially been so opposed to its introduction. 
The Internet is the most recent in a line o f copyright-threatening technologies. In the 
context o f digital music, the Internet has upset the balance between the consumer and 
the copyright holder in an unprecedented manner. 
From the US perspective this thesis examines some of the first high-profile cases 
involving the Internet and digital music distribution. Firstly, the thesis provides a 
background to music, technology, and copyright law. Secondly, it details and 
critically analyses the Diamond, MP3.com and Napster cases. Next, the thesis 
highlights some legal and technological solutions to the current problems. 
Ultimately the thesis concludes that the legal legacy left behind by these cases is 
unsatisfactory. Questions remain unanswered and it seems that a landmark ruling is 
necessary on the legal status o f everyday practices such as 'space-shifting' and 
'sampling'. 
Furthermore, this thesis calls for the recording industry to consider cheaper and more 
secure alternatives to the current methods o f distribution. I f other more suitable 
alternatives are implemented successfully and the above legal questions answered 
decisively then a working business model compatible wi th the online environment 
could pave the way for the future, not only in the context o f music but for all types o f 
digital content. 
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Introduction 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
"Theproblem'splain to see, too much technology... ".' 
1. Introduction 
Unt i l Apr i l 1999, the most common search term on the Internet was "sex".2 Now, the 
undisputed champion is the term "MP3". 3 Unfortunately, although many o f the MP3 
files available on-line are copies authorised by artists, there are also a large number o f 
pirated files that audiophiles post without artists' permission. 
This has led to a battle that may redefine the manner in which many people obtain 
copies o f their favourite music. On one side stands the recording industry, seeking to 
protect its current distribution channels and to control the dissemination o f its 
intellectual property over the Internet. On the other side, a group consisting o f 
Internet mavens, some musical artists, and the ever-present 'cyberpirates', stands 
ready to exploit the Internet as a means to quickly and cheaply distribute and 
download songs. 
In essence the advent o f new technology has been "the catalyst for this struggle over 
the use o f the Internet to distribute songs".4 New data compression technology, 
mainly in the form o f MP3, combined with the Internet's expanding global reach, has 
enabled anyone with access to computers not only to listen to music on their 
computers, but to exchange music files wi th other Internet users and to listen to that 
music on the go. 
Such advancements in technology have always remained elusive to the law's 
scrutiny. Understanding how to fairly apply traditional rules to new technology takes 
1 Styx, Mr. Roboto (Kilroy Was Here - A&M Records, 1983). 
2 B.J. Richards, The Times They Are A-Changin': A Legal Perspective On How The Internet Is 
Changing The Way We Buy, Sell, And Steal Music, 7 J. Intell. Prop. L . 421 (2000) at 421. 
3 Doug Bedell, The MP3 Wave: As Millions Download Music Off The Net, Piracy Enforcement 
Flounders, The Dallas Morning News, July 27, 1999 <http://www.dougbedell.com/mp3.htm>. 
4 Paul Veravanich, Rio Grande: The Mp3 Showdown At Highnoon In Cyberspace, 10 Fordham Intell. 
Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 433 (2000) at 435. ^cm^ 
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time as the impact, affect and use o f emerging technology finds its place in society. 
The recent developments in digital technology, such as the Internet and MP3 
compression pose such a problem to copyright law. Where once a tangible medium 
o f expression, such as an audio cassette, yielded itself to easy regulation, now only a 
digital signal - a binary stream o f 'Os' and ' I s ' - exists. 
In recent years the recording industry, in an attempt to control the unauthorised use o f 
its works through the MP3 format, has taken action against three separate entities that 
it believes has contributed to the unauthorised use o f its music. For one to say that 
the law has struggled to keep up wi th technological advances would be an 
understatement. Consequently, the courts have had to clarify and apply both old and 
new copyright law to deal with the new technology. This has led some to state that 
copyright, as it exists today, is dead and that radical reforms are necessary. 
This paper w i l l detail and critically analyse the court decisions in the 'MP3 trilogy'; 
RIAA v Diamond, UMG Recordings v MP3.com and A&MRecords v Napster. Such a 
discussion w i l l also highlight any problems with the current state o f copyright law 
and whether any action is required f rom the legislature. A n important significance o f 
such a discussion is that it provides a 'taster' for what w i l l inevitably transpire with 
the online digital distribution o f video in the future as and when it becomes more 
feasible.5 
It must be noted from the outset that all the litigation involving these MP3 cases so 
far has taken place in the United States. Consequently, all case law, legislation and 
analysis focus purely on the US perspective. Limit ing the discussion to US 
developments has been done for a number o f reasons. Firstly, these three cases were 
the first o f their kind to be litigated anywhere in the world. Secondly, although it 
would produce an interesting analysis, widening the scope to include other 
jurisdictions, for example the possible affect on European law, would not be possible 
to do within the work length available. As such, focusing on the first trio o f cases in 
this developing area o f law also has the advantage o f allowing the underlying issues 
to be more fu l ly examined. 
2 
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The rest o f this chapter w i l l provide a background to music and technology, including 
who the main players are and what MP3 is. Next, in Chapter 2, I w i l l introduce the 
basic concepts o f US copyright law and the legislature's attempt at introducing 
legislation to deal with digital technology. Chapters 3 through to 5 w i l l detail each of 
the cases in the MP3 trilogy and Chapter 6 through to 8 w i l l critically analyse the 
respective decisions. Next, in Chapter 9 ,1 w i l l highlight some o f the solutions, both 
legal and technological, that could be employed to deal wi th the current problems of 
digital distribution on the Internet. Chapter 9 w i l l also conclude this paper. 
2. Analogue and Digital Technology 
It is important to give a brief overview o f music and technology to understand the 
present problems being faced by the recording industry. 
By the early 1980s the pre-recorded music market had settled into two main formats -
vinyl records and audio cassettes.6 A l l these were in analogue format and wi th each 
listen the quality o f the music stored on them gradually diminished. 
The introduction o f digital music occurred with the Compact Disc ( 'CD ' ) in 1982. 
The technology that the CD introduced gave the maximum clarity in music 
reproduction. Digital technology means that data is represented in '0s' and ' I s ' , 7 
whereas the principal feature o f analogue representations is that they are continuous. 
Unlike analogue recordings, digital recordings do not diminish in sound quality with 
repeated playing. 
At that time, a consumer wanting to own a copy o f a popular song could either buy it 
on v inyl , cassette or CD, or duplicate a friend's copy on an analogue cassette 
recorder. Such analogue home duplication was not considered much o f a threat at 
5 See William Sloan Coats, et al., Streaming Into The Future: Music And Video Online, 20 Loy. L.A. 
Ent. L . Rev. 285 (2000) at 286. 
6 RIAA, Audio Technologies - The Digital Age <http://www.riaa.org/Audio-History-3.cfm>. 
7 Webopedia, Digital <http://www.webopedia.eom/TERM/d/digital.html>. 
8 Webopedia, Analog <http://www.webopedia.eom/TERM/A/analog.html>. 
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that time. Analogue duplication techniques lead to degradation in quality, strongly 
noticeable when compared to the pristine digital sound o f the C D . 9 
The then recently introduced CDs were not equipped wi th any kind o f copy 
protection technology to protect against the unauthorised copying and distribution o f 
copyrighted music. What the recording industry at the time did not realise was that 
the large scale influx o f digital music in the CD format, without the appropriate copy 
protection technology, would in the future pose a serious threat. 
Indeed, the complacency o f the recording industry was soon replaced by a 'chil ly 
fear' when in 1987 manufacturers introduced Digital Audio Tape ( ' D A T ' ) . 1 0 This 
took digital technology one step further. Not only did i t allow music to be stored in a 
digital format, like the CD, but it also allowed a consumer to reproduce music in a 
digital format. Consequently allowing a consumer to create "a flawless reproduction 
o f the crystal clear sound contained on a CD, wi th no quality lost f rom generation to 
generation". 1 1 
Fortunately for the recording industry, the D A T did not go over well wi th consumers, 
settling only into a small niche among professional musicians and sound engineers. 
Two years later, Sony's marketing campaign for a new 'recordable' digital "mini 
disc" similarly flopped, showing that consumers were not quite ready to overhaul 
their music collections again wi th yet another format. 1 2 
To most it seemed that "the angel o f music piracy had passed over the music industry, 
leaving business undisturbed". 1 3 In reality, the worst had yet to come. 
3. The Digital Revolution and The Internet 
During this time computers were becoming increasingly popular. Computers are 
programmable electronic machines based upon digital technology that respond to 
9 Robert T. Baker, Finding A Winning Strategy Against The MP3 Invasion: Supplemental Measures 
The Recording Industry Must Take To Curb Online Piracy, 8 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 1 (2000) at 2. 
1 0 RIAA, Audio Technologies - The Digital Age <http://www.riaa.org/Audio-History-3.cfm>. 
" Robert T. Baker, op.cit at 3. 
1 2 Barry Fox, Big Screen To Little Disc, London Times, August 19, 1994. 
1 3 Robert T. Baker, op.cit at 4. 
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instructions and execute programs. They are generally classified by their size and 
power, and a small, single-user computer based on a microprocessor is called a 
Personal Computer ( 'PC') . 1 5 It was the PC that was becoming increasingly popular 
for individual home users and was being used for such things as word-processing, 
accounting, spreadsheets and playing games.1 6 
In the early 1990s, the rise o f another technology was increasing the popularity o f 
PCs - the Internet. The Internet is "a global network connecting millions o f 
computers". 1 7 For the first 20 years or so it saw only esoteric use until Internet 
Service Providers ('ISPs') such as America Online made it more accessible to 
consumers.1 8 
Essentially, the Internet allows for the transfer o f digital files. These transfers create 
exact copies o f the original and can be digitally delivered to thousands o f Internet 
users wi th a few clicks o f the mouse. 
Another major event in the proliferation o f the Internet was the creation o f the World 
Wide Web (the 'web'). The web was invented by T i m Berners-Lee in 1989 and 
presented a more user-friendly way to use the Internet. 1 9 It allows for a system of 
documents, formatted in a script called HyperText Markup Language, that "supports 
•yn. 
links to other documents, as well as graphics, audio, and video files". 
A l l this made the Internet very popular and by 1994, users could easily manipulate 
Internet interfaces such as e-mail, the web, and Bulletin Board Systems to exchange 
digital files wi th one another. It did not take these users long to start illegally 
• 71 
exchanging intellectual property, inducing copyright holders into litigation. 
While such litigation illustrated how easily the Internet could be used to pirate text 
and graphics, musical copyright holders could still rest easily. By late 1995, the 
1 4 Webopedia, Computer <http://www.webopedia.eom/TERM/c/computer.html>. 
1 5 ibid. 
1 6 Webopedia, Personal Computer <http://www.webopedia.eom/TERM/P/personal_computer.html>. 
1 7 Webopedia, Internet <http://www.webopedia.eom/TERM/I/Intemet.html>. 
1 8 <http://www.aol.com/>. 
1 9 World Wide Web Consortium, Tim Berners-Lee <http://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/>. 
2 0 Webopedia, World Wide Web <http://ww.webopedia.eom/TERM/W/World_Wide_Web.htrnl>. 
2 1 e.g. see Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
5 
Introduction 
fastest modem would have taken hours to transmit a pop-song-length digital sound 
fi le taken o f f o f a standard audio CD. This was an inconvenience to even the most 
patient o f infringers. 2 2 
So for the time being large-scale digital music piracy remained thwarted, not by the 
law, but by the steep time and cost o f downloading data on the Internet. 
4. The MP3 Music Format 
In their search for a more efficient and practical song swapping method "online 
audiophiles soon disinterred a long-lost treasure".2 3 
In 1988, representatives from several international corporate and academic 
organisations founded the Moving Picture Experts Group ( 'MPEG') , a working group 
in charge o f "the development o f standards for coded representation o f digital audio 
and video". 2 4 This group has developed many multimedia standards since. 
The German engineering firm Fraunhofer IIS-A, concentrating on audio files, then 
developed the most advanced format in the series - MPEG 1, Audio Layer 3 - more 
notoriously known as ' M P 3 ' . 2 5 By eliminating 'noise' supposedly imperceptible by 
the human ear, MP3 is able to compress the digital music on an audio CD at a 12:1 
ratio. The result is a near CD-quality digital sound file at a fraction o f its original 
size. 
The rediscovery o f MP3 in the late nineties coincided wi th a widespread increase in 
Internet connection speed.2 6 Homes, businesses, libraries and universities were 
adopting faster internet connections. This combined wi th the fact that MP3 is an 
open, non-proprietary standard meant that anyone could use the MP3 compression 
format to compress their music files and rapidly transmit them over the Internet. 
Robert T. Baker, op.cit at 5. 
2 3 ibid at 5. 
2 4 MPEG, The MPEG Home Page <http://mpeg.telecomitalialab.com/>. 
2 5 Fraunhofer Institute for Integrated Circuits IIS - Applied Electronics, MPEG Audio Layer-3 
<http://www.iis.frauiJiofer.de/amm/techinf/layer3/index.htnil>. 
2 6 Robert T. Baker, op.cit at 6. 
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The recording industry wasn't so fortunate this time, and neither consumer trends nor 
technical obstacles would save them. Consequently, the MP3 compression format 
soon became the online audiophile's preferred method of distribution. 
5. The Recording Industry 
A. The Structure 
Traditionally, the sale of music to consumers has been dominated by a small group of 
large record labels that sell directly to large retailers or through large distributors to 
local retailers. This small group controls approximately eighty-percent o f the popular 
music industry and is known as the ' B i g Five' . 
The ' B i g Five' consists o f B M G Entertainment, E M I Group, Sony Music, Universal 
Music Group, and Warner Music Group. These labels possess the money and 
marketing resources necessary to promote established talent and to introduce new 
artists to the marketplace. 
However, even the largest record label has practical limits on its ability to discover 
and support new artists. As a result, many talented musicians never have their music 
published or promoted by an established record company. The smaller 'independent' 
record labels provide an alternative way for new artists to record and distribute their 
music. 
Overall, the music industry is enormous and a very valuable business. On a world-
wide basis, the value o f recorded music sales in 2001 was US$33.7 b i l l i on . 2 7 These 
numbers are expected to increase with the proliferation o f legitimate Internet music 
distribution. 
B. The Recording Industry Association of America 
The Recording Industry Association o f America ( ' R I A A ' ) is a not-for-profit trade 
group formed f i f t y years ago to foster a business and legal climate that supports and 
7 
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promotes its "members' creative and financial v i ta l i ty" . 2 8 The R I A A represents the 
Big Five, as well as 250 smaller labels. Its members are responsible for producing 
approximately ninety percent o f all albums released in the United States.29 
The R I A A , as a trade group, also helps fight against piracy. Indeed, traditional piracy 
is a very large concern. The value o f the global pirate market in 2001 was estimated 
to be US$4.3 b i l l i on . 3 0 Furthermore, according to the International Federation o f the 
Phonographic Industry ( 'IFPF) the global pirate music market totalled 1.9 bil l ion 
units in 2001. This means that almost 40% o f all CDs and cassettes sold around the 
globe are pirated copies - the highest proportion ever recorded by IFPI . 3 1 
As such it seems that the recording industry has every reason to be concerned about 
music piracy. 
6. Music and The Internet Today 
A. Music and the Internet 
Today, PCs, the Internet and MP3s are as popular as ever. It was estimated that the 
one billionth PC was shipped in Apr i l 2002. 3 2 It took 25 years to reach this 
milestone, and the same companies that reported this achievement believe that the 
next bil l ion computers w i l l sell in just six years - less than a quarter o f the time it 
took to sell the first bil l ion. 
The popularity o f the Internet has also reached a significant level. It was estimated 
that the number o f Internet users has reached over 600 mil l ion world-wide, and this 
figure is set to increase as more people come to grips with computer technology. 3 3 
With the advent o f broadband technology and its increasing accessibility, the speed o f 
BBC News, Global music sales drop, 16 April, 2002 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/entertainment/music/1932344.stm>. 
2 8 RIAA, About Us - Who We Are <http://www.riaa.org/About-Who.cfm>. 
2 9 ibid. 
3 0 IFPI, Music Piracy Report 2002 <http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/antipiracy/piracy2002.html>. 
3 1 ibid. 
3 2 Intel, Intel Celebrates The Industry's 1 Billionth PC 
<http://www.intel.coni/pressroom/archive/releases/20020701corp.htm>. 
3 3 Nua Internet, How Many Online? <http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/index.html>. 
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Internet connections is set to increase further to phenomenal speeds. In turn meaning 
that downloading a file would take less time. 
Al l - in-a l l these factors mean that people are using the Internet more, and are able to 
do a lot more with their PCs. After the rediscovery o f MP3, this for some time now 
has included using their PCs and Internet connections to pursue their musical 
interests, and both the facilities and opportunities are readily available. 
PCs now come with CD-ROM drives and soundcards as standard. These allow a user 
to play and listen to standard audio CDs on their machines. Furthermore, using 
software freely available on the Internet a user can copy music stored on an audio CD 
to a digital music file on the hard-drive o f their PC. 3 4 This process is colloquially 
called ' r ipp ing ' . 3 5 The digital music fi le can then be compressed using the MP3 
compression format and digitally transmitted to others over the Internet or uploaded 
to a web site f rom which visitors can download the MP3 fi le . 
Once downloaded a MP3 can be played back on the PC using MP3 player software. 
Furthermore, once a MP3 file has been stored on the user's hard-drive, it can be 
copied onto an audio CD using readily available CD-writer drives. This process is 
colloquially called 'burning' and 'burning software' is freely available on the 
Internet. 3 6 
This ability to transfer music fast, efficiently and so readily has led to a very popular 
and thriving movement o f music distribution on the Internet mainly in the MP3 
format. Software, often available free o f charge, has helped enable the MP3 standard 
to quickly establish itself as the preferred format o f online music web sites. 
Furthermore, like CDs, MP3 files do not contain copyright management information. 
Thus, there is no restriction on its use in the copying or distribution o f recordings. 
The problem however, is that most o f the MP3 files available on the Internet are not 
authorised for such use. 
3 4 e.g. a free Windows program called Musicmatch Jukebox allows one to rip music from a CD onto a 
PC <http://www.musicmatch.com/>. 
35 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) {"Napster IIF) at 1011. 
3 6 Webopedia, Burn <http://www.webopedia.eom/TERM/B/burn.html>. 
3 7 e.g. see <http:// software, www.mp3.com/software/>. 
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B. Internet Music Piracy 
Before the Internet, consumers who wished to hear a new song or music album at 
home had no choice but to go to a record store and buy it. These purchases allowed 
the copyright owner to control the distribution of the copyrighted works and to 
financially benefit from his or her creation.38 
However, the digital distribution of music over the Internet is threatening to change 
this well-established system.39 Now music enthusiasts are able to transfer MP3 files 
freely without the consent of or payment to the copyright owners. Furthermore, 
because of the lack of regulation of the Internet and the consequential anonymity of 
its use, these audiophiles can freely trade without fear of any repercussions.40 
Whereas the previous physical format of music storage allowed easy control, the 
intangible nature of a digital music file with its lack of any physical transfer means 
that copyright holders can no longer control the use of their music. Consequently, the 
illegal distribution of music on the Internet is a popular phenomena. 
True rates of Internet music piracy are hard to estimate because Internet piracy is a 
covert illegal activity that often goes undetected. Even with the unreliable nature of 
the statistics on Internet piracy, two things are certain - Internet piracy is happening 
and it is costing the Big Five handsomely.41 
The IFPI estimates there are approximately 200,000 Internet sites hosting or linking 
to some 100 million unauthorised recorded music files. 4 2 Further, it was estimated 
that in 2001, approximately 99% of music files available online were unauthorised. 
Accordingly, Internet piracy is a valid concern for copyright owners and law-makers. 
The RIAA has expended substantial energy over the last few years to identify and 
combat Internet-based music piracy. One of the RIAA's more aggressive anti-
3 8 The Economist, The Big Five Hit the Web, May 8, 1999 at 63. 
3 9 William Sloan Coats, et al., op.cit at 285. 
4 0 The Internet has a decentralised structure therefore regulation is difficult. 
4 1 RIAA, Ant>Piracy - Introduction <http://www.riaa.org/Protect-Online-l.cfm>. 
4 2 IFPI, Music Piracy Report 2002 <http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/antipiracy/piracy2002.html>. 
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Internet-piracy strategies, has been to send thousands of cease-and-desist letters to 
sites containing unauthorised musical works available to download.43 However, as a 
result of campaigns like this illegal sound recordings are becoming harder to find. 
7. Legitimate Online Music Distribution 
For sometime now the Internet has been used to buy and sell a variety of goods and 
services. This is no less so for the buying and selling of music mainly in audio CD 
format. Instead of visiting a music store on the high street, there are currently 
hundreds of music retail sites that allow consumers to purchase CDs from the 
convenience of their armchair. One of the most popular being Amazon.com.44 
However, this has not particularly posed any new problems for the music industry. 
Even though this music is being sold on the Internet it still involves the physical sale 
of a legitimate audio CD which is subsequently delivered to the consumer's home 
address. In essence it is no different from phoning your local music store and asking 
them to deliver to you a copy of the latest Tupac Shakur album. 
Al l the controversy however arises from the use of the Internet to illegally transmit 
music in a digital file such as MP3. Putting these piracy issues aside, the legitimate 
online distribution of music does have great potential and many advantages. The 
Internet provides artists with another avenue to disseminate their works while also 
enabling consumers to sample various recordings with ease.45 
Unfortunately, the record companies have resisted the new techniques for producing 
and distributing music, and while they hold out the situation worsens for them. To 
the Big labels, MP3 and online distribution seems like risky business but to the 
smaller, independent labels it is almost like a 'godsend'. 
Independent labels and artists favour the use of the MP3 technology. MP3s are a 
convenient way for unknown artists to get their music out for people to hear.46 It 
4 3 Marc Pollack, RIAA Says It's Crashing Net's Illegal Music Sites, Hollywood Reporter, August 18, 
1999, at 13. 
4 4 <http://www.amazon.com>. 
4 5 Paul Veravanich, op.cit at 435. 
4 6 The Economist, A Note of Fear, October 31, 1998, at 68. 
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gives them a voice among the giants so that they can be heard without being 
overshadowed by the big recording labels and stars.47 MP3 gives unknown bands, 
which have little or no chance of making it with the big labels, an opportunity to 
make it by themselves. 
Overall, this phenomenon of online music distribution has the recording industry 
worried. While several have embraced this new technology as a way of promoting 
unknown or unsigned bands, many artists oppose this technology because it enables 
Internet piracy and deprives artists of control over the reproduction and distribution 
of their music. Providing their music in an unsecured digital audio file format for 
others to distribute and copy just seems to encourage piracy. 
Regardless, it seems that the legitimate online distribution of music is big business 
and wil l substantially increase over the next few years. Indeed, it has been estimated 
that legitimate downloaded music wil l be worth US$635 million by 2005.4 9 
4 7 The Economist, The Big Five Hit the Web, May 8, 1999, at 64. 
4 8 Reuters, Big Label Embraces MP3, Wired News, November 4, 1998 
<http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,16034,00.htrnl>. 
4 9 Bloomberg News, Report: Net music sales to hit $5.2 billion in 2005, CNET News.com, November 
23, 1999 <http://news.com.com/2100-1023-233444.html>. 
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Chapter 2 - Copyright Law and the Digital Age 
"The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers ".1 
In order to explore and analyse the cases in the MP3 trilogy, a brief overview of the 
relevant law and other developments is required. 
1. Background 
Despite the ease of music piracy on the Internet, copyright holders are not naked and 
completely unprotected. They do have some legal protection, "but the efficacy of that 
legal protection is in question". The only legal recourse available to copyright 
holders, comes from the United States Copyright Act 1976 ( 'CA') . 3 
2. Basic rights 
The statutory framework for copyright law grants copyright holders a bundle of 
valuable rights in regards to their work. The exclusive rights that copyright holders 
possess include the right to reproduce the work, the right to prepare derivative works, 
the right to distribute copies of the work, the right to perform the work publicly, the 
right to display the copyrighted work publicly, and the right to perform sound 
recordings by means of a digital audio transmission.4 
Copyright protection subsists "in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device".5 
' Dick the Butcher in William Shakespeare's King Henry VI, Part 2, Act 4, Scene 2. 
2 Kristine J. Hoffman, Fair Use Or Fair Game? The Internet, Mp3 And Copyright Law, 11 Alb. L.J. 
Sci. &Tech. 153 (2000) at 163. 
3 17 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. Unless otherwise stated all references to legislation in this thesis are to the 
Copyright Law of the United States of America and Related Laws Contained in Title 17 of the United 
States Code. 
4 § 106. 
5 § 102(a). 
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With respect to music, works of authorship includes musical works, including any 
accompanying words, dramatic works, including any accompanying music, motion 
pictures and other audio-visual works, and sound recordings.6 Therefore, a recorded 
song involves two distinct copyrights. The musical work copyright protects the 
music and lyrics themselves, whereas the sound recording copyright protects a 
specific recording of the song. 
Fixation occurs when the embodiment of a work "is sufficiently permanent or stable 
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of 
more than transitory duration".7 This definition is wide enough to cover music stored 
on CDs and in the MP3 format. 
3. Infringement 
Section 501(a) CA prescribes that a copyright is infringed when any of the copyright 
holder's exclusive rights are violated. There are three basic forms of copyright 
infringement; direct, contributory and vicarious liability. 
A. Direct Liability 
An individual is directly liable for copyright infringement i f he has copied material 
8 * 
protected by a valid copyright. To establish copyright infringement, two elements 
must be proved: "(1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) copying of constituent 
elements of the work that are original".9 It is the copyright owner's burden to prove 
this, though he does not need to prove the defendant's intent or knowledge of the 
infringement.10 
There are two major exceptions to direct copyright infringement, the common law 
'fair use doctrine' and the Audio Home Recording Act. 
6 § 102(a)(2), (3), (6), (7). 
7 § 101. 
8 See Donna M. Lampert et al., Overview of Internet Legal and Regulatory Issues, Prac. L. Inst., 544 
PLI/Pat 179 (1998) at 223. 
9 Feist Publishing Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) at 361. 
1 0 Jennifer E. Markiewicz, Seeking Shelter From The Mp3 Storm: How Far Does The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act Online Service Provider Liability Limitation Reach?, 7 Commlaw 
Conspectus 423 (1999) at 427. 
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B. Contributory Liability 
Contributory liability "originates in tort law and stems from the notion that one who 
directly contributes to another's infringement should be held accountable".11 A party 
is contributorily liable, i f it has knowledge or reason to know of the infringing 
1") 
conduct of another, and induced, caused, or materially contributed to this conduct. 
Contributory infringement can be based on personal conduct that forms part of or 
furthers the infringement, or the contribution of machinery or goods that provide the 
means to infringe. In the absence of a physical product that is the subject of the 
alleged infringement, "the extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third 
party's means of infringement" is considered. The greater the degree of control, the 
greater the likelihood that contributory infringement wi l l be found. 
For example, in Fonovisa swap meet operators were held contributorily liable for the 
infringing activities of independent vendors who were selling copyrighted music 
recordings without permission.14 The direct liability of the vendors was established 
and the court needed to determine whether the operators' participation level was 
enough to warrant contributory infringement. According to the Ninth Circuit, 
providing the site and facilities where the provider knew infringing activity was 
occurring was sufficient to create contributory liability. Though this case did not 
involve the Internet, it has influenced the legal analysis of contributory liability on the 
web. 1 5 
An important limitation on a claim of contributory liability is the 'staple article of 
commerce' doctrine. 
11 Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Fonovisa") at 264. 
12 Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971) 
("Gershwin") at 1162. 
13 Lockheed Martin v. Network Solutions, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999) at 984. 
14 Fonovisa. 
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C. Vicarious Liability 
Vicarious liability for copyright infringement is imposed where the defendant has the 
right and ability to control the infringer's actions and receives a direct financial 
benefit.16 
Unlike contributory liability, vicarious liability may be imposed even i f a defendant 
has no direct knowledge of the infringing activity.1 7 The courts have developed the 
concept of vicarious liability in an effort to "fashion a principle for enforcing 
copyrights against a defendant whose economic interests were intertwined with the 
direct infringer's, but who did not actually employ the direct infringer". 1 8 
An example of vicarious liability is what was done by Cherry Auction in Fonovisa. 
The Fonovisa court found Cherry Auction to be vicariously liable in addition to 
having engaged in contributory infringement because it "promoted the swap meet and 
controlled the access of customers to the swap meet area".19 Furthermore, Cherry 
Auction derived "substantial financial benefits from admission fees, concession stand 
sales and parking fees, all of which flow directly from customers who want to buy the 
counterfeit recordings at bargain basement prices".20 
4. Fair use 
When someone other than the copyright holder makes fair use of the work, the 
copyright owner's exclusive rights do not preclude the infringement. As long as a 
person uses the work in a reasonable manner, such as for criticism, teaching, or 
research, the infringement is proper and legal. Once the copyright holder proves an 
infringement, the defendant may assert the fair use defence. 
1 5 See Timothy L. Skelton, Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for a 
Negotiated Rulemaking Alternative, 35 San Diego L.Rev. 219 (1998) at 252. 
1 6 See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom, 907 F.Supp 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Netcom") at 1368. 
1 7 Ariel Berschadsky, RIAA v. Napster: A Window Onto The Future Of Copyright Law In The Internet 
Age, 18 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 755 (2000) at 766. 
18 Fonovisa at 262. 
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Section 107 CA provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that one should consider 
when determining i f the reproduction of a copyrighted work is a fair use. These 
factors include: 
"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work". 2 1 
The fair use factors are interrelated and are not to be "treated in isolation, one from 
another. A l l are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the 
purposes of copyright".22 In addition, no greater weight should be given to any one 
factor over the others. I f the copies are used for a commercial purpose, that is, the 
infringer is making copies to earn a profit, a presumption against fair use arises. 
A determination of fair use is made on a case-by-case basis. In addition to those who 
serve the public interest, home users have also been allowed the fair use of 
copyrighted works in certain circumstances. For example, in Sony Corporation of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that 
the time-delayed video taping of television programs by home consumers constituted 
fair use.23 
5. The Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine 
The doctrine of 'substantial non-infringing use' or the 'staple article of commerce' 
doctrine was first applied to copyright law in the landmark Supreme Court case of 
Sony.24 
2 1 §107. 
22 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) ("CampbeW) at 578. 
23 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) ("Sony") at 449-50. 
24 Sony. 
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The Sony case involved a dispute between Sony, manufacturers of Betamax 
machines, and the motion picture industry. These Betamax machines used 
VideoCassette Recorder ('VCR') technology to allow users to record television 
broadcasts onto magnetic tapes. The motion picture industry was tremendously 
concerned with the advent of this technology, fearing their revenues would be 
destroyed i f consumers could so readily copy televised broadcasts. Rather than 
pursue the individual infringers, however, the motion picture industry elected to 
pursue a contributory infringement claim against Sony. 
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, invoked the 'staple article of 
commerce' doctrine to find that the makers of VCRs were not contributorily 
infringing the copyrights of the movie industry. The Supreme Court first reviewed 
the case law on contributory and vicarious copyright infringement, and found no prior 
case imposing liability based solely on the sale of equipment that customers might 
use to infringe. 
United States patent law, in contrast, specifically contemplates such liability, but 
exempts any staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-
infringing use. The Supreme Court found the rationale behind this rule applicable 
to the copyright context and thus extended the 'staple article of commerce' doctrine 
to copyright law. 
The Supreme Court in Sony also held that unauthorised 'time-shifting' - the 
recording of television broadcasts for later home viewing - constituted a fair use 
under copyright law. 2 6 Accordingly, because the VCR had a "substantial 
noninfringing use", the Supreme Court held that Sony was not contributorily 
infringing the copyrights of the movie industry.27 
One important by-product of the Sony decision was that copyright holders would 
have a difficult time bringing a successful contributory infringement action against 
manufacturers of copying technology that has a substantially non-infringing 'fair 
use'. 
2 5 3 5 U.S.C. § 271(c). 
26 Sony at 447-56. 
2 7 ibid at 442. 
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6. The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 
A. Background 
Copyright law worked well at protecting the music industry's rights until technology 
began to make it easier for the average person to copy original recordings. When US 
copyright law was written in 1976, records and eight tracks were the only form of 
recordings available to the public. Without the aid of expensive equipment a person 
could not copy the music. 
Soon after companies developed technology such as the DAT that enabled consumers 
to make digital copies of audio recordings.28 Unlike the previous analogue tape 
technology, digital recording technology presented a serious threat to the music 
industry. 
The recording industry feared that the availability of inexpensive, near-perfect copies 
of musical recordings would discourage consumers from purchasing legitimate 
recordings and encourage music piracy. As such, the recording industry knew that 
products like the DAT could severely diminish the revenues of the music 
corporations and the royalties of the artists. 
29 
The record companies responded by suing Sony, a manufacturer of the DAT. The 
parties eventually settled and in response to industry lobbying for protection from this 
new threat, the US Congress created and enacted the Audio Home Recording Act 
( 'AHRA') embodied in Chapter 10 of the CA. 3 0 The AHRA was signed into law on 
October 28 1992 and attempted to make the law more applicable to modern 
technology. 
See Chapter 1. 
See Cahn v. Sony Corp., 90 Civ. 4537 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
§ 1001. 
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B. Ambit 
To be subject to the AHRA, a device must be a 'digital audio recording device,' 
which the AHRA defines through a set of nested definitions. 
The AHRA first defines a 'digital audio recording device' as "any machine or device 
of a type commonly distributed to individuals for use by individuals, whether or not 
included with or as part of some other machine or device, the digital recording 
function of which is designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is 
capable of, making a digital audio copied recording for private use ...". 3 1 
A 'digital audio copied recording' is defined as "a reproduction in a digital recording 
format of a digital musical recording, whether that reproduction is made directly from 
IT 
another digital musical recording or indirectly from a transmission". 
The AHRA defines a 'digital musical recording' as "a material object (i) in which are 
fixed, in a digital recording format, only sounds, and material, statements, or 
instructions incidental to those fixed sounds, i f any, and (ii) from which the sounds 
and material can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated, either directly 
or with the aid of a machine or device".33 
A 'digital musical recording' does not include: "a material object - (i) in which the 
fixed sounds consist entirely of spoken word recordings, or (ii) in which one or more 
computer programs are fixed, except that a digital recording may contain statements 
of instructions constituting the fixed sounds and incidental material, and statements or 
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in order to bring about the perception, 
reproduction, or communication of the fixed sounds and incidental material".34 
3 1 § 1001(3). 
3 2 § 1001(1). 
3 3 § 1001(5)(A). 
§ 1001(5)(B). 
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C. Purpose 
The US Congress's passage of the AHRA "lent more definition" to the 'fair use' 
doctrine.35 The AHRA also provides broad immunity from civil actions alleging 
copyright infringement. It provides that: 
"No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based 
on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio device, a digital 
audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog recording medium, 
or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a device or medium for 
making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings".36 
This language effectively immunises manufacturers or importers of devices which 
fall under the AHRA from any direct or contributory infringement claims under any 
copyright provision outside the AHRA. Furthermore, it resolves the prior uncertainty 
regarding the legal ramifications of home taping. 
The AHRA effectively prohibits the importation, manufacture, or distribution of 
'digital audio recording devices' unless two requirements are met. First, a 'digital 
audio recording device' must employ a Serial Copyright Management System. 
Second, any person importing, distributing, or manufacturing a 'digital audio 
recording device' must pay a royalty for each device sold. 
D. Serial Copyright Management System 
The AHRA delineates defence mechanisms to copying digital recordings. In order to 
prevent non-copyright holders from infringing upon the exclusive rights of the 
copyright holder, the law requires the incorporation of a Serial Copy Management 
System ('SCMS') or equivalent into every 'digital audio recording device' that is 
imported, manufactured or distributed.37 Such a system must send, receive, and act 
Ariel Berschadsky, op.cit at 765. 
§ 1008. 
See § 1002(a). 
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upon information about the generation and copyright status of the files that the digital 
audio recording device plays. 
This means that every 'digital audio recording device' sold must in some way inhibit 
or regulate the copying of recordings from duplicates of original recordings. More 
simply, once one copy is made of the original, the recording device should not allow 
copies to be made from that copy. In theory this regulates the copying and illegal 
distribution of digital audio recordings. 
E. Mandatory Royalty Payments 
As copyright law allows a person to make one copy of an original work for back-up 
purposes, the recording industry sought additional safe guards against piracy, fearing 
that the provision of the law would be abused and that it would not be protected from 
piracy at a l l . 4 0 
As a result, the AHRA contains a provision requiring the mandatory payment of 
royalties for every 'digital audio recording device' manufactured or sold.4 1 
7. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
A. Background 
When the Internet began its dramatic increase in popularity, digital music had existed 
in the form of CDs for nearly a decade. In addition, the enactment of the AHRA 
produced a satisfactory answer to the debates over home recording using the newly 
introduced DAT. However, Congress and the music industry failed to foresee the 
extensive role that the PC and the Internet would play in the recording and playback 
of music. 
3 8 See § 1002(a)(2). 
3 9 Kristine J. Hoffman, op.cit at 167. 
4 0 See Jason Chervokas, Internet CD Copying Tests Music Industry, N.Y. Times, April 6, 1998 at D3. 
4 1 See§ 1003-1007. 
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This continued expansion of the Internet brought ISPs increasingly into conflict with 
copyright holders. "Unless copyright law was modernized, growth of the Internet 
would be hampered because ISPs could not constantly police the huge amount of 
information that is stored or passes through their networks".42 
In response to this situation, in 1998 the US Congress passed the Online Copyright 
Infringement Liability Limitation Act, which was incorporated as Title I I of the 
Digital Millenium Copyright Act ( 'DMCA'). The DMCA was signed into law on 
October 28 1998 and amended the CA to implement the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation ('WIPO') Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty. 
A detailed analysis of the DMCA is beyond the scope of this paper, but a brief 
overview of the relevant sections is justified. 4 3 
B. Ambit 
Title I I retains the traditional elements required to prove copyright infringement. 
However, an ISP found to be contributorily or vicariously liable for copyright 
infringement can avoid monetary penalties and will not have its operations shut down 
i f it can prove that its activities are protected under Title I I . 
The only penalty that can be imposed on such an ISP is a narrow injunction to block 
access to individual infringing users.44 In determining whether or not to impose an 
injunction, the court must weigh the financial burden of the ISP against the harm 
suffered by the copyright owner i f no action is taken to remove the infringing 
material or activity.4 5 
An ISP proves that it merits Title I I limited liability protection by demonstrating that 
it is, in fact, a 'service provider' as defined by the statute, and also that it engages in 
at least one of four protected functions detailed in subsections 512(a)-(d). 
4 2 Ariel Berschadsky, op.cit at 767. 
4 3 For a more detailed analysis of the DMCA see Jennifer E. Markiewicz, op.cit. 
4 4 § 512(j)(l)(B). 
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1. Title I I Service Provider Status 
The DMCA provides two definitions for a 'service provider'. For purposes of the 
first safe harbour under subsection 512(a), a 'service provider' is any "entity offering 
the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online 
communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the 
user's choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or 
received".46 
The definition is broader for the next three safe harbours detailed under subsections 
512(b)-(d). For these safe harbours "the term 'service provider' means a provider of 
online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor", and includes 
a service provider under the first safe harbour.47 
2. Title I I Functional Safe Harbours 
(a) Subsection 512(a) - Transitory Digital Network Communications 
Subsection 512(a) limits liability "for infringement of copyright by reason of the 
provider's transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, material through a 
system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, or by reason 
of the intermediate and transient storage of that material in the course of such 
transmitting, routing, or providing connections".48 
This protection is only available if, "(1) the transmission of the material was initiated 
by or at the direction of a person other than the service provider; (2) the transmission, 
routing, provision of connections, or storage is carried out through an automatic 
technical process without selection of the material by the service provider; (3) the 
service provider does not select the recipients of the material except as an automatic 
response to the request of another person; (4) no copy of the material made by the 
service provider in the course of such intermediate or transient storage is maintained 
§512(j)(2)(A)-(D). 
§ 512(k)(l)(A). 
§ 512(k)(l)(B). 
§ 512(a). 
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on the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than 
anticipated recipients, and no such copy is maintained on the system or network in a 
manner ordinarily accessible to such anticipated recipients for a longer period than is 
reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing, or provision of connections; and 
(5) the material is transmitted through the system or network without modification of 
its content"4 9 
(b) Subsection 512(b) - System Caching 
Limited liability is granted to a service provider that temporarily stores material on its 
servers in order to provide quick and easy access by its users.50 In order to qualify for 
this form of limited liability, the service provider must subject its users to the same 
conditions of access as the originating site would have imposed.51 The service 
provider must also meet a number of other conditions to be able to qualify for the 
52 
system caching limited liability. 
(c) Subsection 512(c) - Information Residing on Systems or Networks at Direction of 
Users 
Limited liability is granted to a service provider that stores copyright infringing 
material on its system at the behest of a third party, as long as the service provider: 
(1) does not have actual knowledge or awareness that the material is infringing; (2) 
upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness acts expeditiously to remove, or disable 
access to, the information; (3) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable 
to the infringing activity; and (4) upon receiving notification of the infringing activity 
or information, responds expeditiously to remove or disable access to the relevant 
material.53 
4 y §512(a)( l ) - (5) . 
5 0 § 512(b)(l)-(2). 
5 1 § 512(b)(2)(D). 
5 2 § 512(b)(2). 
5 3 § 512(c)(1). 
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(d) Subsection 512(d) - Information Location Tools 
Information location tools are essential to the operation of the Internet because 
without them, users would not be able to find the information they need. In an effort 
to promote their development, limited liability is granted to a service provider 
"referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing material or 
infringing activity, by using information location tools, including a directory, index, 
reference, pointer, or hypertext link". 5 4 
This is only i f the service provider: 
"(1)(A) does not have actual knowledge that the material or activity is infringing; 
(B) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(C) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access to, the material; 
(2) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, 
in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such 
activity; and 
(3) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in subsection (c)(3), 
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to 
be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity, except that, for purposes of 
this paragraph, the information described in subsection (c)(3)(A)(iii) shall be 
identification of the reference or link, to material or activity claimed to be infringing, 
that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably 
sufficient to permit the service provider to locate that reference or l ink". 5 5 
3. Independent Analysis of Functions 
The DMCA provides that a service provider's functions must be analysed 
independently. Referring to section 512, subsection 512(n) of the DMCA states: 
5 4 § 512(d). 
5 5 § 5 1 2 ( d ) ( l ) - ( 3 ) . 
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"Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) describe separate and distinct functions for purposes 
of applying this section. Whether a service provider qualifies for the limitation on 
liability in any one of those subsections shall be based solely on the criteria in that 
subsection and shall not affect a determination of whether that service provider 
qualifies for the limitations on liability under any other such subsections".56 
4. Threshold Requirements for Service Providers 
For a service provider to benefit from any of the four liability limitations created by 
the DMCA, the service provider must meet the threshold requirements. 
A service provider must ensure it "(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and 
informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network 
of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of 
subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network who are 
repeat infringers; and (B) accommodates and does not interfere with standard 
technical measures".57 
8. The Stage Is Set 
As both the relevant background and law has been detailed the stage is now set to 
start exploring the cases in the 'MP3 Trilogy'. 
§ 5 1 2 ( n ) . 
§ 5 1 2 ( i ) ( l ) . 
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The R I A A and Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. 
- The RIAA and Diamond Multimedia Systems, 
A "case involving the intersection of computer technology, the Internet, and music 
listening"} 
1. The Facts 
Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. ('Diamond') is a manufacturer of computer 
products, "specializing in products to improve multimedia, audio, graphics, video, 
and communications uses of personal computers".2 Towards the end of 1998, 
Diamond was manufacturing and intending to distribute a device called the Rio PMP 
300 ('Rio'). 
The Rio was a battery-operated, "lightweight, hand-held device, capable of receiving, 
storing, and re-playing digital audio file stored on the hard drive of a personal 
computer".3 These digital audio files needed to be in the MP3 format.4 Once the Rio 
had received a digital audio file, the device could be detached from the PC and used 
separately to play back the digital audio files. 
In 1999, the Rio player sold for US$200.5 Prior to the invention of devices like the 
Rio, MP3 users had little option other than to listen to their downloaded digital audio 
files through headphones or speakers at their PCs, playing them from their hard 
drives. The Rio effectively rendered these files portable. 
More precisely, once an audio file had been downloaded onto a computer hard drive 
from the Internet or some other source, separate software provided with the Rio, 
called 'Rio Manager', allowed the user to further download the file to the Rio through 
1 Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d 
1072 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Diamond IF) at 1073. 
2 Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 29 F.Supp.2d 
624 (C.D.Cal 1998) ("Diamond F) at 625. 
3 Diamond I at 625. 
4 See Chapter 1. 
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a parallel port cable that plugged the Rio into the PC. The Rio device was incapable 
of effecting such a transfer and of receiving audio files from anything other than a PC 
equipped with Rio Manager. 
It is important to note that the Rio played back the digital audio file through an 
analogue audio signal sent to the headphones and had no digital output capability. 
This meant that the Rio was incapable of passing on any stored digital audio files to 
other devices. 
The Rio device itself contained 32 megabytes of memory, allowing storage of 
approximately 60 minutes of music in the MP3 format. However, the storage 
capacity of the Rio could have been be doubled with the purchase of a removable 
'memory card'. As this 'memory card' was removable, it was possible that a Rio user 
could store music on it and then pass it on to another Rio user. 
2. The Case 
A. The Action 
On October 9 1998 the RIAA filed an action against Diamond. Their obvious 
concern was that devices like the Rio would increase the popularity of unauthorised 
MP3 files. 
The RIAA sought a preliminarily injunction to enjoin the manufacture and 
distribution of the Rio, alleging that it did not meet the requirements of a 'digital 
audio recording device' in the AHRA. Namely, that it did not employ a SCMS that 
sends, receives, and acts upon information about the generation and copyright status 
of the files that it played.6 
Further, the RIAA also sought payment of the royalties owed by Diamond as the 
manufacturer and distributor of a 'digital audio recording device'.7 
Chris St. John, First Hands-On Review of the New Rio MP3 player! 
<http://www.wearablegear.com/reviews/riorev.htm>. 
5 S e e § 1002(a)(2). 
7 See § 1003. 
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B. The Preliminary Injunction 
1. The District Court 
On October 26 1998, the RIAA's motion for a preliminary injunction came on for 
hearing before the United States District Court for the Central District of California. 
First, the District Court held that the Rio was a 'digital audio recording device' under 
the AHRA. Second, the District Court found that the RIAA had not established 
likelihood of success on claims that the Rio device was in violation of AHRA. 
Finally, that in any event any irreparable injury the RIAA might suffer was not as a 
result of any AHRA violation. As such the District Court denied the motion for a 
preliminary injunction. 
2. The Ninth Circuit 
The RIAA brought an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. 
The case was argued and submitted on April 15 1999 and decided on June 15 1999. 
The Ninth Circuit held that the Rio device did not record directly from 'digital music 
recordings,' and that it was not a 'digital audio recording device' because it did not 
reproduce digital music recordings from transmissions. Consequently, the RIAA's 
appeal was dismissed. 
3. The District Court's Discussion 
In determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction against Diamond, the 
District Court first considered RIAA's probability of success on the merits and next 
whether any irreparable injury would be caused to either side. 
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A. The RIAA's Probability of Success on the Merits 
The District Court had no precedent to guide its interpretation of the AHRA, so in 
determining the RIAA's probability of success on the merits, it began its analysis 
with the "familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for 
interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed 
legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as 
conclusive".8 
1. Was the Rio a 'digital audio recording device'? 
For the Rio to fall within the SCMS and the royalty requirements of the AHRA it had 
to be a 'digital audio recording device'. Diamond proposed two theories why the Rio 
was not such a device. 
Diamond's first argument was based on the exclusion in section 1001(5)(B)(ii). For 
the Rio to be a 'digital audio recording device' it had to be capable of making a 
'digital audio copied recording'. A 'digital audio copied recording' is in turn defined 
as "a reproduction in a digital recording format of a digital musical recording".9 
Diamond argued that the exclusion in section 1001(5)(B)(ii) for "material objects...in 
which one or more computer programs are fixed", covered a computer's hard-drive 
and that therefore a computer's hard-drive was excluded from the definition of a 
'digital musical recording'. Consequently, Diamond reasoned that because the source 
of its copy was a computer's hard-drive, the Rio was not capable of making a 'digital 
audio copied recording'. 
Secondly, Diamond argued that the Rio was not a 'digital audio recording device' 
because it did not have a "digital recording function" as required under section 
1001(3). Diamond argued that the Rio had no "digital recording function" because 
unless software on a PC was used to manage the transfer of files, the Rio could not 
record anything. 
8 Continental Cablevision, Inc. v. Poll, 124 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir.1997) at 1048 (quoting Consumer Prod. 
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980) at 108). 
9 § 1001(1). 
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(a) Does the section 1001(5)(B)(ii) exclusion cover a computer's hard-drive? 
With regard to Diamond's first argument, the RIAA argued that the exception in 
section 1001(5)(B)(ii) was not a 'hard-drive exception' as it contented. Instead, 
according to the RIAA it was rather "an exception for computer programs, originally 
designed to clarify that copying of CD-ROMs containing incidental audio tracks is 
not intended to be addressed by the AHRA". 1 0 
The RIAA did not dispute that hard-drives were not subject to the AHRA. However, 
according to the RIAA this exemption did not result from section 1001(5)(B)(ii), but 
rather from the definition of a 'digital audio recording device' in section 1001(3). 
This section effectively excludes from the definition of a 'digital audio recording 
device' a device that does not have as a "primary purpose" the recording of digital 
audio. 
On the other hand, Diamond argued that the section 1001(5)(B)(ii) exclusion was 
unambiguous and that it encompassed not only computer programs on CD-ROM, but 
also hard-drives and other "material objects" including "Zip drives, integrated 
circuits, circuit boards and the like". 1 1 Diamond argued that excluding hard-drives 
from the definition of 'digital musical recording' was part of Congress' intention to 
exclude the PC industry from regulation under the AHRA. 1 2 
The District Court noted that although Diamond's interpretation of section 
1001(5)(B)(ii) had superficial appeal, it was "ultimately unsupported by the 
legislative history and contrary to the spirit and purpose of the AHRA". 1 3 This 
subsequently led the District Court into a discussion of the AHRA's legislative 
history. 
1 0 Plaintiffs' Reply at 12:5-7. 
" Defendant's Opposition at 10:13-16. 
1 2 Defendant's Reply at 11-18:19. 
13 Diamond I at 629. 
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(i) The Legislative History 
The District Court noted that Diamond relied heavily on the declaration of James 
Burger, the former Chairman of the Intellectual Property Committee of the 
Information Industry Council (T IT) , a trade association representing the interests of 
the computer industry. 
Regarding the AHRA, James Burger in his capacity as Chairman of ITI , purported to 
have engaged in direct discussions with representatives of the Consumer Electronics 
Manufacturers Association, RIAA officials, and legislators. James Burger stated that 
it was as a result of these discussion that the section 1001(5)(B)(ii) exclusion covered 
hard-drives.14 In doing this James Burger made reference to Senate Report 102-294. 
The District Court noted that his reference to the legislative history was "not 
persuasive".15 The District Court found that the sentence that James Burger quoted 
from the Senate Report to support Diamond's interpretation of section 1001(5)(B)(ii) 
actually appears in the context of a discussion of section 1001(3), the definition of a 
'digital audio recording device'.1 6 
The District Court went on to explain that the previous paragraph of the Senate 
Report emphasises that the definition of a 'digital audio recording device' makes 
clear that it must be a machine or device that has a recording function designed or 
marketed for the primary purpose of making a 'digital audio copied recording'. 
Consequently, because this language addressed the section 1001(3) definition of 
"primary purpose", rather than the section 1001(5)(B)(ii) definition of "material 
object", the District Court reasoned that James Burger's reference to the passage 
appeared misplaced.17 
The District Court also went on to find that other portions of the legislative history 
supported RIAA's contention that section 1001(5)(B)(ii) was only intended to avoid 
1 4 Burger Declaration 10-11. 
15 Diamond I at 629. 
16 Senate Judiciary Committee, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, Report No. 102-294 (1992) ("Senate 
Report"). 
17 Diamond I at 630. 
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immunising the illegal copying of computer programs. Thus the District Court found 
that this, "albeit far from unequivocal", ultimately suggested "a legislative intent to 
avoid immunizing the illegitimate copying of computer programs from liability for 
copyright infringement".18 
(ii) The Purpose of the AHRA 
More importantly, the District Court found that Diamond's construction of section 
1001(5)(B)(ii) would effectively eviscerate the AHRA. This, the District Court 
explained, was because any 'digital audio recording device' could evade AHRA 
regulation simply by passing the music through a computer and ensuring that the 
MP3 file resided momentarily on the hard-drive. 
The District Court found that Diamond made no attempt to rationalise this result, but 
rather argued that technology had outpaced the AHRA, and that the District Court 
should not re-legislate statutes which failed to anticipate new technology. The 
District Court noted that although the line between "interpretation" and "re-
legislation" was not easily defined, it was sceptical that Congress intended 
Diamond's "counter-intuitive" construction of section 1001(5)(B)(ii).19 
(b) Does the Rio have a "digital recording function"? 
Next, the District Court addressed Diamond's second argument against the Rio being 
a 'digital audio recording device', notably that the Rio had no "digital recording 
function". 
The District Court found that although Diamond did not expressly state it, this 
argument suggested that if a peripheral device was reliant on a PC for any step in the 
recording process, thereby precluding truly "independent" recording, the peripheral 
device would have no "recording function" for the purposes of the AHRA. 2 0 
Diamond I at 630. 
1 9 ibid at 630. 
2 0 ibid at 631. 
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Diamond's argument was premised on a single reference in the legislative history.21 
The District Court noted that aside for this passage, nothing in the legislative history 
even remotely suggested that lack of a completely independent recording function 
removes a device from the purview of the AHRA. 
In fact to the contrary the District Court found that the legislative history established 
that the phrase "recording function" was included to ensure that the primary purpose 
test was only applied to the audio recording function of a device that could record 
audio, video, and multimedia. 
Similarly, the District Court found that nothing in the definition of section 1001(3) 
remotely suggested that a 'digital audio recording device' had to be able to record 
independently from a computer. The AHRA only required that the 'digital audio 
recording device' be "capable of making a.. .recording".22 It did not say 
"independently capable of making recordings". 
As such the District Court noted that Diamond's interpretation of the phrase 
"recording function" was contrary to the purposes of the AHRA. Under Diamond's 
interpretation, any device not capable of truly independent recording would evade 
regulation under the AHRA, even though the device was capable of making digital 
audio reproductions. The District Court held that it was not inclined to undermine 
the entire statutory scheme based on a single, isolated comment in the legislative 
history.24 
2. Section 1002 - The Incorporation of Copying Controls 
(a) Does the Rio allow "serial copying"? 
After the District Court had determined that the Rio was a 'digital audio recording 
device', it next moved on to the issue of "serial copying". The AHRA defines "serial 
2 1 Senate Report at 53. 
2 2 § 1001(3). 
2 3 Diamond I at 631. 
2 4 ibid at 631. 
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copying" as "the duplication in a digital format of a copyrighted musical work or 
25 
sound recording from a digital reproduction of a digital musical recording". 
The District Court concurred with the RIAA that the two-step process at issue here -
audio CD to hard drive, and hard drive to Rio - appeared to technically satisfy the 
definition of "serial copying".2 6 The District Court explained that a conventional 
audio CD was a 'digital musical recording', and the MP3 file 'ripped' from an audio 
CD and stored on the hard-drive was a "digital reproduction" of that 'digital musical 
recording'. This meant that the version in the Rio was a "duplication" of the "digital 
reproduction" on the hard drive. 
Although a PC is not a 'digital audio recording device', the District Court found that 
the definition of 'serial copying' in section 1001(11) did not require that the digital 
reproduction of a 'digital musical recording' be generated by a 'digital audio 
recording device'.2 7 
(b) Section 1002(a) 
The District Court noted that although the two-step process involved with the Rio 
technically satisfied the definition of 'serial copying', the AHRA does not directly 
prohibit digital serial copying of copyright protected audio recordings. 
Instead section 1002(a) prohibits the import, manufacture and distribution of any 
'digital audio recording device' that does not conform to the SCMS, "a system that 
has the same functional characteristics as the Serial Copy Management System", or 
"any other system certified by the Secretary of Commerce as prohibiting 
28 
unauthorized serial copying". 
Consequently, i f Diamond had incorporated the SCMS technology into the Rio, no 
violation of section 1002 would have occurred because the Rio would satisfy 
subsection 1002(a)(1). However, the District Court found that incorporating SCMS 
§ 1001(11). 
Diamond I at 631. 
ibid at 631. 
§ 1002(a)(l)-(3). 
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into the Rio, accomplished nothing. The Rio could not act upon copyright and 
generation status information because the MP3 files on the computer's hard-drive did 
not contain this information. 
Similarly, the District Court found it was undisputed that the Rio did not permit 
downstream copying because the Rio itself had no digital output capability, and the 
removable flash memory cards could not be copied by another Rio device. Therefore, 
according to the District Court it was "nonsensical" to suggest that the Rio must send 
"copyright and generation status information".2 9 
To the District Court incorporating SCMS into the Rio appeared to be an "exercise in 
futi l i ty". 3 0 As a Rio with SCMS would not violate section 1002, and because a Rio 
without SCMS is functionally equivalent to a Rio with SCMS, the District Court was 
convinced that the Secretary of Commerce would conclude that the Rio adequately 
prohibited unauthorised serial copying for purposes of section 1002(a)(3). 
Accordingly, the District Court found that Diamond was only violating section 
1002(a) in a more technical sense, by failing to acquire a certificate. As such the 
District Court concluded that the RIAA's probability of success on the merits was 
mixed. It found that although the RIAA had established a probability that the Rio 
was a 'digital audio recording device', the RIAA had not established a probability of 
success in establishing that the Rio, i f assessed by the Secretary of Commerce, would 
fail to satisfy section 1002(a)(3). 
B. Irreparable Injury 
The District Court found that assuming that the Rio was subject to the AHRA, and 
that Diamond ultimately paid any required royalties, the only potential wrongful 
conduct would be Diamond's failure to encode SCMS information on recordings 
stored in the Rio. 3 1 
Senate Report at 26. 
3 0 Diamond I at 632. 
3 1 ibid at 632. 
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Overall, the court was "skeptical" that the Secretary of Commerce would require 
Diamond to incorporate SCMS technology.32 Furthermore, the District Court found 
that even i f the Secretary did impose that requirement, it believed that the RIAA had 
failed to demonstrate a sufficient causal relationship between this wrongful conduct 
and their alleged injuries. 
The RIAA contended that distribution of the Rio in its current configuration would 
have harmed them and the "public interest by dramatically stimulating the traffic in 
illegal MP3 files". 3 3 The District Court found that although the Rio would inevitably 
be used to record both legitimate music and illegitimate music, the absence of the 
SCMS information did not cause the illegitimate uses. 
Even i f the Rio did incorporate SCMS, a Rio user could still use the device to record 
unauthorised MP3 files posted to the Internet. Moreover, to the extent that the RIAA 
was injured through an deleterious use of the Rio, the court found that this is 
precisely the type of injury for which the royalty provisions were adopted.34 Under 
these circumstances, the District Court concluded that the RIAA had failed to 
establish any irreparable injury. 
Diamond in contrast offered what the District Court found to be credible evidence 
that an injunction would substantially impact its projected revenues from the sale of 
* 35 
the Rio. Moreover, the District Court found that because the Rio was capable of 
recording legitimate digital music, an injunction would deprive the public of a device 
with significant beneficial uses. 
4. The Ninth Circuit 
In the Ninth Circuit's discussion the initial question was whether the Rio fell within 
the ambit of the AHRA. After examining the nested definitions, in the Ninth 
Circuit's opinion, for the Rio to be a 'digital audio recording device,' it had to be able 
Diamond I at 632. 
Plaintiffs' Reply at 20:20-22. 
Diamond I at 632. 
See Defendant's Opposition at 7:1-27. 
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to reproduce, either "directly" or "from a transmission", a 'digital musical 
recording'.36 
A. Is the Rio able to directly reproduce a 'digital musical recording'? 
First the Ninth Circuit considered whether the Rio was able to directly reproduce a 
'digital musical recording'. 
1. Section 1001(5) 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the typical computer hard-drive from which a Rio would 
directly record was obviously a material object. However, the court went on to 
explain that hard-drives ordinarily contain much more than "only sounds, and 
material, statements, or instructions incidental to those fixed sounds". Indeed, 
almost all hard-drives contain numerous programs that are not incidental to any sound 
files that may be stored on the hard-drive. 
The Ninth Circuit therefore held that the Rio appeared not to make copies from 
'digital music recordings', as defined in section 1001(5)(A). Thus, the Rio was not a 
'digital audio recording device' under the AHRA's basic definition unless it made 
copies from transmissions. 
The Ninth Circuit went further still and noted that section 1001(5)(B)(ii) expressly 
provides that the term 'digital musical recording' does not include a material object 
"in which one or more computer programs are fixed".38 As such the Ninth Circuit 
reaffirmed its conclusion that a hard-drive is excluded from the definition of 'digital 
musical recordings'. 
2. The District Court's Rejection of the Exclusion of Hard-drives 
Next, the Ninth Circuit addressed the District Court's rejection of the exclusion of 
computer hard-drives from the definition of 'digital music recordings' under the 
3 6 Diamond II at 1076. 
3 7 § 1001(5)(A)(i). 
3 8 Diamond II ax 1076. 
39 
The R I A A and Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. 
statute's plain language, and its conclusion that such an exclusion was "ultimately 
unsupported by the legislative history, and contrary to the spirit and purpose of the 
AHRA". 3 9 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the statutory language was clear, but nevertheless, went 
on to address the legislative history, because it believed that it was "consistent with 
the statute's plain meaning and because the parties have briefed it so extensively".40 
(a) Basic Definition 
The Senate Report states that " i f the material object contains computer programs or 
databases that are not incidental to the fixed sounds, then the material object would 
not qualify" under the basic definition of a 'digital musical recording'.41 
The Senate Report, however discusses the term "audiogram" which was replaced by 
the term "digital music recording". The Ninth Circuit noted that the two definitions 
were nearly identical and comments in the legislative history regarding the 
"audiogram" definition were relevant to its interpretation of the 'digital music 
recording' definition. 
The Ninth Circuit also noted that a footnote in the Senate Report made it clear that 
this definition only extends to the material objects in which songs are normally fixed; 
that is "recorded compact discs, digital audio tapes, audio cassettes, long-playing 
albums, digital compact cassettes, and mini-discs" 4 2 
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit held that there were simply no grounds in either the 
plain language of the definition or in the legislative history for interpreting the term 
"digital musical recording" to include songs fixed on computer hard-drives. 
Diamond I at 629. 
4 0 Diamond IIat 1077. 
4 1 Senate Report at 118-19. 
4 2 ibid at footnote 36. 
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(b) Specific Exemption 
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the RIAA's contention that the legislative history 
revealed that the Rio did not fall within the specific exemption from the digital 
musical recording definition of "a material object in which one or more computer 
programs are fixed".43 The RIAA pointed out that the House Report describes the 
exemption as "revisions reflecting exemptions for talking books and computer 
„ 44 
programs . 
The Ninth Circuit noted that limiting the exemption to computer programs was 
contrary to the plain meaning of the exemption.45 The Ninth Circuit found that the 
plain language of the exemption at issue did not exclude the copying of programs 
from coverage by the AHRA, but instead, excludes copying from various types of 
material objects. 
These objects, the Ninth Circuit found, include hard-drives, which indirectly achieve 
the desired result of excluding copying of programs. By its plain language, the 
exemption was not limited to the copying of programs, but instead extended to any 
copying from a computer hard-drive. 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit noted that this issue was irrelevant here because the Rio 
did not reproduce files from something that falls within the plain language of the 
basic definition of a 'digital music recording'. 
(c) The Loophole 
Next, the Ninth Circuit addressed the District Court's conclusion that the exemption 
of computer hard-drives from the definition of 'digital music recording', from the 
AHRA's ambit, would effectively eviscerate the Act because any recording device 
could evade regulation simply by passing the music through a computer and ensuring 
that the MP3 file resided momentarily on the hard-drive. 
4 3 § 1001(5)(B)(n). 
4 4 House of Representatives Report, Report No. 102-873(1) (1992) ("House Report 1992") at 35. 
4 5 Diamond IIat 1077. 
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The Ninth Circuit found that while this may be true, "the Act seems to have been 
expressly designed to create this loophole".46 
(i) Primary Purpose 
The Ninth Circuit noted that under the plain meaning of the AHRA's definition of 
'digital audio recording devices', computers hard-drives were not 'digital audio 
recording devices' because their "primary purpose" is not to make digital audio 
copied recordings.47 Instead, the primary purpose of a computer is to run various 
programs and to record the data necessary to run those programs and perform various 
tasks. 
Further, the Ninth Circuit noted, the legislative history is consistent with this 
interpretation of the Act's provisions, because it states that "the typical personal 
• 48 
computer would not fall within the definition of 'digital audio recording device'", 
because a PC's "recording function is designed and marketed primarily for the 
recording of data and computer programs".49 
The Ninth Circuit found that the legislative history thus expressly recognised that 
computers have recording functions capable of recording digital musical recordings, 
and thus implicate the home taping and piracy concerns to which the AHRA is 
responsive. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit found that the legislative history was 
consistent with the AHRA's plain language - computers are not digital audio 
recording devices.50 
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit noted that the exclusion of computers from the AHRA's 
scope seems to have been part of a carefully negotiated compromise between the 
various industries with interests at stake, and without which, the computer industry 
would have vigorously opposed passage of the AHRA. 
Diamond II ax 1078. 
See § 1001(3). 
Senate Report at 122 
ibid at 121. 
Diamond II at 1078. 
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(ii) Laundering 
In turn, the Ninth Circuit found that because computers were not 'digital audio 
recording devices', they were not required to comply with the SCMS requirement and 
thus need not send, receive, or act upon information regarding copyright and 
generation status.51 
This combined with the District Court's finding that MP3 files generally do not even 
carry the codes providing information regarding copyright and generation status, led 
the Ninth Circuit to conclude that the AHRA seemed designed to allow files to be 
"laundered" by passage through a computer. This was so, because even a device with 
SCMS would be able to download MP3 files lacking SCMS codes from a computer 
hard-drive, for the simple reason that there would be no codes to prevent the copying. 
The Ninth Circuit found that, again the legislative history was consistent with the 
AHRA's plain meaning. The Technical Reference Document that described the 
SCMS system explained digital audio signals "that have no information concerning 
copyright and/or generation status shall be recorded by the device so that the digital 
copy is copyright asserted and original generation status".52 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit noted, that the incorporation of SCMS into the Rio would 
have allowed the Rio to copy MP3 files lacking SCMS codes so long as it marked the 
copied files as "original generation status".53 Such a marking would have allowed 
another SCMS device to make unlimited further copies of such "original generation 
status" files, despite the fact that the Rio did not permit such further copies to be 
made simply because it could not download or transmit the files that it stored to any 
other device. 
The Ninth Circuit therefore concluded that the Rio without SCMS inherently allowed 
less copying than SCMS permits. 
S 1 See § 1002(a)(2). 
32 Technical Reference Document for the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, II-A, 10, reprinted in 
House Report 1992 at 32. 
53 Diamond 11at 1079. 
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(iii) Personal Use 
The Ninth Circuit stated that the Rio's operation was entirely consistent with the 
AHRA's main purpose - the facilitation of personal use. As the Senate Report 
explains, the purpose of the AHRA "is to ensure the right of consumers to make 
analog or digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for their private, 
noncommercial use".54 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the AHRA fulfilled this purpose through its home taping 
exemption,55 which "protects all noncommercial copying by consumers of digital and 
analog musical recordings".56 According to the Ninth Circuit, the Rio merely made 
copies in order to render portable, or 'space-shift', those files that already reside on a 
user's hard drive. 
Here, the Ninth Circuit cited the Sony case and 'time-shifting', and found that such 
copying, was paradigmatic non-commercial personal use entirely consistent with the 
purposes of the Act. 5 7 
B. Is the Rio able to reproduce a 'digital music recording' "from a 
transmission"? 
Even though the Ninth Circuit found that the Rio could not directly reproduce a 
'digital music recording', the Rio would nevertheless have been a 'digital audio 
recording device' i f it could have reproduced a 'digital music recording' "from a 
transmission".58 
1. Definition of Transmission 
The term "transmission" is not defined in the AHRA. The Ninth Circuit, found that 
the legislative history confirmed that the copyright law definition of "transmission" 
54 Senate Report at 86. 
5 5 See § 1008. 
56 House Report 1992 at 59. 
5 7 Sony at 455. 
5 8 § 1001(1). 
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was sufficient for its purposes in this case. In the context of copyright law, to 
"'transmit' a performance or display is to communicate it by any device or process 
whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent".60 
2. Nature of the Reproduction of the Transmission 
The RIAA asserted that indirect reproduction of a transmission was sufficient for the 
Rio to fall within the Act's ambit as a 'digital audio recording device'.61 
Diamond asserted that the adverb "indirectly" modified the recording of the 
underlying "digital music recording", rather than the recording "from the 
transmission". Diamond effectively asserted that the statute should be read as 
covering devices that are capable of making a reproduction of a digital musical 
recording, "whether that reproduction is made directly[,] from another digital musical 
recording^] or indirectly[,] from a transmission".62 
The Ninth Circuit found that while the Rio could only directly reproduce files from a 
computer hard-drive through a cable linking the two devices, the Rio could indirectly 
reproduce a transmission.63 For example, i f a radio broadcast of a digital audio 
recording were recorded on a compact disc recorder and then uploaded to a computer 
hard-drive, the Rio could indirectly reproduce the transmission by downloading a 
copy from the hard-drive. 
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit noted that i f indirect reproduction of a transmission 
falls within the statutory definition, the Rio would be a 'digital audio recording 
device'.64 
Senate Report at 10. 
6 0 § 101. 
6 1 § 1001(1). 
62 Diamond II at 1080. 
6 3 ibid at 1080. 
6 4 ibid at 1080. 
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(a) Statutory Language 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that after closer analysis, the RIAA's interpretation of 
the statutory language was "contrary to the statutory language and common sense".65 
According to the Ninth Circuit the focus of the statutory language seemed to be on 
the two means of reproducing the underlying digital music recording - either directly 
from that recording, or indirectly, by reproducing the recording from a transmission. 
The Ninth Circuit found that the RIAA's interpretation of the AHRA language would 
only cover the indirect recording of transmissions, and would omit restrictions on the 
direct recording of transmissions (e.g. recording songs from the radio) from the 
AHRA ambit. 
The Ninth Circuit held that this "interpretation would significantly reduce the 
protection afforded by the Act to transmissions, and neither the statutory language nor 
structure provides any reason that the Act's protections should be so limited". 6 6 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that it made "little sense" for the AHRA to 
restrict the indirect recording of transmissions, but to allow unrestricted direct 
recording of transmissions.67 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the "most 
logical" reading of the AHRA, extends protection to direct copying of digital music 
recordings, and to indirect copying of digital music recordings from transmissions of 
those recordings.68 
(b) Legislative History 
However, because of the arguable ambiguity of this passage of the statute, the Ninth 
Circuit decided that recourse to the legislative history was necessary on this point. 
The Senate Report states that "a digital audio recording made from a commercially 
released compact disc or audio cassette, or from a radio broadcast of a commercially 
Diamond IIat 1080. 
ibid at 1080. 
ibid at 1080. 
ibid at 1080. 
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released compact disc or audio cassette, would be a 'digital audio copied 
recording'".69 
According to the Ninth Circuit this indicated that the recording of a transmission need 
not be indirect to fall within the scope of the AHRA's restrictions, and thus refuted 
RIAA's proposed interpretation of the relevant language.70 
Moreover, the statement tracks the statutory definition by providing an example of 
direct copying of a 'digital musical recording' from that recording, and an example of 
indirect copying of a 'digital musical recording' from a transmission of that 
recording. This led the Ninth Circuit to conclude that the legislative history 
confirmed the most logical reading of the statute, which it then adopted; that is, 
"indirectly" modified the verb "is made" - in other words, modified the making of the 
reproduction of the underlying 'digital music recording'. 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that a device falls within the AHRA's provisions 
i f it can indirectly copy a 'digital music recording' by making a copy from a 
transmission of that recording. As the Rio could not make copies from transmissions, 
but instead, can only make copies from a computer hard-drive, it was not a 'digital 
audio recording device.' 
5. The Aftermath 
Following the Ninth Circuit's ruling, without releasing any terms, the RIAA and 
Diamond settled their case.72 Although the dispute was a source of substantial 
publicity at the time, the controversy concerning the Rio player seems to have had a 
limited short-term impact. 
w Senate Report at 119. 
70 Diamond II at 1081. 
7 1 ibid at 1081. 
7 2 Chris Oakes, RIAA, Diamond Sweep Away Suit, Wired News, August 4, 1999 
<http://www.wired.eom/news/politics/0,1283,21089,00.html>. 
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Furthermore, since the decisions allowing the Rio to be sold to the public, the market 
for MP3-related material has expanded.73 Moreover, soon after the District Court's 
decision the Rio had been hacked to allow the device to upload files back to PCs, one 
of the capabilities the District Court had noted the Rio did not have when denying the 
injunction to prohibit its sale.74 
Even with its limited short-term impact, the Diamond case sparked the discussion 
regarding what steps should be taken in order to protect copyright rights in the face of 
the Internet music explosion.75 As such, policy questions still remained with regards 
to what type of regulations should exist in relation to the distribution of music files 
and related intellectual property over the Internet. 
Jessica Trivellini Toney, You've Got Mud On Your Face: Have MP3s Turned The Middleman Into 
Roadkill?, 22 Hastings Comm/Ent L.J. 127 (1999) at 144. 
7 4 Joe Nickell, Mighty Rio Now a Two-Way Street, Wired News, January 26, 1999 
<http://www. wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,17529,00.html>. 
7 5 Paul Veravanich, op.cit at 446-447. 
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Chapter 4 - The RIAA and MP3.com, Inc. 
"They need to understand that the law's domain knows no such limits ".1 
The RIAA, beaten but not deterred by its defeat at the hands of Diamond, shifted its 
attention from hardware manufacturers to the facilitators of MP3 file transfers over 
the Internet. 
In some cases, an individual entity may be the source of 'copies' for a large number 
of end users. This would be the case in a traditional pirate distribution chain in which 
a single music pirate makes thousands of copies of a recording and sells those copies 
to the public. The MP3.com case involved such large scale copying by a single 
entity, but it "presented a uniquely Internet-based twist on the typical fact pattern".2 
l .The Facts 
MP3.com is a well known web site specialising in distributing music in the MP3 
format and providing information and support to the MP3 community.3 On or around 
January 12 2000, MP3.com launched its new 'My.MP3.com' service. This service 
was advertised as "permitting subscribers to store, customize and listen to the 
recordings contained on their CDs from any place where they have an Internet 
connection".4 
Initially, a subscriber to the 'My.MP3.com' service had to upload the CD that they 
wanted to 'store' to the 'My.MP3.com' web site. This could be done in two ways. 
Firstly, they could insert their music CD into their computer's CD-ROM drive for a 
few seconds. This was called the 'Beam-it Service', and used a proprietary 
verification and security process.5 
1 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 2000 Copr.L.Dec. P 28,141 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) at 6. 
2 Stephen M. Kramarsky, Copyright Enforcement In The Internet Age: The Law And Technology Of 
Digital Rights Management, 11 Depaul-Lca J. Art & Ent. L. 1 (2001) at 24. 
3 <http://www.mp3.com>. 
4 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F.Supp.2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("MP3.com") at 350. 
5 MP3.com at 350. 
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Alternatively, the subscriber could purchase a CD from one of MP3.corn's co-
operating online retailers (an 'e-tailer'). This was called the 'Instant Listening 
Service'. After purchasing a CD, the e-tailer contacted MP3.com and verified that the 
purchaser owned the CD. The idea with the 'Instant Listening Service' was to allow 
the CD purchaser to listen to the purchased music immediately, rather than waiting 
for delivery of the CD. 
After that, however, the subscriber was able to access the 'My.MP3.com' service 
from any computer connected to the Internet. To play the music, the user initiated a 
listening-only streaming transmission from an MP3.com server to the recipient's PC.6 
From the subscriber's perspective, it was like having a celestial jukebox of their own 
recordings to which they could listen, through audio streaming, any time and any 
place from where they had an Internet connection.7 
'Streaming' is a process that allows a user to receive music and video content over 
the Internet and is similar to listening to music on a radio or watching a program on 
television. Unlike radio or television, however, the streamed music or video in most 
circumstances cannot be recorded, or downloaded in the case of the Internet. As such 
MP3.corn's Instant Listening and Beam-It services did not permit the user to 
download MP3 files. 
In fact, My.MP3.com did not maintain separate music files for each subscriber, but 
instead kept an overall database of 80,000 recordings on its computer servers.9 These 
recordings had been ripped from tens of thousands of popular CDs in which the 
RIAA held the copyrights. 
Moreover, the subscriber did not in fact upload the music to My.MP3.com, but 
uploaded information from the CD concerning the number of tracks the CD 
6 Dan Skolnik, Private Use Out Of Control: Disintermediation In The Music Business, While The 
Bands Play On, 5 No. 2 Intell. Prop. L. Bull. 13 (2000) at 24-25. 
7 Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use And Excuse On The Internet, 24 Colum.-Vla J.L. & Arts 1 (2000) at 
22. 
8 Charles L. Simmons, Jr., Digital Distribution Of Entertainment Content...The Battle Lines Are 
Drawn, 33-Aug Md. B.J. 31 (2000) at 36. 
9 The number of albums MP3.com is said to have copied has been variously reported as 40,000, 
45,000, and 80,000. 
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contained, and the length of each track.10 This information supplied a 'fingerprint' 
identifying the subscriber's CD. My.MP3.com then cross-referenced this fingerprint 
information from the subscriber to the fingerprint information in its database, to 
identify the subscriber's holdings. As Skolnik comments calling it 'beaming' was an 
evasion, not a hip synonym, of the word 'uploading'.11 
With respect to the audio streaming, My.MP3.com had acquired performance licenses 
from the copyright owners of the musical compositions contained in the sound 
recordings.12 However, the producers of the sound recordings had not granted 
My.MP3.com performance licenses. Moreover, My.MP3.com had not obtained 
licenses from copyright owners of the musical compositions or of the sound 
recordings to reproduce the works into the database. 
In theory, the My.MP3.com system was premised on its subscribers' legitimate 
acquisition of physical copies of the sound recordings in the form of music CDs. 1 3 In 
fact, My.MP3.com also 'stored' in the subscriber's 'library' copies of entire CDs that 
the subscriber had downloaded from sites carrying ripped copies of CDs or copied 
from a friend. This was allowed because the My.MP3.com database could not tell the 
difference between fingerprint information uploaded from a legitimate CD, and 
fingerprint information uploaded from a ripped copy of the CD. 
In the same manner My.MP3.com would not enter into the subscriber's 'library' 
individual songs, as single songs do not communicate the necessary fingerprint 
information. Thus, although the My.MP3.com enterprise may have encountered 
some 'leakage' by cross-referencing from unlawfully acquired copies of CDs, it 
appeared that most of the subscribers' 'uploads' derived from legitimate sources.14 
1 0 Jane C. Ginsburg (2000), op.cit at 22. 
1 1 Dan Skolnik, op.cit at 25. 
1 2 Jane C. Ginsburg (2000), op.cit at 22. 
1 3 ibid at 22. 
1 4 ibid at 23. 
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2. The Case 
A. The Action 
On January 21 2000, the RIAA filed a copyright infringement lawsuit against 
MP3.com, after negotiations failed between the parties over royalty fees.15 The 
lawsuit alleged that MP3.corn's new service, 'My.MP3.com' constituted an illegal 
reproduction of their sound recordings.16 The RIAA filed a motion for partial 
summary j udgement. 
B. The Partial Summary Judgement 
1. The District Court 
According to the District Court, "the complex marvels of cyberspatial communication 
may create difficult legal issues; but not in this case".17 The District Court found that 
MP3.com's infringement of RIAA's copyrights was "clear".18 Accordingly, on April 
28 2000, the District Court granted the RIAA's motion for partial summary 
judgement holding MP3.com liable for copyright infringement. Its May 4 2000 
opinion stated the reasons why. 
3. The District Court's Discussion 
The District Court noted from the beginning that on its face the facts made out a 
presumptive case of infringement under the CA. 
A. Challenge To Prima Facie Infringement 
MP3.com's only challenge to the RIAA's prima facie case of infringement was the 
suggestion that its music computers files were not in fact "reproductions" of RIAA's 
copyright works within the meaning of the CA. More specifically, MP3.com claimed 
1 5 Hilary Rosen, Letter from RIAA to MP3.com CEO Michael Robertson, January 21, 2000 
<http://www.creativepro.com/story/feature/3608.html>. 
16 SeeMP3.com at 350. 
1 7 ibid at 350. 
1 8 ibid at 350. 
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that the simulated sounds on MP3 formatted music files were not physically identical 
to the sounds on the original CD recordings. 
The District Court noted that MP3.com conceded, however, that the human ear 
cannot detect a difference between the two. Moreover, MP3.com admitted that a goal 
of its copying was to create a music file that was sonically identical to the original 
CD as possible. The District Court concluded that in "such circumstances, some 
slight, humanly undetectable difference between the original and the copy does not 
qualify for exclusion from the coverage of the Act". 1 9 
B. Is Such Copying 'Fair Use'? 
MP3.com also argued that the copying involved here was protected by the defence of 
'fair use'.20 
In conducting the 'fair use' analysis, the District Court noted that other relevant 
factors may also be considered, since fair use is an "equitable rule of reason" to be 
applied in light of the overall purposes of the CA. 2 1 
1. The purpose and character of the use 
Regarding the first factor, MP3.com did not dispute that its purpose was commercial. 
Even though subscribers to My.MP3.com were not being charged a fee, MP3.com 
was seeking to attract a sufficiently large subscription base to draw advertising and 
eventually make a profit. 2 2 
Consideration of the first 'fair use' factor also involves inquiring into whether the 
new use essentially repeats the old or whether, instead, it "transforms" it by infusing 
it with, for example, new meaning or new understandings.23 
MP3.com at footnote 1. 
2 0 See § 107. 
21 Sony at 448,454. 
22 MP3.com at 351. 
2 3 See Campbell at 579. 
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MP3.com argued that the 'My.MP3.com' service provided a transformative "space 
shift" by which subscribers could enjoy the sound recordings contained on their CDs 
without lugging around the physical discs themselves. The District Court found that 
this was "simply another way of saying that the unauthorized copies are being 
retransmitted in another medium - an insufficient basis for any legitimate claim of 
transformation".24 
As such, the District Court held that here MP3.com added no new "new aesthetics, 
new insights and understandings" to the original music recordings it copied but 
simply repackaged those recordings to facilitate their transmission through another 
25 
medium. Thus, the District Court concluded that, "while such services may be 
innovative, they are not transformative".26 
2. The nature of the copyrighted work 
With respect to the second factor, the District Court found that the creative recordings 
that were being copied were close "to the core of intended copyright protection",27 
and thus far removed from the more factual or descriptive work more amenable to 
'fair use'.28 
3. The amount and substantiality 
Regarding the third factor, the District Court found it was undisputed that MP3.com 
copied and replayed the entirety of the copyrighted works in issue here. Accordingly, 
the District Court held that this also negated any claim of fair use. 
24 MP3.com at 351. 
2 5 See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, 150 F.3d 132 (2nd Cir. 1998) 
("Castle") at 142. 
26 MP3.com at 351. 
27 Campbell at 586. 
2 8 See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, (2d Cir.1999) at 72-73. 
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4. The effect of the use 
In relation to the fourth factor, the District Court found that MP3.corn's activities on 
their face invaded the RIAA's statutory right to license its copyrighted sound 
recordings to others for reproduction. 
MP3.com however, argued that so far as the derivative market involved here was 
concerned, the RIAA had not shown that such licensing was "traditional, reasonable, 
or likely to be developed".29 Furthermore, MP3.com argued its activities could only 
enhance the RIAA's sales, since its subscribers could not gain access to particular 
recordings made available by MP3.com unless they had already 'purchased', or 
agreed to purchase, their own CD copies of those recordings. 
The District Court clarified that such purchases may have "actually or purportedly" 
occurred.30 Moreover, these arguments by MP3.com were found to be "dressed in the 
garb of an expert's 'opinion'" and when inspected by the District Court were held to 
consist "almost entirely of speculative and conclusory statements".31 The District 
Court consequently held that MP3.corn's arguments were unpersuasive. 
According to the District Court, any allegedly positive impact of MP3.corn's 
activities on the RIAA's prior market in no way permitted MP3.com to usurp a 
further market that directly derives from reproduction of the RIAA's copyrighted 
works. 3 2 
This, the District Court held, would be so even i f the copyright holder had not yet 
entered the new market in issue. The District Court's reasoning for this was that a 
copyright holder's 'exclusive' rights included the right, within broad limits, to curb 
the development of such a derivative market by refusing to license a copyrighted 
work or by doing so only on terms the copyright holder finds acceptable. ~ 
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2nd Cir. 1994) at 930, footnote 17. 
3 0A/P3.cowat 352. 
3 1 ibid at 352. 
3 2 See Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2nd Cir. 1994) ("Infinity") at 111. 
3 3 See Castle at 145-46. 
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Furthermore, the District Court found that the RIAA had presented substantial 
evidence that they had in fact taken steps to enter that market by entering into various 
licensing agreements. 
5. Other factors 
Next, the District Court addressed MP3.corn's reliance on other factors. This 
essentially involved the claim that My.MP3.com provided a useful service to 
consumers that, in its absence, would have been served by pirates. 
The District Court noted that copyright law was not designed to afford consumer 
protection or convenience but to protect the copyright holders' property interests. 
The District Court further noted that as a practical matter, the RIAA had "indicated 
no objection in principle to licensing their recordings to companies like MP3.com; 
they simply want to make sure they get the remuneration the law reserves for them as 
holders of copyrights on creative works". 3 4 
The District Court concluded that stripped to its essence, MP3.corn's "consumer 
protection" argument amounted to nothing more than a "bald claim" that MP3.com 
should be able to misappropriate the RIAA's property simply because there was a 
consumer demand for it. This, the District Court noted, "hardly appeals to the 
conscience of equity".35 
C. Other Defences 
In conclusion, the District Court held that on any view, MP3.com's 'fair use' defence 
must be denied as a matter of law. The District Court went on to say that MP3.corn's 
if 
other defences were "essentially frivolous" and as such were disposed of briefly. 
MP3.com had contended, under the rubric of copyright misuse, that the RIAA was 
misusing its "dominant market position to selectively prosecute only certain online 
MP3.com at 352. 
ibid at 352. 
ibid at 352-353. 
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music technology companies".37 The District Court found that the evidence showed 
only that the RIAA had so far reasonably exercised its right to determine which 
infringers to pursue, and in which order to pursue them. 
Furthermore, the District Court found that MP3.corn's abandonment defence had to 
also fall since MP3.com had failed to adduce any competent evidence of an overt act 
indicating that the RIAA intentionally abandoned their copyrights.38 The fact that the 
RIAA had filed suit against MP3.com shortly after it had launched its infringing 
My.MP3.com service did not necessarily add weight to this argument. 
Similarly, the District Court held that MP3.corn's estoppel defence had to be rejected 
because MP3.com had failed to provide any competent evidence that it relied on any 
action by the RIAA with respect to its My.MP3.com service. 
Finally, the District Court held that it also had to reject MP3.com's unclean hands 
defence given MP3.corn's failure to come forth with any admissible evidence 
showing bad faith or misconduct on the part of the RIAA. 3 9 
In conclusion the District Court held that the RIAA was entitled to partial summary 
judgement holding MP3.com to have infringed its copyrights.40 
4. The Aftermath 
After the RIAA initially filed its copyright infringement lawsuit against MP3.com, 
the company lost approximately US$1 billion in market value.41 News of the ruling 
finding MP3.com liable for copyright infringement sent the stock price down an 
additional forty percent and reduced the My.MP3.com service to a fraction of its 
initial appeal. 
However, MP3.com did continue to offer the service for the streaming of works in the 
public domain, and by those artists with whom MP3.com had a contractual 
3 7 Defendant's Consolidated Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgement at 21. 
3 8 See Richard Feiner & Co., Inc. v. H.R. Indus., Inc., 10 F.Supp.2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) at 313. 
3 9 See Dunlop-McCullen v. Local J-S, AFL-CIO-CLC, 149 F.3d 85 (2nd Cir.1998) at 90. 
40 MP3.com at 353. 
4 1 See Don Clark & Martin Peers, MP 3 Chief Rocks and Roils Music, Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 2000 at B l . 
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relationship, the vast majority o f whom were unknown bands trying to make it 
through Internet distribution. 
By a motion dated May 18 2000, MP3.com sought to have the District Court certify 
for immediate interlocutory appeal the court's order o f A p r i l 28 2000 holding 
MP3.com liable for copyright infringement. On June 1 2000, the District Court held 
that MP3.corn's copyright infringement was clear, and the mere fact that it was 
"clothed in the exotic webbing o f the Internet does not disguise its i l legali ty". 4 2 
Accordingly, the motion was denied. 
During the summer o f 2000, all the record labels except U M G Recordings Inc. settled 
with MP3.com. MP3.com agreed to pay them approximately US$80 mil l ion in 
damages, and an additional US$30 mil l ion for licensing fees for the labels' 
copyrighted works to be streamed from the MP3.com site for the next three years.4 3 
The fact that U M G had an equity stake in Musicbank, a potential competitor o f 
MP3.com, may explain why U M G did not settle wi th MP3.com. 4 4 
The R I A A then fi led a motion to have the statutory damages computed on a 'per-
song' rather than 'per-CD' basis. By an order dated July 31 2000, the District Court 
denied the RIAA ' s motion. The District Court's August 23 2000 written opinion 
stated that the relevant "work" unit for purposes o f computing statutory damages 
under the CA was each copyrighted CD as a whole, rather than each individual, 
copyrighted song on each such CD 4 5 
The case proceeded to an assessment o f statutory damages wi th respect to U M G , the 
remaining defendant. On September 6 2000 the District Court found that MP3.com 
had w i l f u l l y infringed copyrights owned or controlled by U M G . 4 6 
Characterising the infringement as " w i l l f u l " under section 504 CA, the District Court 
set the damages at US$25,000 per CD, but declined to rule on how many o f the 
4 2 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 2000 W L 710056 at 1. 
4 3 Maggie A. Lange, Digital Music Distribution Technologies Challenge Copyright Law: A Review of 
RIAA v. MP3.com and RIAA v. Napster, 45 B.B.J . 14 (2001) at 30. 
4 4 Michelle Delio and Brad King, MP3.Com Must Pay the Piper, Wired News, September 6, 2000 
<http://www.wired.eom/news/business/0,1367,38613,00.html>. 
4 5 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 109 F.Supp.2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) at 224-225. 
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80,000 copied CDs' copyrights were owned by U M G . However, the District Court 
did comment that i fMP3 .com was right that there were no more that 4,700 CDs for 
which U M G qualified for statutory damages, the total award would be approximately 
US$118 mil l ion. 
On November 13, 2000 the District Court entertained opening arguments in the 
damage phase o f the bifurcated trial. U M G successfully finessed the largest 
copyright infringement consent judgement in US history - US$50 mil l ion plus 
attorney's fees - without proving up a single sound recording copyright. 4 7 
However, on that same day U M G reached a settlement wi th MP3.com. It was agreed 
that U M G would receive US$53.4 mil l ion to settle the suit and would "grant 
MP3.com a non-exclusive, North American license for the use o f UMG-controlled 
recordings on the My.MP3.com system, including the 'Beam-it' and 'Instant 
AO 
Listening' software services". 
4 6 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 2000 Copr.L.Dec. P 28,141 (S .D.N.Y. 2000). 
4 7 See Justin Asher Zitler, Intellectual Property Law, 48 La . B .J . 402 (2001) at 404. 
4 8 MP3.com, Court Awards Judgment to Universal Music Group In Copyright Infringement Suit With 
MP3.com , Press Releases - About MP3.com, November 14, 2000 <http://pr.mp3.com/pr/217.html>. 
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Chapter 5 - The RIAA and Napster, Inc. 
"Napster may win or lose in court, but copyright law will never be the same ".1 
Finding a specific MP3 file on the Internet has always been a tedious process. In 
early 1999, Shawn Fanning, a nineteen-year-old computer science student at 
Northeastern University, wanted to make it easier for his roommate to find such MP3 
files over the Internet. Fanning ended up creating Napster. 
1. The Facts 
Napster, Inc. made its proprietary 'MusicShare' software freely available for Internet 
users to download. 2 Once downloaded, the Napster system allowed users to 
exchange MP3 files stored on their own computer hard-drives directly, without 
payment, and boasted that it took "the frustration out o f locating servers wi th MP3 
files".3 
The Napster system used a process commonly called 'peer-to-peer' file sharing.4 
This process effectively allowed its users to search for and transfer exact copies o f 
MP3 files stored on other users' computers. 
The process was made possible by the 'MusicShare' software and Napster's network 
servers and server-side software. Napster provided technical support for the indexing 
and searching o f MP3 files, as well as for its other functions, including a 'chat room', 
and a directory where participating artists could provide information about their 
music. Napster's 'MusicShare' software also played MP3 files. 
A sound technical understanding o f the Napster system is important to be able to 
examine the relevant legal issues. 
1 Joseph Nocera & Tim Carvell, 50 Lessons, Fortune, October 30, 2000 at 136, 137. 
2 <http://www.napster.com>. 
3 Defendant's Brief at 4. 
4 This structure decentralises the information sharing process and allows each user to both supply and 
access information rather than rely on the traditional method of using large centralised information 
servers to supply the requested files. 
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A. Listing Available Files 
A first-time user was required to register wi th the Napster system by creating a 'user 
name' and password. I f the registered user wanted to share MP3 files on his 
computer hard-drive wi th other users on the Napster system, he had to elect a 'user 
library' directory on his computer's hard-drive where he would store his MP3 files. 
The user would give these self-designated fi le names. 
When the user logged onto the Napster system the 'MusicShare' software interacted 
with Napster's server-side software, automatically connecting the user to one o f some 
150 servers that Napster operated. The MusicShare software then searched the user's 
'user library' and verified that the available files were properly formatted. I f in the 
correct MP3 format, the names of the MP3 files were uploaded f rom the user's 
computer to the Napster servers. The content o f the MP3 files remained stored on the 
user's computer. 
Once uploaded to the Napster servers, the user's MP3 file names were stored in a 
server-side ' library' under the user's name and became part o f a 'collective directory' 
o f files available for transfer during the time the user was logged onto the Napster 
system. The collective directory tracked users who were connected in real time, 
displaying only file names that were immediately accessible. 
B. Searching For Available Files 
Napster allowed a user to locate other users' MP3 files in two ways: through 
Napster's search function and through its 'hotlist' function. 
1. Search Function 
Software located on the Napster servers maintained a 'search index' o f Napster's 
collective directory. By using the MusicShare software a user could search the 
'search index' by entering either the name o f a song or an artist as the object o f the 
search. Napster's server then compiled a list o f all MP3 fi le names pulled f rom the 
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search index which included the same search terms entered by the user and 
transmitted the list to the searching user. 
It is important to note that the Napster server did not search the contents o f any MP3 
file. Instead, the search was limited to "a text search o f the file names indexed in a 
particular cluster. Those file names may contain typographical errors or otherwise 
inaccurate descriptions o f the content o f the files since they are designated by other 
users".5 
2. 'Hotlist ' Function 
To use the 'hotlist' function, Napster users created a list o f other users' names from 
which they had obtained MP3 files in the past. When logged onto Napster, the 
system notified the user i f any user on their list (a 'hotlisted user') was also logged 
onto the system. I f so, the user could access an index o f all MP3 file names in a 
particular hotlisted user's library and request a file in the library by selecting the file 
name. 
C. Transfer r ing Copies of an MP3 file 
The Napster network facilitated the same mode o f file-transfer, whether the 
requesting user accessed a specific MP3 file wi th the search engine or the 'hotlist' 
function. To transfer a copy o f the contents o f a requested MP3 file, the Napster 
server software obtained the Internet address o f the requesting user and the Internet 
address o f the user with the available files (the 'host user'). 
The Napster servers then communicated the host user's Internet address to the 
requesting user. The requesting user's computer used this information to establish a 
connection with the host user and downloaded a copy o f the contents o f the MP3 file 
f rom one computer to the other over the Internet, 'peer-to-peer'. It is important to 
note that the MP3 file was actually transmitted over the Internet, but the steps 
necessary to make that connection could not have taken place without the Napster 
5 A&MRecords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D.Cal. 2000) {"Napster IF) at 906. 
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server.6 Further, it is also important to note that unlike MP3.com, Napster did not 
store any MP3 files on its servers. 
D. Popularity 
Napster changed the way audiophiles searched for and downloaded MP3 files. It 
created a directory o f the best MP3 files on the Internet and led you straight to them. 
Consequently, Napster took the Internet by storm. Napster is still considered to be 
the fastest-growing software application ever recorded by Internet research 
companies.7 
It was believed that by the end o f 2000 there would have been 75 mil l ion Napster 
users. A t one point, Napster estimated that even without marketing, its 'viral service' 
was growing by more than 200 percent per month. Approximately 10,000 music files 
were being shared per second using Napster, and every second more than 100 users 
attempted to connect to the system. 
E . Copyright Policy 
A t the time the lawsuit was filed against Napster, its users uploaded and downloaded 
MP3 files without payment to each other, Napster, or the copyright owners. The 
evidence showed that virtually all Napster users downloaded or uploaded copyrighted 
files and that approximately 87% of the music available on Napster belonged to the 
R I A A . 8 
However, Napster had never obtained licenses to distribute or download, or to 
facilitate others in distributing or downloading, the music that the R I A A owned. 
Napster had however developed a policy that made compliance with all copyright 
laws one o f the 'terms of use' o f its service and warned its users that: 
6 A&MRecords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 Copr.L.Dec. P 28,072 (N.D.Cal. 2000) ("Napster F) at 2. 
7 Peter Svensson, Off the Charts, abcnews.com 
<http://more.abcnews.go.coni/sections/tecli/dailynews/napster000911.html>. 
8 Napster II at 903. 
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"Napster w i l l terminate the accounts o f users who are repeat infringers o f the 
copyrights, or other intellectual property rights, o f others. In addition, Napster 
reserves the right to terminate the account o f a user upon any single infringement o f 
the rights of others in conjunction with use o f the Napster service".9 
However, there was disagreement over when this policy was instituted and how 
effectively it barred infringers f rom using the Napster service. Napster claimed that it 
had a copyright compliance policy as early as October 1999, but admitted that it did 
not document or notify users o f the existence o f this policy unti l February 7 2000. 
2. The Case 
A. The Action 
Napster posed obvious problems for the recording industry. The possible harm 
caused by the Rio and by MP3.com was nothing compared to the damage that was 
being caused by Napster's 75 mil l ion or so users. Officials f rom the R I A A publicly 
referred to Napster's activities as "operating a haven for music piracy on an 
unprecedented scale" and commented that the Napster service was "similar to a giant 
online pirate bazaar".1 0 
On December 6 1999, the R I A A filed suit alleging contributory and vicarious 
copyright infringement by Napster. 
B. The D M C A Safe Habors 
1. The District Court 
Napster filed a motion for summary adjudication o f the applicability o f the safe 
harbour provisions o f the D M C A to its business activities. 1 1 
9 Kessler Declaration § 19. 
1 0 See Brain Hiatt, RIAA Sues Napster Claiming "Music Piracy" 
<www.sonicnet.com/news/archive/story .jhtml?id=5699526>. 
1 1 See § 512(a). 
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Napster argued its entire system fell within the safe harbour and that therefore the 
R I A A could not obtain monetary damages or injunctive relief, except as narrowly 
specified by subparagraph 512(j)( l)(B). In the alternative, Napster asked the court to 
find subsection 512(a) applicable to its role in downloading MP3 music files, as 
opposed to searching for or indexing such files. 
The District Court delivered its opinion on May 12 2000. The District Court 
ultimately held that not all o f Napster's activities were covered by the subsection 
512(a) safe harbour. 
C . The Prel iminary Injunction 
1. The District Court 
Next, the R I A A sought a motion to preliminarily enjoin Napster f rom engaging in or 
assisting others in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing 
copyrighted music without the express permission o f the rights owner. 
In opposition to this motion, Napster sought to expand the ' fair use' doctrine, as 
articulated in the Sony case,12 to encompass the massive downloading o f MP3 files by 
Napster users. 
Alternatively, Napster contended that, even i f this third-party activity constituted 
direct copyright infringement, the R I A A had not shown probable success on the 
merits o f their contributory and vicarious infringement claims. Napster also asked 
the court to find that copyright holders were not injured by a service created and 
promoted to facilitate the free downloading o f music files, the vast majority o f which 
are copyrighted. 
On July 26 2000, the District Court granted the R I A A ' s motion for a preliminary 
injunction. The injunction was slightly modified by written opinion when the 
District Court, delivered its written opinion on August 10 2000. 1 3 
12 Sony. 
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2. The Ninth Circuit 
The R I A A ' s victory was short-lived. Napster appealed the District Court's 
preliminary injunction to United States Court o f Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Two days 
later, on 28 July 2000 the Ninth Circuit entered a temporary stay o f the preliminary 
injunction pending resolution of the appeal. This, for the time being, kept Napster in 
business and as a result the service was more popular than ever. 
The Ninth Circuit heard arguments on October 2 2000, released its original opinion 
on February 12 2001, and released an amended opinion on A p r i l 3 2001 . 1 4 The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the preliminary injunction. 
3. The Distr ict Court's Discussion on the D M C A 
A. The Arguments 
From the outset set, the District Court noted that interpretation o f the section 512 safe 
habors appeared to be an issue o f first impression. 
Napster claimed that its business activities fell within the safe harbour provided by 
subsection 512(a). Citing subparagraph 512(k)( l)(A), Napster argued that it was a 
'service provider' for the purposes o f the 512(a) safe harbour. First, Napster claimed 
to offer the "transmission, routing, or providing o f connections for digital online 
communications" by enabling the connection o f users' hard-drives and the 
transmission of MP3 files "directly from the Host hard drive and Napster browser 
through the Internet to the user's Napster browser and hard dr ive". 1 5 
Second, Napster stated that its users chose the online communication points and the 
MP3 files to be transmitted with no direction from Napster. Finally, it argued that the 
Napster system did not modify the content o f the transferred files. Napster contended 
that, because it met the definition o f 'service provider', it only needed to satisfy the 
1 3 See Napster II. 
1 4 See Napster III. 
1 5 Defendant's Reply Brief at 3. 
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five remaining requirements o f the 512(a) safe harbour to prevail in its motion for 
summary adjudication. 
The R I A A appeared to concede that Napster was a 'service provider' within the 
meaning o f subparagraph 512(k)(l)(A), "arguing instead that Napster does not satisfy 
the additional limitations that the prefatory language o f subsection 512(a) imposes". 1 6 
The District Court assumed, but did not hold, that Napster was a 'service provider' 
under subparagraph 512(k)(l)(A). 
Napster then went on to show compliance with the f ive requirements o f subsection 
512(a). Napster argued that firstly, a Napster user, and never Napster itself, initiated 
the transmission o f MP3 files. Secondly, that the transmission occurred through an 
automatic, technical process without any editorial input f rom Napster. Next, that 
Napster did not choose the recipients o f the MP3 files. Fourthly, that Napster did not 
make a copy o f the material during transmission. Finally, that the content o f the 
material was not modified during transmission. Napster thus maintained that the 
512(a) safe harbour protected its core function - "transmitting, routing and providing 
• 17 
connections for sharing o f the files its users choose". 
The R I A A disagreed. Firstly, it argued that subsection 512(n) required the District 
Court to analyse each o f Napster's functions independently and that not all o f these 
functions fell under the 512(a) safe harbour. In the R I A A ' s view, Napster provided 
information location tools - such as a search engine, directory, index, and links - that 
were not covered by subsection 512(a) but by the more stringent eligibility 
requirements o f subsection 512(d). 
Furthermore, the R I A A contended that Napster did not perform the function which 
the 512(a) safe harbour protected because the infringing material was not transmitted 
or routed through the Napster system, as required by the prefatory language o f 
subsection 512(a). The District Court concurred with the R I A A that the definition o f 
'service provider' under subparagraph 512(k)( l)(A) was not identical to the prefatory 
language of subsection 512(a). 1 8 The latter imposes the additional requirement that 
16 Napster I at footnote 5. 
1 7 Defendant's Reply Brief at 2. 
18 Napster I at 4. 
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transmitting, routing, or providing connections must occur "through the system or 
network". 1 9 
The R I A A argued in the alternative that, i f users' computers were part o f the Napster 
system, copies o f MP3 files were stored on the system longer than reasonably 
necessary for transmission, and thus subparagraph 512(a)(4) was not satisfied. 
Finally, the R I A A noted that under the general threshold eligibili ty requirements 
established in subsection 512(i), a service provider must have adopted, reasonably 
implemented, and informed its users o f a policy for terminating repeat infringers. 
The R I A A contended that Napster only adopted its copyright compliance policy after 
the onset o f litigation and even then did not discipline infringers in any meaningful 
way. 
B . Independent Analysis of Functions 
Citing subsection 512(n), the R I A A argued that the 512(a) safe harbour did not offer 
blanket protection to Napster's entire system. The R I A A considered the focus o f the 
litigation to be Napster's function as an information location tool which is eligible for 
protection, i f at all, under the more rigorous subsection 512(d). Subsection 512(d) 
imposes more demanding eligibility requirements. 
Napster counter-argued in two ways. First, i t argued that subsection 512(a), rather 
than 512(d), applied because the information location tools i t provided were 
incidental to its core function o f automatically transmitting, routing, or providing 
connections for the MP3 files users select. In the alternative, Napster maintained 
that, even i f the District Court decided to analyse the information location functions 
under 512(d), it should hold that the 512(a) safe harbour protected other aspects o f the 
Napster service. 
The District Court found that Napster undisputedly performed some information 
location functions.' Functions like the search engine, indexing and 'hot list' allowed 
users to locate files and other users. However, Napster argued that these information 
1 9 § 512(a). 
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location tools were incidental to the system's core function o f transmitting MP3 
music files, and for this reason, the District Court should apply subsection 512(a). 
However the District Court noted that Napster had advertised the ease wi th which its 
users can locate "millions o f songs" online without "wading through page after page 
o f unknown artists".2 1 The District Court found that such statements by Napster to 
promote its service were "tantamount to an admission that its search and indexing 
functions are essential to its marketability". 2 2 As such the District Court held that 
some o f these essential functions - including but not limited to the search engine and 
index - should be analysed under subsection 512(d). 
The District Court went on to note that the potential applicability o f subsection 512(d) 
did not completely foreclose use o f the 512(a) safe harbour as an affirmative 
defence. 2 3 Furthermore, it noted that a ruling that subsection 512(a) applies to any 
given function would not mean that the D M C A afforded Napster blanket protection. 
C . Subsection 512(a) 
1. Transmitting 
The R I A A ' s main argument against application o f the 512(a) safe harbour was that 
Napster did not perform the passive conduit function eligible for protection under this 
subsection. The District Court noted that the words "conduit" or "passive conduit" 
did not appear in 512(a), but were found only in the legislative history o f the 
D M C A . 2 4 The R I A A contended that the use o f the word "conduit" in the legislative 
history explained the meaning o f "through a system" in subsection 512(a). 
The District Court noted that Napster expressly denied that the transmission o f MP3 
files ever passed through its servers. Indeed, testimony stated that "files reside on the 
computers o f Napster users, and are transmitted directly between those computers". 
Napster I at 5. 
2 1 Frackman Declaration § 4. 
2 2 Napster I at 6. 
2 3 See § 512(n). 
2 4 Napster fat 6. 
2 5 Kessler Declaration § 14. 
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MP3 files are transmitted "from the Host user's hard drive and Napster browser, 
through the Internet to the recipient's Napster browser and hard dr ive". 2 6 However, 
the District court noted that the Internet could not be considered "a system or network 
controlled or operated by or for the service provider". 2 7 
To get around this problem, Napster claimed that its servers and MusicShare 
browsers on its users' computers were all part o f Napster's overall system. However, 
Napster narrowly defined its system to include the browsers on users' computers. 
Whereas, the R I A A argued that either the system did not include the browsers, or it 
included not only the browsers, but also the users' computers themselves. 
The District Court found that even assuming that the system included the browser on 
each user's computer, the MP3 files were not transmitted "through" the system within 
the meaning o f subsection 512(a). 2 8 The District Court noted that Napster 
emphasised the passivity o f its role-stating that all "files transfer directly f rom the 
computer of one Napster user through the Internet to the computer o f the requesting 
29 
user". Further it admitted that the transmission bypassed the Napster server. 
The District Court held that this meant that even i f each user's Napster browser was 
part o f the system, the transmission went f rom one part o f the system to another, or 
between parts o f the system, but not "through" the system. 3 0 The District Court 
consequently found that subsection 512(a) did not protect the transmission o f MP3 
files. 
2. Providing connections 
However, the prefatory language o f subsection 512(a) is disjunctive. Therefore, the 
District Court noted that its finding that transmission did not occur "through" the 
system or network did not foreclose the possibility that subsection 512(a) applied to 
"routing" or "providing connections". As such, each o f these functions was to be 
analysed independently. 
2 6 ibid § 12-13. 
2 7 § 512(a). 
2 8 Napster I<n\ 1. 
2 9 Defendant's Bief at 5. 
3 0 Napster I at 7. 
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Napster contended that providing connections between users' addresses "constitutes 
the value of the system to the users and the public". 3 1 This connection could not be 
established without the provision of the host's address to the Napster browser 
software installed on the requesting user's computer. The central Napster server 
delivered the host's address. Nevertheless, the District Court found that Napster did 
not provide connections "through" its system. 
According to the District Court, although the Napster server conveyed address 
information to establish a connection between the requesting and host users, the 
connection itself occurred through the Internet. The District Court noted the 
legislative history of section 512 demonstrated that Congress intended the 512(a) safe 
harbour to apply only to activities "in which a service provider plays the role of a 
'conduit' for the communications of others". 
In drawing inferences in the light most favourable to the RIAA, the District Court 
could not say that Napster served as a conduit for the connection itself, as opposed to 
the address information that made the connection possible. The District Court 
consequently held that Napster enabled or facilitated the initiation of connections, but 
these connections did not pass through the system within the meaning of subsection 
512(a).3 4 
3. Routing 
The meaning of "routing" had not been discussed in the legislative history. Napster 
tried to make "routing" and "providing connections" appear synonymous. However, 
the District Court doubted that Congress would have used the terms "routing" and 
"providing connections" disjunctively i f they had the same meaning.35 The District 
Court found that it was clear from all submissions that the route of the allegedly 
infringing material went through the Internet from the host to the requesting user, not 
3 1 Defendant's Brief at 15. 
3 2 Napster I at 8. 
33 House of Representatives Report, Report No. 105-551(11) (1998) ("House Report 1998") at 130. 
34 Napster I at 8. 
35 Napster I at 8. 
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through the Napster server. As such, the District Court held that routing did not occur 
through the Napster system.36 
The District Court held that because Napster did not transmit, route, or provide 
connections through its system, it had failed to demonstrate that it qualified for the 
512(a) safe harbour and declined to grant summary adjudication in its favour. 3 7 
D. Copyright Compliance Policy 
The District Court stated that even i f it had determined that Napster met the criteria 
detailed in subsection 512(a), the RIAA still challenged Napster's compliance with 
the subsection 512(i) eligibility requirements. 
First, it pointed to evidence that Napster had not adopted a written policy of which its 
users had notice until on or around February 7 2000 - two months after the filing of 
the lawsuit. Testimony showed that although Napster had a copyright compliance 
policy as early as October 1999, it was not was reflected in any document, or 
communicated to any user. 
The District Court noted that Congress did not intend to require a service provider to 
"investigate possible infringements, monitor its service or make difficult judgments 
as to whether conduct is or is not infringing", but the notice requirement is designed 
to insure that flagrant or repeat infringers "know that there is a realistic threat of 
losing [their] access". 
Further, the District Court stated that the fact that Napster developed and notified its 
users of a formal policy after the onset of the action should not moot RIAA's claim to 
monetary relief for past harms. The District Court held that without further 
documentation, Napster's argument that it has satisfied subsection 512(i) is "merely 
conclusory and does not support summary adjudication in its favor". 3 9 
ibid at 8. 
ibid at 8. 
House Report 1998 at 154. 
Napster / at 9. 
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The District Court noted that summary adjudication was also inappropriate because 
Napster had not shown that it reasonably implemented a policy for terminating repeat 
infringers. 4 0 When Napster was formally notified of infringing activity, it blocked the 
infringer's password so that they could not log on to the Napster service using that 
password.41 The District Court noted that Napster did not block the IP addresses of 
infringing users, and it was disputed whether it was feasible or effective to do so. 
The RIAA claimed that Napster wilfully turned a blind eye to the identity of its users 
because their anonymity allowed Napster to disclaim responsibility for copyright 
infringement. Hence, the RIAA contended, "infringers may readily reapply to the 
Napster system to recommence their infringing downloading and uploading of MP3 
music files" 4 2 
The District Court noted that testimony also casted doubt on Napster's contention that 
blocking IP addresses was not a reasonable means of terminating infringers. This 
was especially so as Napster did ban the IP addresses of users who ran software 
i 
V AT. 
"bots" on the service. 
Overall, the District Court held that Napster's copyright compliance policy was 
neither timely nor reasonable within the meaning of subparagraph 512(i)(A). 4 4 
4 U S e e § 512(i)(A). 
4 1 See Kessler Declaration § 23. 
4 2 Plaintiffs' Brief at 24. 
4 3 A "bot" is a software program that performs actions continuously, in a robotic fashion. 
4 4 Napster I at 10. 
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4. District Court's Discussion on the Preliminary Injunction45 
A. Proof of Direct Infringement 
The District Court found that the RIAA established a prima facie case of direct 
copyright infringement. Virtually all Napster users engaged in the unauthorized 
downloading or uploading of copyrighted music. Napster users who uploaded file 
names to the search index for others to copy violated the RIAA's distribution rights.46 
Napster users who downloaded files containing copyrighted music violated the 
RIAA's reproduction rights 4 7 
The District Court found that according to the evidence as much as 87% of the files 
available on Napster were copyrighted, and more than 70% were owned or 
administered by the RIAA. 
B. Fair Use and Substantial Non-Infringing Use 
Napster asserted the affirmative defences of fair use and substantial non-infringing 
use. The District Court ultimately found that any potential non-infringing use of the 
48 
Napster service was "minimal or connected to the infringing activity, or both". The 
District Court further noted, that the substantial or commercially significant use of the 
service was the unauthorised downloading and uploading of popular music, most of 
which was copyrighted. 
1. General Fair Use Analysis 
The District Court first conducted a general fair use analysis of Naspter by referring 
to the list of fair use factors in section 107.49 
The District Court found that the purpose and character of the use militated against a 
finding of fair use of Napster. Ascertaining whether the new work transformed the 
4 5 Napster II. 
4 6 See § 106(3). 
4 7 S e e § 106(1). 
4* Napster II at 9\2. 
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copyrighted material satisfies the main goal of the first factor.50 The District Court 
found that the RIAA "persuasively" argued that downloading MP3 files did not 
transform the copyrighted music.51 In this respect the RIAA cited the MP3.com 
case.52 
Also under the first factor, the court must determine whether the use is commercial. 
This would weigh against, but would not preclude, a determination of fairness.53 The 
District Court held that "although downloading and uploading MP3 music files is not 
paradigmatic commercial activity, it is also not personal use in the traditional 
sense".54 
Even though the RIAA did not show that the majority of Napster users downloaded 
music for profit, according to the District Court, at the very least, a host user sending 
a file could not be said to engage in a personal use when distributing that file to an 
anonymous requester.55 Moreover, the fact that Napster users got for free something 
they would ordinarily have to buy suggested that they reaped economic advantages 
from Napster use. 
With respect to the second fair use factor the District Court found that the 
copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings were creative in nature. As 
such they constitute entertainment, which cuts against a finding of fair use under the 
second factor.56 
As to the third factor, the District Court found that it was undisputed that 
downloading or uploading MP3 music files involved copying the entirety of the 
copyrighted work. Such wholesale copying for private home use tips the fair use 
analysis in the RIAA's favour if such copying is likely to adversely affect the market 
for the copyrighted material.57 
5 0 See Campbell at 579. 
51 Napster II at 912. 
5 2 See MP3.com at 351. 
" See Campbell at 584. 
5 4 Napster IIat 912. 
5 5 ibid at 912. 
5 6 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) at 563. 
5 7 See Sony at 449-50, 456. 
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Finally, the District Court found that the fourth factor - the effect on the potential 
market for the copyrighted work - also weighed against a finding of fair use. 
According to the District Court the RIAA produced evidence that Napster use harmed 
the market for its copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings in at least 
two ways. First, it reduced CD sales among college students. Second, it raised 
barriers to the RIAA's entry into the market for the digital downloading of music. 
2. Specific Fair Uses 
Napster asserted several potential fair uses of the Napster service, 
(a) Sampling 
Sampling in this context is where a user makes temporary copies of a work before 
purchasing it. The District Court found that sampling on Napster was not a personal 
use in the traditional sense that courts have recognised - copying which occurs within 
58 
the household and does not confer any financial benefit on the user. Instead, 
sampling on Napster amounted to obtaining permanent copies of songs that users 
would otherwise have to purchase. Not only this, but it also carried the potential for 
viral distribution to millions of people. 
The District Court found that Napster had ignored critical differences between 
sampling songs on Napster and VCR usage in the Sony case.59 First, while time-
shifting TV broadcasts merely enabled a viewer to see a work which they had been 
invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the RIAA almost always charge for 
their music. The RIAA only made promotional downloads available on a highly 
restricted basis, and copyright holders also earned royalties from streamed song 
samples on retail web sites. 
Second, the majority of VCR purchasers in Sony did not distribute taped television 
broadcasts, but merely enjoyed them at home. In contrast, a Napster user who 
downloaded a copy of a song also made that song available to millions of other 
individuals, even i f they eventually chose to purchase the CD. As such so-called 
5 8 Napster II at 9U. 
76 
The RIAA and Napster, Inc. 
sampling on Napster may have quickly facilitated unauthorised distribution at an 
exponential rate. 
Napster's argument that using Napster to sample music was identical to visiting a free 
listening station in a record store, or listening to song samples on a retail web site, 
failed to convince the District Court because Napster users could keep the music they 
download. Whether or not they decide to buy the CD, they still obtained a permanent 
copy of the song. In contrast, many retail sites only offer thirty-to-sixty-second 
samples in streaming audio format, and promotional downloads from the RIAA are 
often 'timed-out' that is, they exist only for a short time on the user's computer. 
The District Court found that the global scale of Napster usage and the fact that users 
avoided paying for songs that otherwise would not be free militated against a 
determination that sampling by Napster users constitutes personal or home use in the 
traditional sense.60 The District Court held that even i f the type of sampling 
supposedly done on Napster was a non-commercial use, the RIAA had demonstrated 
a substantial likelihood that it would adversely affect the potential market for their 
copyrighted works if it became widespread. 
The RIAA claimed three general types of harm: a decrease in retail sales, especially 
among college students; an obstacle to its future entry into the digital downloading 
market; and a social devaluing of music stemming from its free distribution. 
An expert for the RIAA concluded that the more songs Napster users downloaded, 
the more likely they were to reveal that such use reduced their music buying.61 The 
District Court found that such evidence suggested that sampling and building a free 
music library through unauthorised downloading were not mutually exclusive. As 
such it was Napster users - not the RIAA - who controlled the music selection, the 
amount and the timing of the sampling activity, and who were able to keep songs 
after deciding not to purchase the music. 
5 9 ibid at 913. 
6 0 Napster II at 914. 
6 1 See Jay Report at 4, 18. 
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On the other hand Napster maintained that sampling did not decrease retail music 
sales and may even stimulate them. To support this assertion, it relied heavily on 
evidence from an expert who concluded that consumers do not view MP3 files as 
perfect substitutes for CDs. This evidence included an assertion that "60% of online 
users who download free digital music do so to preview music before buying the 
CD". 6 2 
The District Court found that this evidence relied on by Napster was unreliable and 
failed to rebut the RIAA's showing of harm. As such, the District Court found that 
the RIAA had demonstrated a meaningful likelihood that the activity Napster called 
sampling did actually decrease retail sales of its music.63 
Furthermore, the District Court noted that any potential enhancement of the RIAA's 
sales due to sampling would not tip the fair use analysis conclusively in Napster's 
favour. The courts have rejected the suggestion that a positive impact on sales 
negates the copyright holder's entitlement to licensing fees or access to derivative 
markets. The District Court found the MP3.com opinion "especially instructive".64 
Similar to the RIAA in the MP3.com case, the RIAA here alleged that Napster use 
impeded its entry into the online market. Evidence showed that the RIAA had 
already expended considerable funds and effort to commence Internet sales and 
licensing for digital downloads. Furthermore, an economic expert opined that the 
availability of free MP3 files would reduce the market for authorised, commercial 
downloading.65 
The District Court found that this point was corroborated by the fact that all 49 songs 
available for purchase on Sony's web site could be obtained for free using Napster. 
The District Court found that if consumers chose to buy, rather than burn, entire CDs 
they were still more likely to obtain permanent copies of songs on Napster than buy 
them from Sony's site or listen to streamed samples at other online locations.66 
Fader Report § 74. 
Napster II at 914. 
ibid at 915. 
See Teece Declaration at 14-18. 
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The District Court concluded that, even assuming the sampling alleged in this case 
was a non-commercial use, the RIAA had demonstrated a meaningful likelihood that 
it would adversely affect their entry into the online market i f it became widespread. 
Moreover, it deprived the RIAA of royalties for individual songs. Furthermore, the 
District Court held that the unauthorised downloading of the RIAA's music to sample 
songs would not constitute a fair use, even i f it enhanced CD sales.67 
(b) Space-shifting 
Space-shifting in this context is where a user accesses a sound recording through the 
Napster system that they already own in audio CD format. The District Court was 
unconvinced that Sony applied to space-shifting. The District Court found that 
Napster "erroneously relies on the Ninth Circuit's assertion, in a case involving an 
inapplicable statute, that space-shifting constitutes non-commercial personal use".68 
The District Court was making reference to the Diamond case and the applicability of 
the AHRA to the Rio. 6 9 The District Court found that the AHRA was irrelevant here 
as the RIAA had not brought their claim under the AHRA. Furthermore, the District 
Court noted that the Ninth Circuit did not hold in Diamond that the AHRA covered 
the downloading of MP3 files.7 0 
The District Court noted that Napster also implied that space-shifting music was 
sufficiently analogous to time-shifting television broadcasts to merit the protection of 
Sony. Napster produced evidence that space-shifting - like time-shifting - leaves the 
value of the copyrights unharmed because it does not displace sales. This evidence 
also included the statistic that 70 percent of Napster users at least sometimes engage 
in space-shifting. This evidence had come from the same expert whom the District 
Court had held was unreliable. 
ibid at 915. 
ibid at 915. 
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Moreover, under either analysis, the District Court found that Napster was 
distinguishable from Sony because the Supreme Court determined in Sony that time-
71 
shifting represented the principal, rather than an occasional use of VCRs. 
Napster also contended that, i f space-shifting was deemed to be a fair use, the staple 
article of commerce doctrine would preclude liability for contributory or vicarious 
infringement. This was because under Sony, the copyright holder cannot extend his 
72 
monopoly to products "capable of substantial noninfringing uses". 
However, the District Court held that Napster failed to show that space-shifting 
73 
constituted a commercially significant use of Napster. Instead, the District court 
found that the most credible explanation for the exponential growth of traffic to the 
website, was the vast array of free MP3 files offered by other users - not the ability of 
each individual to space-shift music he already owns. Thus, according to the District 
Court even i f space-shifting was a fair use, it was not substantial enough to preclude 
liability under the staple article of commerce doctrine. 
The District Court also declined to apply the staple article of commerce doctrine 
because, it found that Napster exercised ongoing control over its service.74 In Sony, 
the defendant's participation did not extend past manufacturing and selling the VCRs: 
"[t]he only contact between Sony and the users of the Betamax ... occurred at the 
moment of sale".75 Here, in contrast, Napster maintained and supervised an 
integrated system that users must access to upload or download files. 
Indeed, the courts have distinguished the protection Sony offers to the manufacture 
and sale of a device from scenarios in which the defendant continues to exercise 
control over the device's use.76 As such the District Court found that Napster's 
"facilitation of unauthorized file-sharing smacks of the contributory infringement in 
these cases, rather than the legitimate conduct of the VCR manufacturers".77 
71 See Sony at 421. 
7 2 Sony at 442. 
7 3 Napster II at 9\6. 
7 4 ibid at 916. 
7 5 Sony at 438. 
7 6 e.g. see A&M Records, Inc. v. General Audio Video Cassettes, Inc., 948 F.Supp. 1449 ( C D . Cal. 
1996) at 1456-57. 
77 Napster 11 at 9\1. 
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Consequently, Napster's control over the service, as opposed to mere manufacturing 
or selling, meant that the existence of a potentially unobjectionable use like space-
shifting did not defeat the RIAA's claims. 
(c) The New Artist Program 
The District Court found that none of the other potential non-infringing uses of 
Napster precluded contributory or vicarious liability. 
The New Artist Program was the permissive distribution of recordings by both new 
and established artists. Napster claimed that it engaged in the authorised promotion 
of independent artists, 98% of who are not represented by the RIAA. However, the 
District Court found that the New Artist Program did not represent a substantial or 
commercially significant aspect of Napster. The evidence suggested that Napster 
initially promoted the availability of songs by major stars, as opposed to "page after 
page of unknown artists".79 
The District Court noted that Napster's purported mission of distributing music by 
artists unable to obtain record-label representation appears to have been developed 
later. For example, Napster did not launch the web site aspect of its New Artist 
Program until after the RIAA filed suit, and as recently as luly 2000, bona fide new 
artists constituted a very small percentage of music available on Napster. The 
District Court held that in any event, Napster's primary role of facilitating the 
unauthorised copying and distribution established artists' songs rendered Sony 
inapplicable.80 
Furthermore, the District Court noted that the RIAA did not object to all of the 
supposedly non-infringing uses of Napster. Indeed, they did not seek an injunction 
covering chat rooms or message boards, the New Artist Program or any distribution 
authorised by copyright holders. Furthermore, the RIAA did not they seek to enjoin 
applications unrelated to the recording industry. 
ibid at 917. 
ibid at 917. 
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The District Court noted that the RIAA did not ask the court to shut down such 
satellite activities, the fact that these activities may be non-infringing did not decrease 
the RIAA's likelihood of success. The District Court therefore found that the RIAA 
81 
had established a reasonable probability of proving third-party infringement. 
C. Contributory Copyright Infringement 
Once they had shown direct infringement by Napster users, the RIAA had to 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on their contributory infringement claim. 
1. Knowledge 
The District Court noted that the RIAA presented convincing evidence that Napster 
executives actually knew about and sought to protect use of the service to transfer 
illegal MP3 files. For example, a document authored by co-founder Sean Parker 
mentioned the need to remain ignorant of users' real names and IP addresses since 
they were exchanging pirated music. 
The same document stated that, in bargaining with the RIAA, Napster would benefit 
from the fact that Napster was not just making pirated music available but also 
pushing demand. The District Court found that "these admissions suggest that 
facilitating the unauthorized exchange of copyrighted music was a central part of 
Napster, Inc.'s business strategy from the inception". 
The RIAA also demonstrated that Napster had actual notice of direct infringement 
because the RIAA informed it of more than 12,000 infringing files. Although 
Napster, purportedly terminated the users offering these files, the songs were still 
available using the Napster service, as were the copyrighted works which the RIAA 
had further identified. 
US copyright law does not require actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement. 
Accordingly, the District Court rejected Napster's argument that titles in the Napster 
81 Napster II at 917. 
8 2 ibid at 918. 
8 3 ibid at 918. 
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directory cannot be used to distinguish infringing from non-infringing files and thus 
that they could not know about infringement by any particular user of any particular 
• 84 
musical recording or composition. 
The District Court found that at the very least, Napster had constructive knowledge of 
its users' illegal conduct.85 Some Napster executives boasted recording industry 
experience, and Napster did not dispute that it possessed enough sophistication about 
intellectual property laws to sue a rock band that copied its logo. Furthermore, the 
evidence indicated that Napster executives downloaded infringing material to their 
own computers using the service and promoted the website with screen shots listing 
infringing files. 
The District Court held that such conduct satisfied the objective test for constructive 
knowledge - Napster had reason to know about infringement by third parties.86 The 
District Court also noted that this finding also puts an end to Napster's "persistent" 
attempts to invoke the protection of the subsection 512(d) safe harbour of the DMCA. 
2. Material Contribution 
The District Court held that the RIAA had shown that Napster materially contributed 
* • • • 87 
to the infringing activity. 
In Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit held the copyright holders' allegations were "sufficient 
to show material contribution" because "it would have been difficult for the 
infringing activity to take place in the massive quantities alleged without the support 
• * 88 
services provided by the swap meet". 
The District Court agreed with the RIAA's characterisation that in this case Napster is 
essentially an Internet swap meet albeit more technologically sophisticated.89 The 
swap meet provided support services like parking, booth space, advertising, and 
Napster IIat 9IS. 
ibid at 919. 
ibid at 919. 
ibid at 919. 
See Fonovisa at 264. 
Napster II at 920. 
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clientele. Here, Napster supplied the proprietary software, search engine, servers, and 
means of establishing a connection between users' computers. Without the support 
services Napster provided, its users could not find and download the music they 
wanted with the ease of which Napster boasted. 
The District Court noted that several contributory infringement cases involving online 
services were in accord with its conclusion that Napster materially contributed to the 
infringing activity.90 
In keeping with its view that Napster played a more active role in facilitating file-
sharing than an ISP acting as a passive conduit, the District Court found it probable 
that Napster materially contributed to unlawful conduct. As such the District Court 
I 
held that the RIAA had established a reasonable likelihood of success on their claim 
of contributory infringement.91 
D. Vicarious Copyright Infringement 
Next, the District addressed the RIAA's claim for vicarious copyright infringement. 
1. The Right and Ability to Supervise 
In Fonovisa, the swap meet operator satisfied the first element of vicarious liability 
because it had the right to terminate vendors at will, and because it also controlled 
customers' access and promoted its services.92 The District Court noted that although 
Napster argued that it is technologically difficult, and perhaps infeasible, to 
distinguish legal and illegal conduct, the RIAA had shown that Napster supervises its 
93 
use. 
Indeed, the District Court noted that Napster itself took pains to inform the court of 
its improved methods of blocking users about whom copyright holders complained.94 
This, the District Court found, was tantamount to an admission that it could have, and 
9 0 e.g. Netcom at 1375. 
" Napster II at 920. 
9 2 See Fonovisa at 262. 
9 3 Napster II at 920. 
9 4 See Defendant's Opposition Brief at 19. 
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sometimes did, police its service. Moreover, the District Court noted that a defendant 
need not exercise its supervisory powers to be deemed capable of doing so.95 
The District Court therefore found that Napster had the right and ability to supervise 
its users' infringing conduct.96 
2. Direct Financial Interest 
The District Court found that the RIAA had already shown a reasonable likelihood 
that Napster had a direct financial interest in the infringing activity.97 Citing several 
cases, the RIAA contended that direct financial benefit did not require earned 
revenue, so long as the defendant had economic incentives for tolerating unlawful 
behaviour.98 
The District Court noted that although Napster did not generate any revenue, its 
internal documents stated that it would earn revenues directly from increases in its 
user-base. In turn, the Napster service attracted more and more users by offering an 
increasing amount of music for free. The District Court noted that Napster hoped to 
"monetize" its user base through one of several generation revenue models.99 
The District Court found that this was similar to the type of direct financial interest 
the Ninth Circuit found sufficient for vicarious liability in Fonovisa, where the swap 
meet's revenues flowed directly from customers drawn by the availability of music at 
bargain basement prices.100 
Relying on Netcom, Napster maintained that it did not have a policy of ignoring 
infringement, and that even i f it did, its non-infringing uses lured consumers to its 
service.101 The District Court found that Napster's latter contention, for which it 
See Gershwin at 1161-63. 
Napster II at 921. 
ibid at 921. 
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provided no factual support, did not square with its prediction that the requested 
• 102 
injunction would effectively put Napster out of business. 
If many of Napster's commercially significant uses were non-infringing, an 
injunction limited to unlawful activity would not have such a dire impact. The 
District Court found that Napster's "representations about the primacy of its 
legitimate uses thus appear disingenuous".103 Indeed, the District Court found that 
"the ability to download myriad popular music files without payment seems to 
constitute the glittering object that attracts Napster's financially-valuable user 
base".104 
As such the District Court held that the RIAA had shown a reasonable likelihood of 
success on their claim of vicarious infringement. 
E. The District Court's Conclusion 
The District Court held that because the RIAA had shown a reasonable likelihood of 
success on the merits of their contributory and vicarious copyright infringement 
claims, they were entitled to a preliminary injunction against Napster. 
As such Napster was preliminarily enjoined "from engaging in, or facilitating others 
in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs' 
copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings, protected by either federal 
or state law, without express permission of the rights owner".105 This injunction 
applied to all such works that the RIAA owned and was not limited to those listed in 
their complaint. 
The District Court held that the RIAA had shown persuasively that they own the 
copyrights to more than 70% of the music available on the Napster system. The 
District Court held that because Napster has contributed to illegal copying on a scale 
that is without precedent, it bears the burden of developing a means to comply with 
Napster II aX 921-922. 
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the injunction. The District Court held that Napster had to insure that no work owned 
by the RIAA which neither Napster nor its users have permission to use or distribute 
is uploaded or downloaded on Napster. The District Court ordered the RIAA to co-
operate with Napster in identifying the works to which they own copyrights. 
F. The Preliminary Injunction 
The District Court ordered Napster to comply with the preliminary injunction by 
midnight on July 28 2000. However, before that deadline the Ninth Circuit stayed the 
preliminary injunction pending a review of the District Court's decision. 
5. Ninth Circuit's Discussion on the Preliminary Injunction106 
The Ninth Circuit then reviewed the District Court's decision to grant the preliminary 
injunction. The Ninth Circuit began its discussion by agreeing with the District Court 
that the RIAA had established a prima facie case of direct infringement. Next the 
Ninth Circuit addressed Napster's fair use defences and the District Court's 
corresponding analysis. 
A. Fair Use 
Overall the Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court's conclusion that Napster 
• 107 
users are not fair users. 
1. The District Court's General Fair Analysis 
With regard to the "purpose and character" of the use, the District Court first 
concluded that downloading MP3 files did not transform the copyrighted work. The 
Ninth Circuit found this conclusion to be supportable.108 
This "purpose and character" element also required the District Court to determine 
whether the allegedly infringing use was commercial or non-commercial.109 The 
106 Napster III. 
1 0 7 ibid at 1014-1015. 
1 0 8 ibid at 1015. 
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Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court's finding that the infringing use was a 
commercial use and thus weighed against a finding of fair use.110 The Ninth Circuit 
stated that in the present case, commercial use would be demonstrated by a showing 
that repeated and exploitative unauthorised copies of copyrighted works were made to 
save the expense of purchasing authorised copies. The Ninth Circuit held that the 
RIAA had made such a showing before the District Court. 
In relation to the nature of the use, the Ninth Circuit found no error in the District 
Court's conclusion. With regard to the third factor, the portion used, the Ninth 
Circuit agreed with the District Court that Napster users engage in "wholesale 
copying" of copyrighted work because file transfer necessarily "involves copying the 
entirety of the copyrighted work".1 1 1 However, the Ninth Circuit did note that under 
certain circumstances, a court will conclude that a use is fair even when the protected 
112 
work is copied m its entirety. 
With regard to the fourth fair use factor, the effect of use on the market, the Ninth 
Circuit ultimately concluded that the District Court made sound findings related to 
Napster's deleterious effect on the present and future digital download market. 
Moreover, The Ninth Circuit stated that the lack of harm to an established market 
cannot deprive the copyright holder of the right to develop alternative markets for the 
works. 
The Ninth Circuit found that here, similar to L.A. Times v. Free Republic and 
MP3.com, the record supports the District Court's finding that the "record company 
plaintiffs have already expended considerable funds and effort to commence Internet 
sales and licensing for digital downloads".113 Having digital downloads available for 
free on the Napster system necessarily harms the RIAA's attempts to charge for the 
same downloads. 
, o s See Campbell at 584-85. 
110 Napster IIIat 1015. 
111 Napster II at 913. 
1 1 2 e.g. see Sony at 449-50. 
113 Napster II at 915. See L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453 (C.D.Cal. 2000) at 1469-
71. 
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The Ninth Circuit next addressed Napster's identified uses of sampling and space-
shifting. 
2. Specific Fair Uses 
(a) Sampling 
Napster contended that its users download MP3 files to 'sample' the music in order to 
decide whether to purchase the recording. The District Court determined that 
sampling remains a commercial use even i f some users eventually purchase the 
music. The Ninth Circuit found no error in the District Court's determination.114 
The Ninth Circuit found that the RIAA had established that they were likely to 
succeed in proving that even authorised temporary downloading of individual songs 
for sampling purposes is commercial in nature. The Ninth Circuit found that the 
record supports the District Court's preliminary determinations on this issue. Firstly, 
that the more music that sampling users download, the less likely they are to 
eventually purchase the recordings on audio CD. Secondly, that even i f the audio CD 
market is not harmed, Napster has adverse effects on the developing digital download 
market.115 
Napster further argued that the District Court erred in rejecting its evidence that the 
users' downloading of 'samples' increases or tends to increase audio CD sales. The 
Ninth Circuit found that the District Court, however, correctly noted that any 
potential enhancement of the RIAA's would not tip the fair use analysis in Napster's 
favour. The Ninth Circuit agreed that increased sales of copyrighted material 
attributable to unauthorised use should not deprive the copyright holder of the right to 
license the material. Furthermore, a positive impact in one market, here the audio CD 
market, should not deprive the copyright holder of the right to develop identified 
alternative markets, here the digital download market. 
(b) Space-Shifting 
114 Napster IIIat 1018. 
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Napster asserted that the Ninth Circuit in Diamond had already held that space-
shifting of musical compositions and sound recordings was a fair use. However, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that that the District Court did not err when it refused to 
apply the 'shifting' analyses of Sony and Diamond, 
The Ninth Circuit found both Diamond and Sony to be inapplicable because the 
methods of shifting in these cases did not also simultaneously involve distribution of 
the copyrighted material to the general public. Indeed, the time or space-shifting of 
copyrighted material in those cases exposed the material only to the original user. 
The Ninth Circuit stated that conversely, it is obvious that once a user lists a copy of 
music he already owns on the Napster system in order to access the music from 
another location, the song becomes "available to millions of other individuals", not 
just the original CD owner. 1 1 6 Here the Ninth Circuit cited the MP3.com case in 
support.1 1 7 
As such the Ninth Circuit found no error in the District Court's determination that the 
RIAA would likely succeed in establishing that Napster users did not have a fair use 
118 
defence. Accordingly, next the Ninth Circuit addressed whether Napster was 
secondarily liable for contributory infringement and vicarious infringement. 
B. Contributory Liability 
The Ninth Circuit found that the District Court did not err in finding that the RIAA 
would establish Napster's liability as a contributory infringer. The Ninth Circuit 
found that Napster, by its conduct, knowingly encourages and assists the infringement 
of the RIAA's copyrights. 1 1 9 
1. Knowledge 
115 Napster III at 1018. 
1 1 6 ibid at 1019. 
117 SeeMP3.com at 351-52. 
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The Ninth Circuit found that it was apparent from the record that Napster had 
knowledge,|)oth actual and constructive, of direct infringement. Napster claimed that 
it is nevertheless was protected from contributory liability because of the Sony case. 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. 
The Ninth Circuit observed that Napster's actual, specific knowledge of direct 
infringement renders the Sony case of limited assistance to Napster. The Ninth 
Circuit stated that it was compelled to make a clear distinction between the 
architecture of the Napster system and Napster's conduct in relation to the operational 
• 120 
capacity of the system. 
The Sony Court refused to hold the manufacturer and retailers of VCRs liable for 
contributory infringement despite evidence that such machines could be and were 
used to infringe the plaintiffs' copyrighted television shows. Sony stated that i f 
liability "is to be imposed on petitioners in this case, it must rest on the fact that they 
have sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers 
may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material". 
The Sony Court declined to impute the requisite level of knowledge where the 
defendants made and sold equipment capable of both infringing and 'substantial 
noninfringing uses'. 
The Ninth Circuit held that it was bound to follow Sony, and would not impute the 
requisite level of knowledge to Napster merely because peer-to-peer file sharing 
technology may be used to infringe the RIAA's copyrights. The Ninth Circuit 
departed from the reasoning of the District Court that Napster failed to demonstrate 
that its system is capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses.122 
The Ninth Circuit found that the District Court improperly confined the use analysis 
to current uses, ignoring the Napster system's capabilities. The Ninth Circuit stated 
that consequently, the District Court placed undue weight on the proportion of current 
infringing use as compared to current and future noninfringing use. 
1 2 0 Napster IIIat 1020. 
121 Sony at 439. 
122 Napster III"at 1021. 
91 
The RIAA and Napster, Inc. 
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit found that regardless of the number of Napster's 
infringing versus noninfringing uses, the evidentiary record here supported the 
District Court's finding that the RIAA would likely prevail in establishing that 
Napster knew or had reason to know of its users' infringement of the RIAA's 
copyrights. 
The Ninth Circuit found that this analysis was similar to that of Netcom, which 
suggests that in an online context, evidence of actual knowledge of specific acts of 
infringement is required to hold a computer system operator liable for contributory 
copyright infringement. 1 2 3 
Netcom considered the potential contributory copyright liability of a computer 
bulletin board operator whose system supported the posting of infringing material. 1 2 4 
The court, in denying Netcom's motion for summary judgement of noninfringement 
and plaintiffs motion for judgement on the pleadings, found that a disputed issue of 
fact existed as to whether the operator had sufficient knowledge of infringing 
activity. 1 2 5 
The Netcom court determined that for the operator to have sufficient knowledge, the 
copyright holder must "provide the necessary documentation to show there is likely 
infringement". 1 2 6 I f such documentation was provided, the court reasoned that 
Netcom would be liable for contributory infringement because its failure to remove 
the material "and thereby stop an infringing copy from being distributed worldwide 
constitutes substantial participation" in distribution of copyrighted material. 1 2 7 
The Ninth Circuit agreed that i f a computer system operator learns of specific 
infringing material available on his system and fails to purge such material from the 
system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement. 1 2 8 Conversely, 
absent any specific information that identifies infringing activity, a computer system 
operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because the structure 
Netcom at 1371. 
ibid at 1374. 
ibid at 1374-75. 
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of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material. The Ninth Circuit 
noted that to enjoin simply because a computer network allows for infringing use 
would, in its opinion, violate Sony and potentially restrict activity unrelated to 
infringing use.1 3 0 
The Ninth Circuit nevertheless concluded that sufficient knowledge existed to impose 
contributory liability when linked to demonstrated infringing use of the Napster 
system. The Ninth Circuit found that the record supported the District Court's 
finding that Napster had actual knowledge that specific infringing material was 
available using its system, that it could block access to the system for suppliers of the 
infringing material, and that it failed to remove the material. 
2. Material Contribution 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court that Napster provided "the site and 
facilities" for direct infringement. 1 3 1 The Ninth Circuit found that the District Court 
correctly applied the reasoning in Fonovisa, and properly found that Napster 
materially contributes to direct infringement. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's conclusion that the RIAA 
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of the contributory copyright 
infringement claim. 
C. Vicarious Liability 
Next, the Ninth Circuit turned to the question of whether Napster engaged in 
vicarious copyright infringement. Importantly, the Ninth Circuit noted that Sony's 
"staple article of commerce" analysis had no application to Napster's potential 
liability for vicarious copyright infringement. 1 3 3 
1 2 9 See Sony at 436, 442-43. 
1 3 0 Napster III at 1021 
1 3 1 See Fonovisa at 264. 
1 3 2 Napster III at 1022. 
133 Napster III at 1022. 
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According to the Ninth Circuit the issues of Sony's liability under the doctrines of 
direct infringement and vicarious liability were not before the Supreme Court. 
However, the Supreme Court did recognised that the "lines between direct 
infringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious liability are not clearly 
drawn". 1 3 4 The Ninth Circuit noted that consequently, when the Sony court used the 
term "vicarious liability" it did so broadly and outside of a technical analysis of the 
doctrine of vicarious copyright infringement. 1 3 5 
1. Financial Benefit 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court's conclusion that Napster financially 
benefits from the availability of protected works on its system.1 3 6 Financial benefit 
exists where the availability of infringing material "acts as a 'draw' for customers".137 
The Ninth Circuit stated that ample evidence supports the District Court's finding that 
138 
Napster's future revenue is directly dependent upon "increases in userbase". More 
users register with the Napster system as the "quality and quantity of available music 
increases".139 
2. Supervision 
The District Court determined that Napster has the right and ability to supervise its 
users' conduct.1 4 0 The Ninth Circuit agreed in part. 
The ability to block infringers' access to a particular environment for any reason 
whatsoever is evidence of the right and ability to supervise.141 The Ninth Circuit 
found that the RIAA had demonstrated that Napster retains the right to control access 
to its system. Napster had an express reservation of rights policy. The Ninth Circuit 
held that to escape imposition of vicarious liability, the reserved right to police must 
1 3 4 See Sony at 435 n. 17, 
1 3 5 See ibid at 435. 
136 Napster III at 1023. 
137 Fonovisa at 263-64. 
1 3 8 Napster III at 1023 
1 3 9 Napster II at 902. 
1 4 0 ibid at 920-21. 
1 4 1 See Fonovisa at 262. 
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be exercised to its fullest extent. Turning a blind eye to detectable acts of 
infringement for the sake of profit gives rise to liability. 
The Ninth Circuit found that the District Court correctly determined that Napster had 
the right and ability to police its system and failed to exercise that right to prevent the 
exchange of copyrighted material. The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court, 
however, failed to recognise that the boundaries of the premises that Napster 
"controls and patrols" are limited. The Ninth Circuit stated that put differently, 
Napster's reserved "right and ability" to police is cabined by the system's current 
architecture. The Napster system does not 'read' the content of indexed files, other 
than to check that they are in the proper MP3 format. 
Napster, however, has the ability to locate infringing material listed on its search 
indices, and the right to terminate users' access to the system. The Ninth Circuit held 
that the file name indices, therefore, are within the "premises" that Napster has the 
ability to police. The Ninth Circuit stated that it recognised that the files are user-
named and may not match copyrighted material exactly. For Napster to function 
effectively, however, file names must reasonably or roughly correspond to the 
material contained in the files, otherwise no user could ever locate any desired music. 
The Ninth Circuit held that Napster's failure to police the system's "premises" 
combined with a showing that Napster financially benefited from the continuing 
availability of infringing files on its system, leads to the imposition of vicarious 
l iabil i ty. 1 4 2 
D. The Preliminary Injunction 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the District Court correctly recognised that a preliminary 
injunction against Napster's participation in copyright infringement is not only 
warranted but required. 1 4 3 The Ninth Circuit believed however, that the scope of the 
injunction needed modification in light of its opinion. 
143 
' Napster III at 1024. 
Napster III at 1027. 
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Specifically, it reiterated that contributory liability may potentially be imposed only 
to the extent that Napster: "(1) receives reasonable knowledge of specific infringing 
files with copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings; (2) knows or 
should know that such files are available on the Napster system; and (3) fails to act to 
prevent viral distribution of the works". 1 4 4 The Ninth Circuit noted that the mere 
existence of the Napster system, absent actual notice and Napster's demonstrated 
failure to remove the offending material, is insufficient to impose contributory 
l iabil i ty. 1 4 5 
The Ninth Circuit held that conversely, Napster may be vicariously liable when it 
fails to affirmatively use its ability to patrol its system and preclude access to 
potentially infringing files listed in its search index. 1 4 6 The Ninth Circuit found that 
Napster had both the ability to use its search function to identify infringing musical 
recordings and the right to bar participation of users who engage in the transmission 
of infringing files. 
The Ninth Circuit held that the preliminary injunction which it stayed was overbroad 
because it placed on Napster the entire burden of ensuring that no "copying, 
downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing" of the RIAA's works occur on 
the system.1 4 7 The Ninth Circuit stated that it now placed the burden on the RIAA to 
provide notice to Napster of copyrighted works and files containing such works 
available on the Napster system before Napster had the duty to disable access to the 
offending content. 
The Ninth Circuit also stated that Napster also bears the burden of policing the 
system within the limits of the system. The Ninth Circuit, recognised "that this is not 
an exact science in that the files are user named". 1 4 8 The Ninth Circuit held that in 
crafting the injunction on remand, the District Court should recognise that Napster's 
system does not currently appear to allow Napster access to users' MP3 files. 
See Netcom at 1374-75. 
See Sony at 442- 43. 
Napster III dt 1027. 
ibid at 1027. 
ibid at 1027. 
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E . Ninth Circuit's Conclusion 
The Ninth Circuit directed that the preliminary injunction fashioned by the District 
Court prior to the appeal by Napster was to remain stayed until it was modified to 
conform to the requirements of its opinion. 
6. The Aftermath 
With all the drama in the courtroom in the Napster case there was a lot going on 
outside the courtroom as well. After the Ninth Circuit's stay of the Preliminary 
Injunction, as the public awaited a judicial decision, the landscape of the case was 
rapidly changing. Napster itself, once the alleged darling of music pirates, became 
part of the corporate structure of a major record label. 
On October 31 2000, Napster and Bertelsmann AG, the majority shareholder of BMG 
Music and a plaintiff in the action against Napster, announced a surprising strategic 
alliance. 1 4 9 Bertelsmann AG agreed to loan Napster US$50 million to be used by 
Napster to develop a subscription-based membership service. 
The new service is intended to preserve the current Napster peer-to-peer file sharing 
experience, while providing royalty payments to recording artists, songwriters, 
recording companies and music publishers. Although neither company has 
commented in detail on the revenue model to be used, Napster has stated that a 
monthly fee of US$4.95 for use of the file sharing application is under 
consideration.150 Bertelsmann AG has agreed that, once the new service is 
implemented, it wi l l drop its current lawsuit against Napster. 
Leunig comments that "no doubt Napster's enormous user base and available music 
database, which is touted as the largest in the world, played a pivotal role in 
Bertelsmann AG's decision to forge a partnership with Napster".151 
Sheila M. Leunig, A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc.: The Fate Of Peer-To-Peer File Sharing 
Technology, 5 No. 2 Intell. Prop. L. Bull. 1 (2000) at 9. 
1 5 0 Daniel P. Dolan, The Big Bumpy Shift: Digital Music via Mobile Internet 
<http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_12/dolan/>. 
1 5 1 Sheila M. Leunig, op.cit at 9. 
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Others followed as well and Edel, a large independent record label, also announced 
152 
its intention to form a similar alliance with Napster m January 2001. 
1 5 2 Anthony Shadid, Edel Music AG Forms Alliance with Napster; Independent Label to Join New 
Network, Boston Globe, January 3, 2001 at C2. 
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Chapter 6 - Analysis of Diamond 
"The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our predecessors. A 
dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant himself".1 
1. Introduction 
For six years after its enactment, scrutiny of the AHRA was limited to academic 
critique. The only case to consider the AHRA during this time held that it was 
inapplicable. 
The Diamond case was the first judicial interpretation of the AHRA. It has been 
noted that the litigation in this case "exposed inherent weaknesses in the Act, 
especially in light of the newly enacted DMCA and the continuing advances in 
Internet technology".3 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that while the recording industry's concerns about 
piracy remain legitimate, "the Ninth Circuit correctly ruled for Diamond on both legal 
and policy grounds".4 It has been submitted that the Rio did not infringe any of the 
rights created under the CA or the AHRA. Instead use of the Rio represented "a 
classic instance of fair use, a fundamental policy which should not be trumped by 
industry-specific goals".5 
1 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 511 (1945). 
2 See Abkco Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 65- 66 (2d Cir. 1996). 
3 Aaron L. Melville, The Future Of The Audio Home Recording Act Of 1992: Has It Survived The 
Millennium Bug?, 1 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 372 (2001) at 389. 
4 Ines G. Gonzalez, Recording Industry Association Of America, Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 
Inc., 15 Berkeley Tech. L . J . 67 (2000) at 78. 
s ibid at 78-79. 
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2. The District Court 
A. General 
Some have noted that the "Rio decisions certainly strained the AHRA". 6 The District 
Court addressed the 'digital audio recording device' issue by looking beyond the 
Act's plain language and searching the legislative history, "but limited the import of 
its analysis by relying on the lack of irreparable harm".7 Others have stated that the 
District Court "inappropriately rejected Diamond's argument after erroneously 
consulting the legislative history". 
B. Problematic Reasoning 
The District Court's reasoning can be seen as being problematic for two reasons. 
1. Interpretation 
First, within the decision itself, the District Court articulated the guidelines it would 
follow in interpreting the AHRA. The District Court had no precedent to guide its 
interpretation of the AHRA, so it began its analysis with the "familiar canon of 
statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language 
of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, 
that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive".9 
The District Court subsequently found that although the Rio's "two-step process 
technically satisfies the definition of 'serial copying', the AHRA does not directly 
prohibit serial copying". 1 0 Barthel comments that this statement by the District Court 
is "confusing" given the fact that section 1002(a) clearly articulates three specific 
6 Aaron L. Melville, op.cit at 394. 
7 ibid at 394. 
8 Stephen W. Webb, op.cit at 21. 
9 Diamond I at 628. 
1 0 ibid at 631. 
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means by which a 'digital audio recording device' must effectively implement serial 
copy controls.11 
Furthermore, Barthel finds "even more perplexing" the District Court's use of the 
Senate Report to reconcile this "incongruity".1 2 The District Court believed that it 
was nonsensical to suggest that the Rio had to send "copyright and generation status 
information". 1 3 The fu l l Senate Report passage that the District Court made reference 
to reads: "Devices that receive digital audio transmissions sent without copyright and 
generation status information shall indicate that copyright is asserted over the 
transmitted audio material and that the generation status is original". 1 4 
According to Barthel a neutral interpretation of this passage suggests that a 'digital 
audio recording device' that receives audio transmissions without the proper 
copyright and generation status information "must somehow compensate for the 
erroneously sent transmission by indicating that copyright is asserted over the 
material and that the generation status is original". 1 5 
Thus, according to Barthel, a neutral interpretation of the fu l l Senate Report citation 
would have required the Rio to comply with subsection 1002(a)(2) and incorporate a 
functional equivalent to the SCMS. This certainly seems to make sense. 
By tracing the District Court's two-step approach for statutory interpretation, it can be 
seen that the District Court conceded that the Rio satisfied the statutory definition of 
'serial copying'. According to Barthel it was the second step taken by the District 
Court - the absence of "a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary" - that 
proves "troublesome".16 
By ignoring the first half of the Senate Report citation, the District Court was able to 
"twist this statement and use it to support its position that the AHRA does not directly 
" Ted J. Barthel, RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc.: The Sale Of The Rio Player Forces The 
Music Industry To Dance To A New Beat, 9 Depaul-Lca J. Art & Ent. L . 279 (1999) at 305. 
1 2 ibid at 305. 
13 Diamond I at 631. 
14 Senate Report at 26. 
1 5 Ted J. Barthel, op.cit at 305. 
1 6 ibid at 305. 
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prohibit serial copying". In so doing, the District Court was able to equate a Rio 
without SCMS to a Rio with SCMS. Barthel argues that citation "to the ful l Senate 
)i 18 
Report sentence would not have allowed the court to accomplish such a deed". 
2. Royalty Payments 
Secondly, the District Court's use of royalty payments as a remedy for damages 
caused by the Rio's non-incorporation of SCMS causes concern. 
In relation to the extent that the RIAA were injured through an illicit use of the Rio, 
the District Court sated that this was precisely the type of injury for which the royalty 
provisions were adopted.19 According to Barthel a further inquiry into the legislative 
history would have indicated that a link between royalty payments and SCMS 
20 
compliance is "unsupported". 
Indeed, in discussing the purposes behind the copy control provisions, the Senate 
Report states: "The prohibition on actions under section 1002 is not dependent upon 
compliance with other requirements under this chapter. Thus, for example, the 
protection granted by section 1002 applies to all digital audio recording devices and 
media regardless of whether applicable royalty payments have been made for a device 
or medium or whether a device includes SCMS". 2 1 
Barthel argues that in other words, regardless of whether Diamond makes royalty 
22 
payments on the Rio player, compliance with the SCMS provision is required. 
Thus, it seems that the District Court's use of royalty payments as a remedy for not 
incorporating SCMS in the Rio is "at odds with the legislative intent behind the 
AHRA" . 2 3 
1 7 Ted J. Barthel, op.cit at 305. 
1 8 ibid at 306. 
19 Diamond I at 632. 
2 0 Ted J. Barthel, op.cit at 306. 
21 Senate Report at 52. 
2 2 Ted J. Barthel, op.cit at 306. 
2 3 ibid at 306. 
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3. The Ninth Circuit 
A. General 
While the Ninth Circuit did rely more on the merits than the District Court, Melville 
argues that " i t shortsightedly stated that the 'clear' language of the statute removed 
any doubt that the Rio was not an infringing device".2 4 Furthermore, the Ninth 
Circuit's conception of the term "transmission" in the context of the AHRA was "too 
narrow". 2 5 Allemann proposes that a more appropriate definition of the term would 
have led to a different outcome.26 
B. The Limited Applicability of the AHRA 
1. The Act 
Gonzalez believes that the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that the Rio was not 
subject to the AHRA because it constructed its definition of a 'digital audio recording 
device' by examining the statutory language. According to Gonzalez, the Ninth 
Circuit relied on the "explicitly defined" terms in section 1001 of the AHRA "instead 
of substituting its own interpretation as the District Court did". 
The Ninth Circuit determined that a hard drive was excluded from the definition of 
'digital musical recordings'. Consequently, as the Rio obtained its input from a hard-
drive, it could not reproduce a 'digital musical recording' and therefore could not be a 
'digital audio recording device'. According to Gonzalez this "conclusion makes 
sense because the Rio does not enable the serial copying that the AHRA was 
designed to prevent".28 
2 4 Aaron L. Melville, op.cit at 394. 
2 5 Alex Allemann, Manifestation Of An AHRA Malfunction: The Uncertain Status Of MP3 Under 
Recording Industry Association Of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 79 Tex. L. Rev. 189 
(2000) at 191. 
2 6 ibid at 191. 
2 7 Ines G. Gonzalez, op.cit at 79. 
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2. The Legislative History 
Gonzalez also argues that the legislative history supports the Ninth Circuit's reading 
of the statutory language, which excludes the classification of the Rio as a 'digital 
29 
audio recording device'. 
Section 1001 established a new type of material object embodying musical works - a 
'digital musical recording'. According to Gonzalez, this served two purposes.30 
Firstly to delineate clearly the types of devices and media subject to the AHRA. 
Secondly, to ensure that devices dedicated to the recording of motion pictures, 
television programs, or multimedia works would not be covered by the AHRA. 
As such, the US Congress defined 'digital musical recordings' to include CDs, DATs, 
audio-cassettes, albums, digital compact cassettes and mini-discs. The US Congress 
also considered that a computer hard-drive containing programs or databases would 
32 
be excluded from the definition of a 'digital musical recording'. 
Thus, Gonzalez believes that the legislative history supports the Ninth Circuit's 
analysis that the Rio is not a 'digital audio recording device' because it cannot 
I T 
reproduce a 'digital musical recording'. 
3. Purpose and Policy 
Gonzalez also argues that from a policy perspective the Ninth Circuit's decision 
reflects the primary purpose behind the AHRA. That is, "to ensure the right of 
consumers to make analog or digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for their 
private, noncommercial use".34 This right to make copies for personal use, Gonzalez 
explains, "reflects the fundamental policy of fair use underlying copyright law". 3 5 
Ines G. Gonzalez, op.cit at 79. 
2 9 ibid at 79. 4 
3 0 ibid at 79. § 
3 1 See Senate Report at 46. 
3 2 See ibid at 4%. 
3 3 Ines G. Gonfalez, op.cit at 79-80. 
3 4 See Senate Report at 30. 
3 5 Ines G. Gonzalez, op.cit at 80. 
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4. The Loophole 
(a) The Loophole 
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the AHRA potentially leaves a "loophole" for 
MP3 music pirates to get through.3 6 As was pointed out by the District Court, pirates 
could evade "regulation simply by passing the music through a computer and 
37 
ensuring that the MP3 file resided momentarily on the hard drive". This did not 
seem to bother the Ninth Circuit, which believed that a computer simply did not f i t 
the definition because a computer's main purpose was not to make recordings. 
In addressing the loophole seemingly created by excluding devices like the Rio from 
coverage by the AHRA, "the Ninth Circuit merely cited a bit of legislative history 
and the AHRA's purpose".38 However, Allemann argues that while the 
"unnecessary loophole" found to exist by the District Court is a correct literal reading 
of the AHRA, the result does not correspond with the underlying purpose of the 
statute.39 
(b) DMCA Conflicts 
Melville comments that the DMCA's anti-circumvention measures "only complicate 
the issue further". 4 0 
The AHRA defines various recording devices to exclude computers, hard-drives, and 
subsequent to the Ninth Circuit's opinion, devices like the Rio. Consequently, 
because of the 'loophole' created by the Ninth Circuit holding, the SCMS becomes 
unnecessary in any device found to be a 'computing device'. 
Melville notes that i f "courts continue to apply the AHRA in a limited fashion, every 
person choosing to use a computer to record music wi l l arguably violate the DMCA's 
Kristine J. Hoffman, op.cit at 174. 
Diamond I. 
Aaron L . Melville, op.cit at 394. 
Alex Allemann, op.cit at 191. 
Aaron L. Melville, op.cit at 395. 
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anti-circumvention language". Thus, according to Melville, the AHRA as 
interpreted contradicts the DMCA. 
The AHRA loophole allows a PC to 'launder' copyright-protection encoded digital 
music because computers are not required to implement the SCMS, even "though 
such a computer could clearly be seen to function as a recording device".42 Thus, 
under the AHRA, a computer can be used to legally circumvent the SCMS copyright 
protections placed on any second-generation copy simply by copying the song to the 
hard-drive. 
However, as Melville observes out this appears to be unlawful under the DMCA 
because a protection system encoding is effectively being circumvented.43 The 
DMCA clearly makes it unlawful to circumvent a technological measure that controls 
access to a protected work.44 
Indeed, as Melville points out this tension must be resolved to provide consumers of 
music and computer technology with clear guidance as to which music recording and 
playback activities are lawful. 4 5 Such a tension between two pieces of legislation 
causes uncertainty for both consumers and manufacturers. 
(c) Solution to the Loophole 
It has been suggested that an earlier Ninth Circuit decision may help the RIAA's 
cause.46 In Mai Systems Corporation v. Peak Computer, Inc., Mai sued Peak over 
copyright infringement of computer software.47 Mai sought an injunction to keep 
Peak from running Mai software for its customers, using unlicensed software, and 
loaning Mai computers with Mai software to Peak's customers 4 8 
4 1 Aaron L. Melville, op.cit at 395. 
4 2 ibid at 395. 
4 3 ibid at 395. 
4 4 S e e § § 1201-1205. 
4 5 Aaron L. Melville, op.cit at 395. 
4 6 Kristine J. Hoffman, op.cit at 174. 
4 7 Mai Systems Corporation v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Mar). 
4 8 See ibid at 513-514. 
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The Ninth Circuit pointed out that in order for Mai to succeed, it would have to show 
that there was copying as defined under the CA. 4 9 This was a problem in this case, 
because it was unclear at that time whether copying occurred when a software 
program was transferred from a permanent storage medium to a computer's Random 
Access Memory ( 'RAM'). 5 0 
Despite the fact that a copy is only temporarily fixed in the computer's RAM, the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that "loading of copyrighted software into RAM creates a 'copy' 
of that software in violation of the Copyright Act". 5 1 According to the Ninth Circuit, 
copying software onto computer chips and then selling the chips violated section 117 
CA, which only protects copies if they are made for archival purposes or i f they are 
necessary for the use of a computer program.52 
Hoffman notes that this conclusion "is logical, because Copyright law is meant to 
protect the copyright holder from the sale of copied material".53 Finally, the Ninth 
Circuit pointed out that it was also generally accepted that loading software onto a 
computer is considered to be copying under the law.5 4 
Hoffman proposes that while "the Mai court specifically discussed the issue of 
copying software, the same principles can be applied to the copying of digital 
recordings".55 Accordingly, the RIAA could use the Ninth Circuit's approach in Mai 
in relation to the use of computers as copying devices in order to get around the 
obstacles created by the Diamond court.56 
The Mai court pointed out that loading software onto a computer is generally 
accepted as copying. According to Hoffman, the RIAA would need to argue that 
downloading digital music files onto a computer is also a form of copying, very much 
like the loading of software.57 Clearly, there is a strong argument in favour of 
drawing such an analogy. Downloading a music file, whether it be on to the hard-
4 5 See Mai at 517. 
5 0 See ibid at 519. 
5 1 See ibid at 518. 
5 2 See ibid at 518. 
5 3 Kristine J. Hoffman, op.cit at 175. 
5 4 See Mai at 519. 
5 5 Kristine J. Hoffman, op.cit at 175. 
5 6 ibid at 175. 
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drive or RAM of a computer, is essentially the same as loading software onto a 
computer. "Clearly, the downloaded music file is not the original and, therefore, 
58 
must be a copy in violation of Copyright law". 
Hoffman believes that i f "the RIAA were able to persuade a court to take this 
approach as a general rule, then it should be successful in getting around the 
computer exception relied on by the court in Diamond".59 
4. Copyright Action and Fair Use 
A. The RIAA's Position Gets Worse 
As Berger notes, what "was at first a fairly significant setback for the RIAA became a 
massive loss".60 After the District Court's opinion, Diamond would at least have had 
to pay royalties on the Rio, providing some consolation to the RIAA. After the Ninth 
Circuit opinion however, the RIAA was deprived of any relief. 
Furthermore, at first glance the Ninth Circuit's decision was favourable to the online 
music industry.61 The decision sent a message to manufacturers and distributors of 
technologies, that by allowing the downloading of music through PCs, they were not 
subject to the royalty payments and serial copy protection requirements imposed by 
the AHRA. 
In fact, soon after the Ninth Circuit's decision, many new MP3 players were 
announced by other manufacturers. These products included not just hand-held 
portables like the Rio, but also automobile MP3 players, MP3 components for the 
home stereo, and CD players which play CDs encoded with MP3-formatted music in 
addition to the regular formatted audio CDs.62 
Kristine J. Hoffman, op.cit at 175. 
5 8 ibid at 175. 
5 9 ibid at 175. 
6 0 Eric Berger, The Legal Problems Of The MP3, 18 Temp. Envtl. L . & Tech. J. 1 (1999) at 14. 
6 1 William Sloan Coats, et al., op.cit at 302. 
6 2 See Wired News, Meet the Double Decker CD, August 6, 1999 
<http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283)21155,00.html>. 
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In short, everything the RIAA sought to avert became reality after its court losses. 
The Rio was released, given a welcome reception by consumers and the press, MP3 
became wildly popular, and other electronics firms were encouraged to enter the 
market. 
B. The Possibility of Copyright Infringement Actions 
However, the Ninth Circuit's decision does not expressly immunise those 
manufacturers and distributors from copyright infringement.63 Consequently, the 
Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the Rio was not a 'digital audio recording device' and 
therefore not subject to the AHRA can be seen as an advantage for the RIAA. This is 
because the RIAA may now sue Diamond and other manufacturers for copyright 
violations.64 
The suit the RIAA brought against Diamond, though motivated by copyright 
infringements, was not an action based in copyright but for violations of the AHRA. 
Had the Rio been a 'digital audio recording device', the RIAA would not have been 
able to bring a copyright suit against Diamond, as the AHRA expressly forbids such 
suits.65 Since the Rio is not subject to the AHRA, that Act's 'no-copyright-suit' ban 
does not apply. Thus, it has been suggested that the Ninth Circuit's decision may be 
viewed as permitting actions against "technologies like Rio based on direct, 
contributory or vicarious copyright infringement theories".66 
However, it has been commented that the Ninth Circuit's decision "probably does not 
represent decisive approval of such infringement actions".67 Furthermore, as Berger 
notes, such suits are not easy to win. 6 8 Such a suit would have to be based on 
contributory infringement. A manufacturer like Diamond does not directly infringe 
any copyrights because Diamond does not copy or distribute any copyrighted work. 
The RIAA would in effect be saying that Diamond facilitates infringement by 
consumers. 
William Sloan Coats, et al., op.cit at 302. 
See § 1008. 
ibid. 
William Sloan Coats, et al., op.cit at 302. 
ibid at 302. 
Eric Berger, op.cit at 15. 
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C. Substantial Non-Infringing Uses 
For Diamond to defeat any contributory infringement action it must show that the Rio 
is capable of substantial non-infringing uses. The Rio has two potentially substantial 
non-infringing use arguments; space-shifting and the ability to copy legitimate MP3s. 
1. Space-Shifting 
In Sony the substantial non-infringing use was private, non-commercial time-shifting 
in the home.69 The Supreme Court found that time-shifting was a fair use.70 Thus the 
VCR manufacturers won and the movie industry lost. 
In the Rio case, the Ninth Circuit court noted that devices like the Rio merely 'space-
shifts' already existing files on the user's computer.71 The Ninth Circuit concluded 
that this kind of copying was "paradigmatic non-commercial personal use entirely 
72 
consistent with the purposes of the Act". 
The Ninth Circuit court seemed to consider space-shifting as a fair use, analogising it 
to the "time-shifting" of television programming in the home video context. Thus, it 
has been noted that the Diamond decision may result in fair use being recognised as a 
valid defence to any potential claims of direct, contributory or vicarious infringement 
in Rio-like technology cases.73 
It would be very difficult for the RIAA to overcome such a "ringing endorsement" of 
space-shifting.74 So while available, a copyright action for contributory infringement 
after Sony may not be a viable option. Indeed, there has not been any talk of the 
RIAA bringing such an action. 
6 9 See Sony at 451. 
7 0 See ibid at 454-55. 
71 Diamond II at 1079. 
7 2 See ibid at 1079. 
7 3 William Sloan Coats, et al., op.cit at 302-303. 
7 4 Eric Berger, op.cit at 16. 
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(a) The Sony Analogy 
Consequently, the issue of an analogy with the recording of copyrighted music, as in 
Diamond, and the recording of home movies, as in Sony, becomes relevant. There 
are a number of points on which an analogy between 'space-shifting' and 'time-
shifting' can or cannot be made. 
Both opinions involve the concept of '-shifting' and in this respect the Sony opinion 
is "substantially analogous" to the Diamond opinion.75 The Supreme Court in Sony 
ruled that time-shifting was fair use of the copyrighted programming. As such this 
should apply to 'space-shifting'. 
Further, in overruling the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court stated that any 
substantial potential for legitimate use would invalidate claims of the threat of illegal 
use. The Supreme Court further held that the sale of home VCRs to the general 
public did not constitute contributory infringement of copyrights because the movie 
industry failed to show that time-shifting of programs would cause any significant 
harm to the value of the copyrights.76 
Webb comments that while "this would seem to bode well for the recording industry 
because it Accounts for the hundreds of millions of dollars lost annually, these 
harmful efficts haven't been localized".77 Furthermore, Webb notes that since the 
music industry suffered these losses prior to the advent of digital recording 
technology, it would be difficult to argue that a significant amount of music piracy 
7ft 
occurs through the MP3 format. 
However, as Webb points out, there "are a few important aspects of each case that 
diverge".79 In the case of the VCR's time-shifting of free commercial programming, 
the programming was offered freely. Whereas, in relation to MP3 players, the 
copyrighted music is usually not free, but for sale. 
7 5 Stephen W. Webb, RIAA v Diamond Multimedia Systems: The Recording Industry Attempts To Slow 
The Mp3 Revolution - Taking Aim At The Jogger Friendly Diamond Rio, 7 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 5 (2000) 
at 33. 
7 6 Sony at 456. 
7 7 Stephen W. Webb, op.cit at 31. 
7 8 ibid at 31. 
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Also, the music industry had already begun to feel the negative effect that this new 
80 
method of storing and playing music brings. Whereas in Sony, there was no more 
than an "inference" that the general population would copy movies illegally. Further, 
in Sony the copied material would be of substantially lower quality than the one it 
was copied from. 8 1 In Diamond, the fear of digitally perfect musical files being 
serially copied posed much more of a dilemma for the recording industry. In Sony 
serial copying was not a concern at that particular point in time. 
So Webb argues that this is another distinguishing point between Sony and Diamond. 
The Sony court was essentially faced with the issue of whether it would use copyright 
law to regulate the prospect of illegal use. To this extent the Supreme Court was 
not impressed with the prospect that the illegal use could exceed the legal use of the 
VCR.8 3 Whereas in Diamond it was apparent that the illegal use could exceed the 
legal use of time-shifting of digital music. 
2. Not All MP3s Are Illegal 
Another "good" argument that Diamond has for substantial non-infringing use is that 
not all MP3s are illegitimate.84 Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit noted in Diamond, "the 
85 
Internet also supports a burgeoning traffic in legitimate audio computer files". 
Some independent artists distribute their music entirely in MP3 format. Other artists, 
including some established artists, use MP3 as free samples for marketing purposes 
intended to entice listeners to purchase that artist's CD recordings. 
Furthermore some web sites are buying up old music catalogues of established artists 
and offering them in MP3 format for free or for sale. For example, the deceased 
9 Stephen W. Webb, op.cit at 33. 
0 e.g. see Diamond II at 1074. 
1 Stephen W. Webb, op.cit at 33. 
2 ibid at 34. 
3 Sony at 444. 
4 Eric Berger, op.cit at 16. 
5 Diamond Hal 1074. 
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reggae star Bob Marley is one artist whose musical works are legally available in the 
MP3 format.86 
D. The Uncertainty is Back 
Allemann argues that while Diamond may be a correct literal reading of the AHRA, 
"the result does not conform with the underlying purpose of the statute".87 As 
Allemann points out the Ninth Circuit's technical analysis effectively returns the 
88 
issue of audio home recording to its status prior to the enactment of the AHRA. 
That is, to a status when the legitimacy of home audio recording remained ambiguous 
under the general provisions of the CA. 
Further, by holding that the Rio device was not subject to the AHRA, the Ninth 
Circuit "necessarily" implies that infringement suits based on the use of such devices 
are not prohibited. Instead, any infringement issues associated with such devices 
are by default governed by the CA. This was the same situation regarding the general 
issue of audio home recordings before the enactment of the AHRA, which established 
its legitimacy when using a 'digital audio recording device'. 
Thus, the previously unresolved issue of whether home audio recording qualifies as 
fair use under the CA becomes relevant once again. As Allemann argues such 
"uncertainty, and the potential for increased suits, will do more to harm the 
introduction of new recording technology than to help i t" . 9 0 
However, as was shown above, manufacturers such as Diamond would have a good 
chance of establishing 'space-shifting' as a fair use. Not only this, but since 
Allemann made this comment the market for MP3 players and new recording 
technology has boomed, without any further legal action against MP3 player 
manufacturers. 
8 6 See Siddiq Bello, MCY.com Gels Bob Marley Catalog, 8 MP3 Impact, February 28, 1999 
<http://www.addictme.com/PDF/mp3impact_8.pdf>. 
8 7 Alex Allemann, op.cit at 191. 
8 8 ibid at 191-192. 
8 9 ibid at 191. 
9 0 ibid at 191. 
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On the flip-side however, the Napster case seemly indicates that the fair use defence 
is unlikely to be successful in these contributory infringement suits. On the other 
hand it can be argued that the facts of Napster can be materially distinguished from 
those in Diamond. 
Furthermore, in the future as new devices offer flexible output functionality similar to 
those devices covered by the AHRA, it is likely that the 'space-shifting' argument 
will lose some of its force and the threat of various infringement claims will become 
much more real again.91 
5. Technicalities 
A. Technicalities 
It has been commented that the Ninth Circuit's decision was one based on 
"technicalities". The District Court found that the AHRA was applicable to the Rio 
because, in its opinion, the Rio fit the definition of a 'digital audio recording device'. 
On the other hand, the District Court based its interpretation of the legislative history 
on what it called the "purpose" of the AHRA. As Scharton points out, ultimately 
this decision by the District Court was the key finding overturned by the Ninth 
Circuit, and exemplifies the weakness of the AHRA. 9 4 
The Ninth Circuit found that as the Rio uploaded only MP3 files that were not 'digital 
musical recordings', and 'digital audio recording devices' store 'digital music 
recordings', the Rio could not itself be a 'digital audio recording device'.95 Both the 
District Court and Ninth Circuit recognised how ridiculous this was. Indeed, as 
Scharton comments it "is hard to imagine a more appropriate target for the SCMS 
requirement than an MP3 player".96 
9 1 William Sloan Coats, et al., op.cit at 303. 
9 2 Nathan Scharton, MP3 In Y2K: The Audio Home Recording Act And Other Important Copyright 
Issues For The Year MM, 20 N. 111. U. L. Rev. 745 (2000) at 761. 
9 3 See Diamond I at 630. 
9 4 Nathan Scharton, op.cit at 763. 
9 5 See Diamond II at 1076. 
9 6 Nathan Scharton, op.cit at 764. 
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Nevertheless, the courts are not, and should not attempt to be, "super-legislatures", 
97 
imposing order and meaning where there is none. As such, it seems that the AHRA 
does not provide the ease of intellectual property rights protection that the CA allows, 
and in the case of MP3 technology, fails to provide any copyright protection to 
copyright holders at all. 
It seems that the recording industry has, through the AHRA, "hoisted itself on its own 
technological petard".98 As was stated before, the AHRA was a result of extensive 
lobbying by the recording industry. Now, one decade later it is effectively useless in 
the fight against MP3 piracy. The AHRA's own 'technicalities' are primarily a result 
of the inability of people generally to predict the future of technology. As such, as the 
law stands now, copyright holders must live with computer hard-drives acting as 
laundromats for illegally copied music.99 
B. The AHRA's Purpose 
Melville comments that "these initial decisions construing the AHRA provide little 
guidance as to how the Act is to adequately deal with evolving technology".100 He 
argues that the central issue should be the US Congress's goal in passing the AHRA. 
The AHRA's purpose was to legalise home recording and create a modest royalty 
payment system for those affected by lost sales due to the perfect nature of digital 
recordings.101 Melville points out that there was no indication that the AHRA was to 
be a broad anti-piracy statute.102 In fact, the text of the AHRA does not even mention 
the terms "piracy", "pirated", or "pirate".103 Even, the Senate Report on the AHRA 
does not mention any variation of "pirate".104 Whereas, on the other hand, the Ninth 
Circuit in Diamond opinion employed variations of the word "pirate" more than 
fifteen times.105 
Nathan Scharton, op.cit at 764. 
9 8 See A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Tort and Technological Tensions, 
64 Notre Dame L . Rev. 47 (1989) at 97. 
9 9 Nathan Scharton, op.cit at 764-765. 
1 0 0 Aaron L . Melville, op.cit at 394. 
1 0 1 See Senate Report at 30-33. 
1 0 2 Aaron L. Melville, op.cit at 395. 
1 0 3 S e e § § 1001-1010. 
1 0 4 See Senate Report. 
1 0 5 As pointed out by Melville - Aaron L. Melville, op.cit at 395 at footnote 183. 
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Melville questions whether this was "judicial activism, the work of industry interest 
groups, or a justified change in viewpoints due to the technology-driven times in 
which we live?"1 0 6 However, whatever the underlying intention may be, it now 
seems that problems caused by advances in digital recording technology are far 
beyond the scope of the AHRA. 
Aaron L. Melville, op.cit at 395. 
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Chapter 7 - Analysis of MP3.com 
" ...the brave new world of rip and burn and beam and stream ".1 
1. Introduction 
The MP3.com decision addressed the liability of an online commercial service that 
effectively tried to promote or facilitate the 'private' copying of sound recordings. 
The results of the MP3.com decision seemed to suggest that Internet businesses 
would be ill-advised i f they failed to compensate or secure permission from authors, 
performing artists and other copyright owners for the online delivery of protected 
music. 
In cases like MP3.com, it is important to distinguish between the technology of online 
music delivery in general and the activities of these businesses in particular. The 
facts that surround MP3.com brings up a different business model that appears to be, 
on its face, a legal way to listen and store a person's musical library. In reality it 
involved 'simple old-fashioned piracy'. 
Some legal experts have concluded that the MP3.com ruling was significant because 
"it confirmed that existing copyright law applied to the digital arena". Moreover, 
others have commentated that this opinion should also set the standard for future 
lawsuits involving music and the digital market place.3 Further, the decision is 
important for members of the movie industry, as they soon will have to start fighting 
the same battles as the recording industry. 
Another significance of MP3.com is that it went the furthest in striking down the use 
of new and innovative technology because it was the first case of its kind to reach the 
damages stage. These damages will affect the way the marketplace will look in the 
future for Internet businesses like MP3.com. It is possible that no Internet business 
1 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 2000 Copr.L.Dec. P 28,141 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) at 1. 
2 Martin Peers, MP3.com Has Infringed on Copyrights Of Five Record Firms, Judge Decides, Wall St. 
J . , May 1,2000, at A3. 
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will exist on the same level that pre-trial customers ofMP3.com had grown accustom 
to. 
2. Old-fashioned Piracy? 
The MP3.com decision turned on the District Court's view that MP3.com was 
engaged in simple, old-fashioned piracy - the copying of the PJAA's copyrighted 
material for its commercial gain. 
Indeed, the fact that MP3.com had to copy CDs by converting them to MP3 format 
and saving the resulting files on its servers in order to run its service made the case a 
good fit for a traditional infringement analysis. As Kramarsky points out in "the 
world of digital distribution, however, cases are rarely so simple".4 
A closer, more technical analysis of the nature of the services offered by MP3.com 
reveals that some of its functions may have been legitimate. As such, it is important 
to separate the two services that were in operation. 
A. The Instant Listening Service 
Copyright protection is conferred upon fixation, therefore copyrighted music 
converted to MP3 files is necessarily protected under copyright law.5 Mullen argues 
that even though an MP3 file that is downloaded or streamed is capable of being 
perceived and reproduced for the purposes of the CA, it is unclear why the copyright 
holder's exclusive reproduction and distribution rights were violated by MP3.corn's 
Instant Listening service.6 
Firstly, on the facts the subscriber had to have purchased the CD from an 'e-tailer' 
who was able to verify, with a high degree of certainty, ownership of the CD.7 
3 Gregory Hunt, In A Digital Age, The Musical Revolution Will Be Digitalized, 11 Alb. L.J . Sci. & 
Tech. 181 (2000) at 199. 
4 Stephen M Kramarsky, op.cit at 26. 
5 Sheldon W. Halpern, et al., Fundamentals of United States Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, 
Patent, and Trademark, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999 at 41. 
6 Kathryn I. Mullen, "The Rich Man's Eight Track": Mp3 Files, Copyright Infringement, And Fair 
Use, 5 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 237 (2001) at 245. 
7 ibid at 245. 
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Secondly, the Instant Listening service was only intended for personal use - every 
user must have a password to retrieve songs from their My.MP3.com account. As 
Mullen points out, MP3.corn's only role was to transfer the contents of the CD to the 
user's My.Mp3.com account.9 To that end, MP3.com acted only to provide free 
online storage, in a digitised form, of an individual's music library.10 
Furthermore, Mullen argues that by selling a CD the copyright holder is exercising 
their exclusive right to reproduce and distribute copies and thereby necessarily 
acquiescing to the fact that the purchaser is buying the CD for the purpose of listening 
to it . 1 1 As the CA does not limit sound recordings to specific media, as long as the 
CD is purchased, the copyright holder is compensated for the right to listen to the 
contents of the CD. 1 2 
As such, according to Mullen, the Instant Listening service does not appear to violate 
any of the copyright holders' exclusive rights under section 106 of the CA. 1 3 The 
Instant Listening service merely allows music to be listened to through a new 
listening medium.14 
B. The Beam-it Service 
In the Beam-it service the copyrighted music converted to MP3 format was also 
necessarily protected under copyright law. As with the Instant Listening service, 
MP3 files created with this service were capable of being perceived and reproduced 
for the purposes of the CA. However, as Mullen points out there is a factor that 
distinguishes the Beam-it service from the Instant Listening service. This difference 
consequently renders the Beam-it service an infringement of copyright. This 
important distinguishing factor is the fact that the Instant Listening service users 
accessed MP3 files contained on a purchased CD, whereas the Beam-it services users 
did not necessarily own the music they wanted to store and stream.15 
8 Kathryn I. Mullen, op.cit at 245. 
9 ibid at 245. 
1 0 ibid at 245. 
1 1 ibid at 245. 
1 2 ibid at 245. 
n ibid at 245. 
1 4 ibid at 245. 
1 5 ibid at 246. 
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MP3.com, through the Beam-it service, violated copyright law by reproducing and 
distributing copyrighted works because MP3.com offered the copyrighted works for 
Beam-it users to stream. Similar to the Instant Listening service, MP3 files were 
being copied to MP3.corn's servers and then released to users upon satisfaction of 
Beam-it's verification process. 
The probleiji as Mullen points out is that the Beam-it verification process was 
unreliable.16! Other companies, such as MyPlay.com, also offer digital music storage 
accounts along the same lines as MP3.com, but these services require that the user 
actually upload the file to be stored. This in turn requires that the file actually be 
'ripped' from the CD to the companies' servers. The ripping and uploading process 
can take up to an hour per disc, depending on the speed of one's microprocessor and 
Internet connection. 
With the Beam-it service, MP3.com sought to distil the process to the time needed for 
one of its servers to gather a few lines of text from the user's CD. 1 7 To accomplish 
this MP3.com designed a system by which, when the user beams his or her copy of an 
album, what is streamed back to him on later occasions was MP3.corn's wholly 
separate copy of the same album. As Skolnik comments, this fact compounded the 
disingenuous reality of the beaming terminology.18 
This meant that it was relatively easy for a Beam-it service user to put works they did 
not own into their digital locker simply by beaming a friend's copy of an album. 
Skolnik comments, that separately but equally disingenuous, was MP3.corn's "blithe 
disregard" of this possibility.19 This is especially so in light of the fact that a user 
could beam a great number of borrowed albums in a short period of time. 
As Skolnik points out the "court had no misunderstanding of this fact".20 It has been 
noted that although not stated on the record, the fact that there was no way to ensure 
1 6 Kathryn I. Mullen, op.cit at 246. 
1 7 See Warren Cohen, Wallet Out, MP3.com Finds Many Upturned Hands, Inside, June 14, 2000 
<http://wjcohen.home.mindspring.com/music/publishers.htm>. 
1 8 Dan Skolnik, op.cit at 25. 
1 9 ibid at 25. 
2 0 ibid at 25. 
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that the CDs users inserted were their own, and not borrowed from someone else for 
the purpose, probably played a decisive role in the District Court's decision.21 
Indeed, the District Court when addressing MP3.corn's defence that the Beam-it 
service stimulates sales of physical recordings because the user must place the CD 
into the CD-ROM drive, characterised the user's task as "actually or purportedly" 
demonstrating ownership of the disc.22 
Even though some may argue that the Beam-it service was a system designed to 
protect copyrights, it is "really a system designed to obscure the way it violates 
copyrights". The possibility of 'leakage' was not present with the Instant Listening 
service, because through its 'e-tailers' MP3.com, could verify ownership as the 
recordings were purchased online.24 However, there was no 'e-tailer' or third party 
through which ownership of a CD could have been verified for the Beam-it service 
users. 
This is where the two services differed and why Mullen argues that the Instant 
Listening service did not appear to violate any of the copyright holders' exclusive 
* • • 25 
rights, but the Beam-it service did. 
3. Fair Use 
A. The Market Harm Factor 
Generally speaking the District Court's fair use analysis is supported by most 
commentators.26 
Ginsburg notes, with respect to the market harm fair use factor, that the MP3.com 
court, like the Free Republic court, emphasised that "a further market that directly 
derives from reproduction of the plaintiffs copyrighted works"27 remains within the 
2 1 John B. Lunseth II, E-Commerce Disputes: Legislation And Litigation Are The Brave New World, 68 
Def. Couns. J. 280 (2001) at 295. 
2 2 See MP3.com. 
2 3 Dan Skolnik, op.cit at 25. 
2 4 Kathryn I. Mullen, op.cit at 246. 
2 5 ibid at 246. 
2 6 e.g. See Kathryn Mullen Kathryn I. Mullen, op.cit at 254. 
27 MP3.com. 
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copyright owner's control. Indeed, Ginsburg comments that where Free Republic 
underlined the defendants' incursion on new markets that the copyright owner was 
already exploiting, MP3.com "stressed plaintiffs right to control". 
Furthermore, MP3.com might have hit upon the clever business idea of enhancing 
consumer convenience, but that did not mean the enhancement should be free of 
copyright holders' charges or control.30 
Ginsburg also notes that the MP3.com ruling is consistent with the Second Circuit's 
recent ruling in Infinity. There, the Second Circuit rejected a fair use defence to the 
retransmission of radio broadcasts over phone lines. The Infinity case involved non-
transformative audience shifting, because the defendant made the plaintiffs 
broadcasts available, without alteration, to distant listeners. The Infinity court ruled 
that the copyright holder was entitled to control who could access its transmissions. 
In Infinity, the defendant's activities disrupted that control and enabled the defendant 
to replace the plaintiff in distant markets. 
MP3.com, like Free Republic, is a further rejection of what Ginsburg calls 
"redistributive" fair use.31 This an aspiring doctrine that would excuse the broad 
unpaid distribution of works on the dual grounds that copyright must not rein in the 
progress of new technologies of communication, and that the public is enriched by 
greater exposure to works that it enjoys.32 Instead, according to the Free republic and 
MP3.com courts, when technology opens up new markets and wider audiences it is 
not fair use to bring the work to more people by means of unlicensed copying or 
unauthorised public performance. 
On the other hand it could be argued that the MP3.com did not claim to bring the 
recorded music to more listeners, but only in theory to those people who had already 
purchased the original CDs.34 Nonetheless, in order to make the work available to the 
same audience in different places, MP3.com was not in fact streaming its users' own 
2 8 Jane C. Ginsburg (2000), op.cit at 24. 
2 9 ibid at 24-25; MP3.com at 352. 
3 0 Jane C. Ginsburg (2000), op.cit at 25. 
3 1 ibid at 25. 
3 2 ibid at 25. 
3 3 ibid at 25. 
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copies, but copies it had made itself in a massive database. Again, "this substantia] 
and systematic copying condemned its activities".35 
Copying in order to create a single library corresponding to its subscribers' combined 
collections may have made sense from a business point of view, as a single library 
avoids duplication across collections, and thus saves space on the server.36 It may 
also have facilitated faster uploading and delivery. However, creating a faster, 
cheaper operation by means of copying does not enjoy a strong claim to fair use, 
particularly when the more efficient operation gives it an advantage over competitors 
37 
who lose time and incur extra transactions costs by seeking copyright licenses. 
B. Space-shifting 
Some have commented that there is a lack of any persuasive explanation in the 
District Court's decision of why MP3.corn's space-shifting into another medium was 
any less worthy of the District Court's indulgence than was the space-shifting in 
T O 
Diamond or the time-shiftmg in Sony. 
At first glance such a proposition seems valid. However, as Ginsburg points out 
MP3.com did not involve space-shifting of the kind seemingly sanctioned as a fair 
use in the Diamond case.39 The distinguishing factor seems to be that in Diamond the 
end users themselves effected the copying from their computers onto the space-
shifting device.40 Whereas in MP3.com all of the copying was actually being done by 
MP3.com, not its users. Furthermore, MP3.com was not copying the user's CDs, but 
its own. Skolnik argues along the same lines, as to the importance of this 
distinguishing factor.41 
As Ginsgurg points out, as the facts are distinguishable the MP3.com court did not 
need to address the question of whether end-user copying and storage would have 
3 4 Jane C. Ginsburg (2000), op.cit at 25. 
3 5 ibid at 25. 
3 6 ibid at 25-26. 
3 7 ibid at 26. 
3 8 Richard B. Graves III, Private Rights, Public Uses, And The Future Of The Copyright Clause, 80 
Neb. L. Rev. 64 (2001) at 85. 
3 9 Jane C. Ginsburg (2000), op.cit at 28. 
4 0 ibid at 28. 
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been an infringement. Nor, did it have to address the issue of whether an Internet 
service that offered individual-access celestial storage lockers for end-users to stock 
themselves would be an infringer.43 As such a 'space-shifting' analysis was not 
required on the specific facts of MP3.com. 
C. Other Space-shifting Scenarios 
It is interesting to note Ginsburg's view that i f MP3.corn's customers could 
themselves lawfully send their CDs to MP3.com, then MP3.com's copying might be 
excused as the functional equivalent of each user creating a separate library of files.4 4 
Needham seems to agree, commenting that it "technically would be fair use, as the 
consumer has the right to listen to his or her music from any location".45 
On the other hand, even if a user might enjoy a space-shifting privilege to copy his or 
her CDs to a website, whose access is restricted to themselves, it does not necessarily 
follow that the privilege shields a third party who goes into the business of creating 
the personalised digital library and supplying access to i t . 4 6 
Here, Ginsburg points out as an analogy that the courts have stated that educational 
institutions may enjoy a fair use privilege to photocopy from protected works for 
purposes of teaching. However, the courts have nonetheless held that it is not fair use 
for an off-campus, for profit, photocopy shop to prepare course packs at the 
institution's behest, without the copyright owner's authorisation.47 
The analogy seems clear and would logically apply to MP3.com as well. MP3.com is 
clearly a commercial intermediary. Furthermore, at the time of the MP3.com case, 
MP3.com carried advertising and it was a possibility that it may begin charging 
subscription fees 4 8 As such where there is a commercial relationship between the 
4 1 Dan Skolnik, op.cit. 
4 2 Jane C. Ginsburg (2000), op.cit at 28. 
4 3 e.g. see <http://www.myplay.com>. 
4 4 Jane C. Ginsburg (2000), op.cit at 24. 
4 5 Lisa M. Needham, A Day In The Life Of The Digital Music Wars: The RIAA v. Diamond 
Multimedia, 26 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1135 (2000) at 1164. 
4 6 Jane C. Ginsburg (2000), op.cit at 24. 
4 7 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Sens. Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). 
4 8 My.MP3.corn's 'Terms and Conditions' do not preclude this possibility. My.MP3.com, Terms and 
Conditions <http://www.mp3.com/mymp3/terms/index.html>. 
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copier and the user, as Skolnik points out, the copying would constitute commercial 
use, not private use, of the music.49 
4. Good or bad? 
Overall, the MP3.com decision seems to be damaging on a number of fronts. Firstly, 
as Needham points out the District Court's careful dismantling of MP3.corn's fair use 
claim does not bode well for new technology.50 This increased cost and uncertainty 
in turn seems to be bad for both audiophiles and businesses. 
Secondly, the MP3.com case led both to a costly damages judgement and settlement 
between MP3.com and the major record labels. On this point, Needham comments 
that this type of deal-making "seems to point to increased record industry control over 
content and licensing".51 Further still, the developments in this case may be good for 
traditional copyright, but it is questionable whether they help society take full 
advantage of new technological possibilities. Moreover, i f all Internet-related 
advancements require costly lawsuits and even costlier settlements, how will 
newcomers break into the market? 
Dan Skolnik, op.cit at 25. 
5 0 Lisa M. Needham, op.cit at 1165. 
5 1 ibid at 1166. 
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Chapter 8 - Analysis of Napster 
"Like they say about roaches, for every one you see, there's a hundred in the walls ".1 
As is apparent, the My.MP3.com service was quite different from Napster in that 
MP3.com itself was doing the copying and then distributing the MP3 files. Napster, 
on the other hand only provided the technology to find the MP3 files. 
1. Introduction 
The Napster litigation was important on many fronts. It was the first case to consider 
the DMCA safe harbours and consequently was touted from the outset as being an 
important precedent setting case. This was especially so as it involved a newly 
enacted piece of legislation that was designed to address the problems posed by 
modern digital technology. 
Second, the case examined the knowledge element required for contributory 
infringement in the light of the 'staple article of commerce' doctrine. It addressed 
what conduct in the Internet context constituted knowledge of or reason to know of 
infringing a|tivity. The Ninth Circuit's decision effectively sets the path for the 
future. ? 
This, combined with the Sony defence that Napster cannot be liable for contributory 
infringement because it is a program that facilitates substantial non-infringing uses, 
raised "critical policy issues".2 While copyright owners are justified in trying to 
protect their intellectual property from piracy on the Internet, holding Napster 
responsible for the infringing actions of its users could have upset the balance sought 
by copyright law, thereby posing a substantial burden upon a variety of businesses 
that provide directory and search services to copyrighted materials available on-line.3 
1 Frank Pellegrini, Will Music Giants Bite at Napster's Bait?, Time.com, February 21, 2001 
<http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,100133,00.html>. 
2 Rebecca J. Hill, Pirates Of The 21st Century: The Threat And Promise Of Digital Audio Technology 
On The Internet, 16 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L . J . 311 (2000) at 335. 
3 Janelle Brown, MP3 free-for-all, Salon, February 03, 2000 
<http://dir.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/02/03/napster/index.html>. 
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Thus, the Napster litigation touched upon a grey area of copyright law that tries to 
strike a balance between protecting intellectual property in cyberspace while also 
protecting ISPs from liability for the unauthorised actions of their users. As such, the 
resolution of the case had far-reaching implications for the future of property rights in 
cyberspace, even beyond the music industry. Movie companies correctly viewed the 
Napster dispute as a glimpse into their own future.4 At the time of the Naptser case, 
high-quality video files were too large to be sent quickly over most Internet 
connections, but now faster transmission services have started to threaten the status 
quo in the movie industry as well. 
2. The DMCA 
To put it lightly, all of Napster's arguments under the DMCA appeared to "fail 
miserably".5 However, there are a number of flaws with the approach taken by the 
courts. 
A. General Analysis of the District Court's Interpretation 
1. Section 512(a) 
McWane comments that a potential flaw with the District Court's opinion was the 
"rigid" application of subsection 512(a)'s definition of "through a system".6 The 
District Court denied the subsection 512(a) defence because the safe harbour only 
applies where connections and routing occur through the service provider's system. 
The District Court found that because the MP3 files were transmitted through the 
Internet and not through Napster's servers, Napster could not claim the safe harbour 
protection. 
However, McWane argues that although MP3 files never actually pass through 
Napster's servers, information about a user's request for a particular recording and 
4 Ariel Berschadsky, op.cit at 757. 
5 Ryan C. Edwards, Who Said Nothing In This World Is Free? A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.: 
Problems Presented, Solutions Explored, And Answers Posed, 89 Ky. L .J . 835 (2001) at 866. 
6 Sarah H. Mcwane, Hollywood vs. Silicon Valley: Decss Down, Napster To Go?, 9 Commlaw 
Conspectus 87 (2001) at 102. 
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Napster's subsequent facilitated response regarding host IP addresses and availability 
of the material certainly does pass "through" Napster's servers. 
This seems to imply that i f Napster had simply routed the MP3 files through its own 
server, presumably it could have claimed the safe harbour exception since it would 
g 
then have met the requirements of subsection 512(a). The Ninth Circuit did not 
explore the issue further and indicated that the DMCA's safe harbor was not 
necessarily inapplicable to Napster. 
McWane notes that i f subsection 512(a) does not apply to file-sharing services like 
Napster, this narrow reading of the DMCA could stifle other Internet ventures from 
using or expanding on this revolutionary technology that requires central data indexes 
to work.9 Indeed, legitimate Internet companies need to be able to grow 
unencumbered by the threat of copyright infringement lawsuits. 
2. Section 512(d) 
The District Court also noted that although a subsection 512(d) claim was not 
presented by Napster, it could not rely on it as a safe harbour because Napster had 
"reason to know" of the third party's copyright infringement. However, McWane 
points out that subsection 512(d) requires an 'actual knowledge' or a 'red flag' 
standard, which is much more than a mere "reason to know".10 
This red flag standard is based on an ISP's subjective awareness and differs from 
previous standards. The Section 512 standard is whether the service provider 
deliberately proceeded in the face of blatant factors of which it is aware.11 
Mcwane further points out that even i f Napster had failed to comply with the red flag 
standard, it was necessary for the District Court to use the proper standard in a 
7 Sarah H. Mcwane, op.cit at 102. 
8 Shawn D. Chapman, Pushing The Limits Of Copyright Law And Upping The Ante In The Digital 
World: The Strange Case Of A&MRecords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 89 Ky. L .J . 793 (2001) at 809. 
5 John Heilemann, David Boies: The Wired Interview, Wired, October 2000 
<http://www.wired.eom/wired/archive/8.10/boies.html>. 
1 0 Sarah H. Mcwane, op.cit at 103. 
" ibid at 103. 
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precedent-setting case like this one.12 It has been commented that the US Congress 
could not have intended a mere knowledge standard to apply to the DMCA because, 
i f ISPs do not know that their users are engaging in copyright infringement, there 
would be no third-party liability for ISPs under the DMCA. 1 3 
3. Reasonable Policy 
The District Court found that Napster did not meet the reasonably implemented 
policy standard for repeat infringers required by subsection 512(i)(l)(A) because 
Napster did not block the IP addresses of infringing users. However, as McWane 
comments "this is not a requirement anywhere in the DMCA". 1 4 
Under section 512(j), the only permissible type of court injunction against a protected 
ISP is termination of the subscriber accounts as specified in the court's order. There is 
no mention of blocking the IP addresses. So it seems logical that by relying on the 
plain meaning of the DMCA Napster had not blocked any IP addresses and instead 
after October 2000 had terminated hundreds of thousands of users under the DMCA 
notification procedure.15 
4. General 
A restrictive reading by the District Court of subsection 512(a) has virtually assured 
no Internet business can claim the exception.16 Further, McWane notes that the 
opinion in this case seems sympathetic to copyright holders and pessimistic about the 
future of file-sharing technology in that the District Court failed to consider 
legitimate aspects of the technology.17 
This may be inline with protecting copyright holder's right, but it seems that this may 
restrict the development of new technology. This in turn is not beneficial to society 
1 2 Sarah H. Mcwane, op.cit at 103. 
1 3 See John Heilemann, David Boies: The Wired Interview, Wired, October 2000 
<http://www.wired.eom/wired/archive/8.10/boies.html>. 
1 4 Sarah H. Mcwane, op.cit at 103. 
1 5 John Heilemann, David Boies: The Wired Interview, Wired, October 2000 
<http://www.wired.eom/wired/archive/8.10/boies.html> 
1 6 e.g. see Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 809; Ariel Berschadsky, op.cit at 775-82. It should be noted 
Berschadsky's article was published before the District Court had issued any rulings. 
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as a whole. Such technology should be analysed with more emphasis on the 
prospective legitimate uses of peer-to-peer file swapping on the Internet. 
B. The DMCA Safe Habors and Vicarious Liability 
As Belknap points out Napster's attempts to comply with the DMCA safe harbours 
allowed the Ninth Circuit to find Napster vicariously liable for copyright 
infringement.18 This catch-22 situation for ISPs undermines their ability to rely on 
the DMCA. 
An ISP is vicariously liable for another's infringement when it has the right and 
ability to supervise the infringing activity, and a direct financial interest in the 
activity. Under the DMCA, an ISP is ineligible for the final two safe harbours i f it 
receives "a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in 
which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity".19 
Consequently, as Belknap points out, it seems that i f both elements of vicarious 
liability are present, the DMCA removes the ISP from the subsection 512(c) and (d) 
safe harbours against vicarious infringement.20 This situation creates a difficult 
catch-22 situation for ISPs trying to protect themselves under the DMCA. 
To use any of the DMCA safe harbours, an ISP must adopt, implement, and notify its 
users of a policy that outlines grounds for terminating network access for repeat 
infringers.21 Essentially, an ISP must prove that it has the right and ability to control 
its system before it can rely on the subsection 512(c) and (d) safe harbours. However, 
as Belknap notes, because the right and ability to police one's system comprises half 
of the vicarious liability test, any ISP that qualifies under the first subsection 512(i) 
requirement and has a direct financial interest in the infringing activity consequently 
is liable for vicarious infringement. 
1 7 Sarah H. Mcwane, op.cit at 103. 
1 8 John W. Belknap, Copyright Law And Napster, 5 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 183 (2001) at 192. 
1 9 §512(c)(1)(B), (d)(2). 
2 0 John W. Belknap, op.cit at 196. 
2 l § 5 1 2 ( i ) ( l ) ( A ) . 
2 2 John W. Belknap, op.cit at 197. 
130 
Analysis of Napster 
Belknap comments that Napster is a "prime example" of this vicarious liability catch-
22. On the facts, it seems that because of Napster's reservation of rights policy, 
which stated that Napster had the right to refuse service to anyone, the Ninth Circuit 
held that Napster had the right and ability to control infringing material on its system. 
The Ninth Circuit did however note that Napster's system architecture might not 
allow for perfect policing because the Napster system only checks for file names 
instead of file content. Nevertheless, Belknap comments that it was "Napster's policy 
of regulating its system, presumably adopted as a means of complying with DMCA, 
that allowed it to be held liable for vicarious infringement".24 This situation is clearly 
not acceptable. 
C. The DMCA and Proper Notification 
Questions remain about what kind of notification one must give an ISP to trigger the 
25 
ISP's duty to remove or disable access to infringing material. Essentially, here the 
question is whether Napster received proper notification. 
The Ninth Circuit left open the issue of whether the RIAA had given Napster 
sufficient notification of the existence of infringing materials accessible through 
Napster's system. I f there was proper notice, Napster then had to disable or remove 
access to the infringing materials promptly or lose protection under DMCA. 2 6 The 
notification requirements are detailed in subsection 512(c)(3). 
As Belknap points out, based on the pre-trial record there is evidence that the RIAA 
at one point informed Napster of the presence of over twelve thousand infringing 
27 
files. However, neither the Ninth Circuit nor the District Court addressed the 
validity of notification under the DMCA. 
A recent case from the United States District Court for the Fourth Circuit provides 
some guidance on the DMCA notification requirements. In ALS Scan, Inc. v. 
2 3 John W. Belknap, op.cit at 197. 
2 4 ibid at 197. 
2 5 ibid at 192. 
2 6 §512(c ) ( l ) (A) ( i i i ) , (d)(1)(C). 
2 7 John W. Belknap, op.cit at 198. 
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RemarQ Communities, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that substantial compliance with 
the DMCA statutory notification provisions was sufficient to trigger an ISP's duty to 
disable access to infringing material.28 
Effectively, the Fourth Circuit in ALS Scan held that a defendant lost its DMCA 
protection the moment it became aware that a third party was using its system to 
infringe. Further, to be able to use the DMCA, the ISP would have to disable access 
to the infringing material in question. 
As to the contents of the notification, the Fourth Circuit emphasised that the 
notification must substantially comply with the statutory notification requirements of 
DMCA. Furthermore, only a representative list of infringing material was required, 
so long as the list was reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate 
the infringing material. 
The Fourth Circuit added that the DMCA was designed "to reduce the burden of 
29 
holders of multiple copyrights who face extensive infringement of their works". 
Regarding the defendant's claim that the Fourth Circuit's ruling would require it to 
remove non-infringing works from the system, the Fourth Circuit noted that the 
defendant had remedies under the DMCA i f forced to remove or disable access to 
non-infringing material.30 
Belknap comments that the ALS Scan decision has "potentially significant 
consequences" for Napster.31 I f substantial compliance with the DMCA notice 
provisions is sufficient notification, Napster might have had an affirmative duty to 
remove thousands of music files from its system well before the litigation in this case 
began. 
Consequently, according to Belknap the list of infringing works sent by the RIAA 
would be sufficient to trigger Napster's duty to remove files from its system.32 
Additionally, the RIAA would only need to inform Napster of a representative list of 
2 8 ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 2001 W L 98364 (4th Cir. 2001) ("ALS Scan") at 6-7. 
2 9 ibid at 6. 
3 0 ibid at 7. 
3 1 John W. Belknap, op.cit at 199. 
3 2 ibid at 200. 
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infringing files, instead of having to identify each infringing file with specificity. 
Thus, it seems that even with minimal notification of infringing files, Napster would 
have faced the burden of removing those files. 
3. Napster's Fair Use Defences 
Chapman comments that much of the District Court's analysis of Napster's fair use 
defence "is correct".33 The Ninth Circuit agreed after reviewing the District Court's 
decision for abuse of discretion and clear error. 
According to Chapman, the District Court's rejection of a general fair use exception 
for Napster use "simply makes sense".34 Napster and its users were engaged in a 
commercial activity that involved copying of protected material and ultimately had an 
adverse effect on the RIAA's market for its works. As such all four of the fair use 
factors in section 107 CA were met. However, problems seem to arise from the 
District Court's analysis of Napster's specific claims of fair use - sampling, space-
shifting, and the New Artist Program. 
The District Court first applied the section 107 factors in an "extensive, and quite 
persuasive, analysis of sampling".35 Ultimately, because users could permanently 
keep the music they 'sampled' from Napster and because of the adverse economic 
effect of widespread Napster use, sampling did not constitute a fair use in this 
context. According to Chapman this reasoning is sound.36 Further, Napster's 
comparison of its service to a free listening station in a record store "simply defies 
common sense", since its users obtained a permanent copy of the song.37 
Chapman argues that the District Court's analysis of the other claimed fair uses -
space-shifting and the New Artist Program - "was not as convincing".38 This has 
even more importance when taking into account that once a specific practice is 
3 3 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 813. 
3 4 ibid at 814. 
3 5 ibid at 813. 
3 6 ibid at 814. 
3 7 ibid at 814. 
3 8 ibid at 814. 
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deemed to be a fair use then the 'staple article of commerce' doctrine precludes 
liability for contributory or vicarious infringement. 
Consequently, because of the significance of the finding of fair use in the analysis 
behind the 'staple article of commerce doctrine', it is important to analyse the courts' 
approach when considering the specific fair uses. Notably, Chapman argues that in 
denying Napster's fair use and subsequent 'staple article of commerce' claim 
regarding space shifting and legitimate distribution, Judge Patel "misapplied" the 
Supreme Court's decision in Sony.39 
4. Space-Shifting 
A. District Court 
The Ninth Circuit in Diamond expressly analogised the 'space-shifting' of MP3s to 
the 'time-shifting' protected in Sony - holding that such "copying is paradigmatic 
non-commercial personal use".40 As such, Chapman argues that the practice of 
'space-shifting' should constitute a fair use.41 
However, the District Court attempted to dispel this argument by claiming that 
because the Ninth Circuit in Diamond was applying a provision of the AHRA, an 
"inapplicable statute" in the Napster case, its analysis of space-shifting was also 
inapplicable.42 In an extensive footnote, the District Court attempted to support this 
dismissal of Napster's argument, but as Chapman points out the note consists of 
"little more than a reiteration that the AHRA is inapplicable" 4 3 
Chapman argues that the Ninth Circuit's dicta is not inapplicable, i f only for the 
simple reason that the opinion in Diamond made clear the analogy between 'space-
shifting' and 'time-shifting' - "an analogy whose application is not limited only to 
the AHRA" 4 4 
Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 814. 
4 0 Diamond II at 1079. 
4 1 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 814. 
4 2 Napster II at footnote 19. 
4 3 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 815. 
4 4 ibid at 815. 
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According to Chapman, Judge Patel's 'inapplicable' argument is something of a 
"bad-faith effort at avoiding this issue - making a tautological argument that the dicta 
is irrelevant because it is irrelevant".45 Further, the "analogy is clear, and a failure to 
apply it in this case amounts to a misreading of Diamond' 46 
Chapman further argues that if properly applied, Diamond indicates that the 'space-
shifting' of MP3 files, "whether it be from a personal computer to a portable device 
or from one personal computer to another over the Internet, is the sort of non-
infringing use contemplated by Sony's staple article of commerce doctrine".47 
The District Court further attempted to support this finding of no 'fair use' with facts 
from the Napster case itself. The District Court found that "space-shifting accounts 
for a de minimis portion of Napster use and is not a significant aspect of defendant's 
business".48 The District Court reached this conclusion through the application of 
"common sense" basing its reasoning on several factors including Napster's failure to 
show that it "saw space-shifting as an attraction for its user base" 4 9 The District 
Court also pointed to an expert opinion indicating that a significant portion of 
college-age Napster users do not own the music that they download. 
However, as Chapman points out, these facts do not support the idea that 'space-
shifting' is not a fair use, but instead they are part of the 'staple article of commerce' 
inquiry into whether or not the non-infringing use is substantial.50 Again according to 
Chapman, the District Court seems to have misread the Sony opinion, claiming that 
the finding of time-shifting as a fair use was due to the fact the "time-shifting 
represented the principal, rather than an occasional use of VCRs".51 
Chapman concedes that while it is true that the Sony court did accept that time-
shifting was the principal use of VCRs, its finding of fair use was based on an 
Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 815-816. 
4 6 ibid at 816. 
4 7 ibid at 816. 
4 8 Napster II at 904. 
4 9 ibid at 905. 
5 0 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 816. 
51 Napster II at 9\6. 
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analysis of the four factors in section 107 CA. Indeed, what portion of the overall 
use that a given fair use constitutes is only relevant in determining whether the staple 
article of commerce doctrine is applicable, not in evaluating whether a given use is a 
fair use. 
Consequently, Chapman argues that the District Court "commingled" two separate 
aspects of the 'staple article of commerce analysis' - the determination of 'fair use' 
comes first and is based in the criteria laid out in section 107 CA. 5 3 Accordingly, 
Chapman argues that a clear reading of Diamond and Sony indicates that space-
shifting is a "non-commercial, fair, non-infringing use".54 
B. Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion as the District Court that space-
shifting was not a 'fair use'. Though, as Chapman points out "it applied a different, 
yet equally flawed, analysis".55 
The Ninth Circuit pointed out that in Sony and Diamond, the person who 'shifted' the 
copyrighted material did not also distribute that material to others. The Ninth Circuit 
indicated that Napster's use was different because "once a user lists a copy of music 
he already owns on the Napster system in order to access the music from another 
location, the song becomes 'available to millions of other individuals'".56 
Effectively the Ninth Circuit found that because other persons are able to access the 
files, the space-shifting is no longer a fair use. Chapman argues that while "this is 
certainly a stronger argument than that offered by the District Court, it again fails to 
57 
convince". He argues that just because files are available to other persons does not 
change the fact that the files are space-shifted, and that this is paradigmatic fair use.58 
5 2 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 816. 
5 3 ibid at 817. 
5 4 ibid at 817. 
5 5 ibid at 817. 
5 6 Napster III at 1019. 
5 7 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 817. 
5 8 ibid at 817. 
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Chapman explains that space-shifting is a separate activity from distribution to other 
persons and simply because a technology allows a fair use and an unfair use to occur 
simultaneously does not make the fair use unfair.59 Chapman's reasoning certainly 
seems sound. 
The Ninth Circuit attempted to support its position by citing MP3.com and Religious 
Technology Center v. Lerma.60 However, according to Chapman, these cases are 
"clearly distinguishable".61 
The Ninth Circuit claimed that MP3.com included a finding that 'space-shifting' of 
MP3 files was not a fair use even when previous ownership is demonstrated before a 
download is allowed. Chapman comments that this argument fails to take into 
account the most basic factual difference between MP3.com and Napster - MP3.com 
provided the files, whereas in Napster users provide their own files.6 2 
{ 
Chapman points out that the "fundamental idea behind a fair use is that it is 
personal".63 In MP3 .com the use was not personal because MP3.com directly 
infringed copyright by providing the files, and because it reaped a financial benefit 
for the distribution of the files. Chapman comments, that in the context of 'time-
shifting,' this would be analogous to a business selling bootleg copies of a television 
program so that people could watch the programs at a time other than when 
broadcast.64 This, he argues, is "clearly not a personal or fair use". Consequently, 
the difference between the practices in MP3.com and Napster, while subtle, are very 
significant. 
The Ninth Circuit indicated that Religious Technology Center also supported its 
position because it suggested "that storing copyrighted material on computer disk for 
later review is not a fair use".65 Again, Chapman argues the alleged use in Religious 
Technology Center, much like in MP3.com, was not a personal use.66 The defendant 
5 9 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 817. 
6 0 Religious Technology Center, v. Lerma, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1569 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
6 1 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 818. 
6 2 ibid at 818. 
6 3 ibid at 818. 
6 4 ibid at 818. 
6 5 Napster 111 at 1019. 
6 6 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 818. 
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in Religious Technology Center did not previously own the materials that he was 
'space-shifting'. Further, Chapman argues that the Ninth Circuit's use of Religious 
Technology Center directly contradicts the its previous holding in Diamond - that 
space-shifting of MP3 files was "paradigmatic" fair use.67 
5. Napster's Staple Article of Commerce Defence 
A. District Court 
1. Space-Shifting 
Chapman argues that i f "anything, the space-shifting analyses offered by the District 
Court and the Ninth Circuit show only that some of the uses of Napster are not fair". 6 8 
Thus, fair use by Napster's users is not a complete defence. It would have to be 
employed merely as part o f a defence based on the 'staple article of commerce' 
doctrine. 
The 'staple article of commerce' analysis simply addresses whether the product is 
"capable of substantial noninfringing uses".69 As Chapman notes the Sony court was 
reluctant to apply a rigid standard regarding whether a non-infringing use was 
'significant' or 'substantial'.7 0 
The statistics cited by the District Court in Napster show that a large percentage of 
Napster users were engaged in some sort of space-shifting. The Supreme Court's 
language in Sony indicates resorting to mere accounting is unnecessary: 
"Whatever the future percentage of legal versus illegal home-use recording might be, 
an injunction which seeks to deprive the public of the very tool or article of 
commerce capable of some noninfringing use would be an extremely harsh remedy, 
as well as one unprecedented in copyright law". 7 1 
6 7 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 818. 
6 8 ibid at 819. 
6 9 Sony at 442. 
7 0 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 819. See Sony at 442-446. 
7 1 So/iy at 444. 
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Consequently, Chapman argues that it is clear that under the 'staple article of 
commerce' doctrine, the amount of space-shifting encountered on Napster should 
have been enough to serve as an affirmative defence. 
2. Napster's On-Going Control 
Chapman comments that the District Court's final argument against applying the 
staple article of commerce doctrine is "perhaps the strongest".73 The District Court 
indicated that the 'staple article of commerce' doctrine does not apply because 
"Napster exercises ongoing control over its service",74 whereas Sony's "participation 
did not extend past manufacturing and selling the VCRs". 
Chapman comments that this argument is "somewhat misleading", especially when 
considered in the light of the Sony court's doctrinal concerns regarding the rationale 
behind copyright law. 7 6 The Sony Court stated that the basic function of copyright is 
to encourage the "broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts" and 
that the monopoly granted to the copyright holder is simply a subservient means to 
that end. 7 7 
As such when "technology has advanced so as to elude a clear answer under current 
copyright law, courts should be very reluctant to expand copyright protection by 
78 
interpreting the law through the lens of this basic function". Consequently, the Sony 
court was reluctant to give broadcasters a right to suppress the new technology of the 
VCR. 
Furthermore, Chapman points out that the cases that the District Court cited to 
support her argument that retaining control of a product eliminates the 'staple article 
of commerce' defence, were all based on specific uses of currently existing 
Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 819. 
ibid at 819. 
Napster II at 916. 
ibid at 916. 
Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 819. See Sony at 430-432. 
Sony at 431-432. 
Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 819-820. 
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technology - "technology that the copyright law has had time to ingest and adjust to 
79 
accordingly". 
On the other hand, Chapman argues that Napster is more like the VCR when it was 
first introduced in the late 1970s.80 It is a new technology, the main function of 
which is to provide greater access to music - "a function that coincides perfectly with 
the basic aims of copyright law". 8 1 
Thus according to Chapman, "rather than suppressing Napster, the Napster court 
should have been loath to expand the recording industry's copyright monopoly, 
especially in the initial stages of litigation when a potentially damaging injunction 
82 
lies ready to envelop and potentially destroy this new technology". Further, the 
"basic philosophy of American copyright urges the release and support - not 
83 
hindrance - of new technology". 
B. Ninth Circuit 
Given the District Court's difficulty with the 'staple article of commerce' doctrine, 
the Ninth Circuit, with its furthest departure from the District Court's opinion, 
attempted to clarify the discussion. The Ninth Circuit did this by differentiating 
between contributory liability and vicarious liability and then proceeding to discuss 
the 'staple article of commerce' doctrine's application to each theory of liability. 
1. Contributory Liability 
(a) A More Technology-Friendly Approach 
Ginsburg comments that the Ninth Circuit's decision "tacitly" acknowledges the 
concern that copyright should not stifle the advance of technology. While not 
everyone asserted the lawfulness of Napster's particular operation of peer-to-peer file 
7 9 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 820. 
8 0 ibid at 820. 
8 1 ibid at 820. 
8 2 ibid at 820. 
8 3 ibid at 820. 
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sharing technology, most concurred that peer-to-peer file sharing technology offers a 
valuable means of communication whose promotion should not be put in jeopardy by 
overly broad copyright protection. 
This is why Ginsburg believes that the Ninth Circuit felt "compelled to make a clear 
distinction between the architecture of the Napster system and Napster's conduct in 
relation to the operational capacity of the system".85 Ginsburg argues that by making 
this distinction the Ninth Circuit stressed that Napster was not the Sony case all over 
again. 
The Ninth Circuit adopted "an apparently more technology-friendly approach" than 
the District Court did. 8 6 The Ninth Circuit stated that the District Court had 
improperly confined its analysis of non-infringing uses to current uses, ignoring the 
system's capabilities. As such the District Court placed undue weight on the 
proportion of current infringing use as compared to current and future non-infringing 
use. 
The Ninth Circuit, however, warned that it would "not impute the requisite level of 
knowledge to Napster merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may be 
used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights."8 7 Ginsburg comments that these statements 
appear "designed to alleviate concerns about conflicts between copyright and new 
technology".88 
The Ninth Circuit clarified that deployment of a technology that the exploiter knows 
can be used to infringe does not of itself satisfy the knowledge element for 
contributory liability. Effectively, contributory liability wi l l not lie "merely because 
the structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material". 
(b) Actual Knowledge 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright And Control Over New Technologies Of Dissemination, 101 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1613 (2001) at 1639. 
8 5 ibid at 1639. 
8 6 ibid at 1640. 
87 Napster III at 1020-21. 
8 8 Jane C. Ginsburg (2001), op.cit at 1640. 
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As Ginsburg comments so "far so good for new copyright-implicating technologies in 
principle". 9 0 However, as Chapman points out the Ninth Circuit then took a "curious 
turn in its reasoning", noting that i f knowledge can otherwise be proven, then 
contributory liability ensues.91 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Sony test of 'substantial non-infringing use' to 
be related entirely to the knowledge element of contributory infringement. 
Effectively, it found that the existence of substantial non-infringing uses for a 
technology does not insulate the provider of that technology from liability, it merely 
makes it improper to "impute the requisite level of knowledge" to the provider for 
contributory infringement.9 2 
So, as Kramarsky points out, once any substantial non-infringing use is demonstrated, 
93 
the question apparently becomes one of actual knowledge. In effect, the technology 
provider's knowledge of specific user infringements "overrides the impunity that the 
actual or potential existence of noninfringing uses might otherwise give i t " . 9 4 
According to Ginsburg, it was Napster's knowledge of its users' infringing activities 
that supplied the "crucial difference" between the Napster technology and the VCR in 
Others do not agree with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Sony - that once 
Napster had knowledge of users' direct infringement on its system, it could not claim 
the 'staple article of commerce' immunity from contributory liability. 9 6 Indeed on 
this point Dogan comments that the "Ninth Circuit gave a somewhat elliptical 
treatment of Sony"?1 
8 9 Napster IIIat 1021. 
9 0 Jane C. Ginsburg (2001), op.cit at 1640. 
9 1 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 821. 
9 2 Napster III at 1021-22. 
93Stephen M. Kramarsky, op.cit at 32. 
9 4 Jane C. Ginsburg (2001), op.cit at 1641. 
9 5 ibid at 1641. 
9 6 e.g. see Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 820-821. 
9 7 Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster A VCR? The Implications Of Sony For Napster And Other Internet 
Technologies, 52 Hastings L .J . 939 (2001) at 948. 
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Chapman argues that this knowledge assertion "is troubling in two respects". First 
Chapman argues that Napster's knowledge is "simply" an element of the claim of 
contributory infringement to which the 'staple article of commerce' doctrine is an 
affirmative defence." 
Chapman argues that the 'staple article of commerce' doctrine does "more than create 
a rebuttable presumption of a lack of knowledge; it is an affirmative defense".100 He 
argues that a reading of Sony, especially the areas repeatedly cited by the Ninth 
Circuit in support of this proposition fails to show any sign of this "twist in the 
doctrine". 1 0 1 In fact, he argues further, the Sony court pointed out that to assert the 
defence one need only show that the technology in question is "merely...capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses". 
Secondly, in its assertion that actual knowledge trumps the 'staple article of 
commerce' doctrine the Ninth Circuit felt "compelled to make a clear distinction 
between the architecture of the Napster system and Napster's conduct in relation to 
the operational capacity of the system".1 0 3 
Essentially, the Ninth Circuit contended that Napster's "conduct in relation" to its 
system - its continued control of the system and subsequent failure to block access to 
the system by suppliers of the infringing material - when combined with knowledge 
of the direct infringement was enough to overcome the 'staple article of commerce' 
doctrine. 1 0 4 
Chapman comments that putting aside any objections to the Ninth Circuit's 
interpretation, "this appears to be just the sort of confusion between contributory and 
vicarious liability that the court of appeals warned against just a few pages later". 1 0 5 
More importantly, according to Chapman this confusion also appears to be crucial in 
9 8 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 821. 
9 9 ibid at 821. 
, 0 ° ibid at 821. 
1 0 1 ibid at 821. 
1 0 2 ibid at 821. 
103 Napster HI at 1020. 
1 0 4 ibid at 1019-22. 
1 0 5 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 822. 
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the Ninth Circuit's argument against the application o f the 'staple article of 
commerce' defence to vicarious liabili ty. 1 0 6 
I 
* 
According to the Ninth Circuit, it was important to distinguish between the 
"architecture of the Napster system and Napster's conduct in relation to the 
operational capacity of the system".1 0 7 Thus, the decision appears to focus on the 
legality of the services provided by Napster rather than the underlying technology 
itself. As Burger comments, this may provide comfort for businesses engaged in 
I OR 
developing technologies that may be used for any number of purposes. 
According to Burger, however, the Ninth Circuit's opinion "fails to clearly articulate 
the distinction between the services at issue and the underlying technology".1 0 9 As a 
result, he argues that it is uncertain how this standard relates to the Sony test of 
whether a product is capable of substantial non-infringing uses.110 
Burger notes that the Ninth Circuit's reasoning appears to suggest that, "in an online 
context", the Sony test has less relevance, and courts should instead focus on 
evidence of actual knowledge by ISPs of the infringing activities of their users.111 
Burger argues further, that while this distinction may be sufficient in the immediate 
case, "it seems likely that in future cases it may be more difficult to distinguish 
112 
between the use of the service and the use of the technology". 
2. Vicarious Liability 
(a) Application of the Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine 
1 0 6 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 822. 
107 Napster III at 1021. 
1 0 8 James M. Burger, "Rock 'N Roll Is Here To Stay": Napster And Online Music Distribution, 19-Spg 
Comm. Law. 1 (2001) at 35. 
1 0 9 ibid at 35. 
1 1 0 ibid at 35. 
1 1 1 ibid at 35. 
1 1 2 ibid at 35. 
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Chapman comments that vicarious liability focuses on continuing control of the 
technology, a concern clearly implicated in the Ninth Circuit's discussion of 
contributory l iabil i ty. 1 1 3 However, the Ninth Circuit went to great length to express 
the difference between the two theories of liability. 
In doing so the Ninth Circuit noted that Sony's 'staple article of commerce' analysis 
had no application to Napster's potential liability for vicarious copyright 
infringement. The Ninth Circuit stated that the Sony analysis should not apply to 
vicarious liability because the Sony court used the term "vicarious liability" in a 
generic sense instead of for its specific legal meaning. As such, the Ninth Circuit 
found the Sony analysis of substantial non-infringing uses irrelevant to a 
determination of vicarious liability. 
Thus, Napster had no Sony defense to vicarious infringement. Consequently as 
Belknap points out even " i f the Ninth Circuit had not modified the Sony contributory 
infringement analysis, Napster would still be liable for vicarious copyright 
infringement". 1 1 4 
The Ninth Circuit cited the Sony case itself as authority for this claim. Chapman 
comments the Ninth Circuit correctly pointed out that specific claims of direct and 
vicarious liability were not before the Sony court and that the Supreme Court 
recognised that the "lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement, and 
vicarious liability are not clearly drawn". 1 1 5 
The Ninth Circuit argued that as a result, the Sony court used the terms 'contributory' 
and 'vicarious' liability imprecisely and interchangeably. Chapman argues that 
despite the Ninth Circuit's characterisation, an imprecise use of the terminology of 
these two theories of indirect liability does not necessarily mean that the Sony court 
intended the staple article of commerce analysis to only apply to one theory - that is 
to contributory l iabil i ty. 1 1 6 
1 1 3 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 822. 
1 1 4 John W. Belknap, op.cit at 192. 
115 Sony at 435 n.17. 
1 1 6 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 823. 
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Chapman argues further that nothing " in the Sony opinion supports such a 
reading". 1 1 7 Instead, "a look at the philosophical underpinnings of the Sony court's 
opinion - that the arts, sciences, and new technology should be promoted, not 
hampered by the limited monopoly provided by copyright law - indicates that the 
opposite conclusion is proper".1 1 8 This certainly seems to be the case from a 
straightforward reading of Sony. 
According to Chapman, the staple article of commerce analysis is an affirmative 
defence to both theories of indirect copyright l iabil i ty. 1 1 9 To read Sony otherwise 
would allow "the fundamental rationale behind copyright to be swallowed by a 
120 
distinction between two theories of liability that essentially merge in practice". 
Chapman argues that this 'practical merging' is evidenced both by the Supreme 
Court's interchangeable use of the two theories in Sony and the Ninth Circuit's 
difficulty in drawing a distinct line between the two despite its express desire to do so 
in Napster.m 
(b) Uncertainty 
Burger comments that the Ninth Circuit "failed to clearly articulate the distinction 
122 
between vicarious and contributory liability for copyright infringement". Its 
decision imposed on Napster a duty to police its system to the "fullest extent" 
possible in order to escape liability for vicarious copyright infringement. 
Moreover, at the same time the Ninth Circuit refused to decide whether the DMCA's 
safe harbour protections for online service providers would apply. Berger, thus 
comments that as "a result, the decision creates uncertainty regarding the duties of 
computer service providers to police their networks when they have actual or 
constructive knowledge of potentially infringing activities". 1 2 3 
1 1 7 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 823. 
1 1 8 ibid at 823. See Sony at 430-432. 
1 1 9 Shawn D. Chapman, op.cit at 823. 
1 2 0 ibid at 823-824. 
1 2 1 ibid at 823-824. 
1 2 2 James M. Burger, op.cit at 35. 
1 2 3 ibid at 36. 
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This is becomes more relevant in light of tracking activities undertaken by both the 
RIAA and more recently the Motion Picture Association of America ( 'MPAA') . For 
example, once the MPAA has tracked users who download digital movies without 
authorisation, it sends warning letters to the relevant ISPs warning them of their users 
violation of the law. 
6. The Peer-2-Peer Movement 
The simple Napster peer-to-peer ('P2P') service relied on users to pay for their own 
storage and connection costs, an approach that has paved the way for other P2P file-
sharing applications.124 Consequently, even while Napster was still in operation, 
before the fatal blows from the District Court and Ninth Circuit decisions, there were 
alternative file-sharing services on offer and in the pipeline. 
However, none of these alternatives were as popular as Napster and its sixty million 
or so users. This all changed after Napster's shutdown. Its users were then forced to 
seek out unstoppable alternatives. These uncontrollable alternatives are the P2P file 
sharing software programs such as Gnutella operated by those that are hard to reach 
through judicial process.125 
Such P2P systems do not rely on a central server that a traditional ISP or Napster 
must have to provide its services.126 The Gnutella protocol connects users in an ad 
hoc fashion as i f in a dynamic, loosely organised web of individual connections 
across the Internet. These users then make files available on their hard-drive to others 
on the web. 
One drawback is that these systems slow down considerably when more users join 
them, particularly users with dial-up modems, and such systems can ultimately slow 
to a halt. 1 2 7 Indeed, at the time when Napster was still operating, with its future 
James M. Burger, op.cit at 33. 
1 2 5 See <http://gnutella.wego.com/>. 
1 2 6 Chewychin (a pseudonym), Napster vs. Gnutella, Epinions.com, May 08, 2001 
<http://www.epinions.com/content_1460707460>. 
1 2 7 James M. Burger, op.cit at 36. 
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hanging in the balance, there was concern over whether such P2P alternatives would 
be able to handle a large portion of the existing Napster users. 
It was believed then that given the publicity surrounding Napster and hacker 
motivations, it would be surprising not to see either Gnutella and similar programs 
improving, or new alternative file-sharing services emerging. This certainly seems to 
have happened. 
James M. Burger, op.cit at 36. 
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Chapter 9 - Solutions and Conclusions 
"As sure as you or I are sitting in this courtroom today, some bright young 
entrepreneur... is going to come up with a device to unjam the jam. And then we 
have a device to jam the unjamming of the jam and we all end up like jelly ".1 
An analysis of the recent litigation involving the digital distribution of music over the 
Internet would not be complete without a brief mention of the possible solutions that 
could be implemented. Both the legislature and the recording industry have a number 
of legal and technological options available, some of which have already been acted 
upon, that could be used to tackle the problem of unauthorised distribution of music. 
1. Legal Solutions 
A. Changing the Internet's Underlying Structure 
The legislature is not completely powerless when it comes to regulating the Internet, 
even though some would argue that "the nature of the space makes behavior there 
unregulable".3 
It cannot be denied that the nature of the Internet makes it difficult to stop the spread 
of information. Therefore, some argue that it would be better for the legislature to 
regulate how the Internet works, rather than regulating the behaviour of its users.4 
This could be done by enacting a law requiring code writers to change the underlying 
code of the Internet.5 
' Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: The Law and Lore of Copyright from Gutenberg to the 
Celestial Jukebox, Hill & Wang, New York, NY, 1994 at 159. 
2 Other possible solutions have not been mentioned here. For example the adoption of a shareware 
approach to the distribution of on-line music. For a detailed analysis of such an approach see further 
Paul Veravanich, Paul Veravanich, op.cit at 475 -478. 
3 Lawrence Lessig, Comment, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 
501, 1999 at 505. 
4 Kristine J. Hoffman, op.cit at 169. 
5 Lawrence Lessig, Comment, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 
501, 1999 at 514. 
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Simply by changing the Internet's code, a user's identity could be self-
authenticating.6 As soon as a user connects to the Internet, or to a particular site, that 
user's identity, possibly along with other identifying information, would be 
transmitted to the site. 
This type of legislation would aid the RIAA immeasurably in tracking down pirates. 
It would be able to track a user's legitimate and illegitimate transfers. No longer 
would it be possible for pirates to transfer digital music files anonymously, because 
their identity would be known as soon as they logged on. Whether or not the RIAA 
should be able to keep track of a user's legitimate transfers is a different issue all 
together.8 No doubt, such information would be invaluable to the RIAA and its 
members for marketing purposes. 
It should be noted, however, that this is not a perfect solution to the problem.9 First, 
it could be argued that it is too drastic a solution. On the other hand, other copyright 
holders would be able to enjoy the benefits of such a solution as well. Second, the 
legislature would have to come up with a standard code format for the code writers to 
use. This alone could take months or even years to do. 1 0 
Next, this code, like all other codes, could be cracked. A diligent and motivated 
hacker would break the code sooner or later.11 Finally, tracking transfers might be 
socially undesirable, given privacy concerns. Not everyone who uses the Internet 
wi l l want an ISP, web site owner, other users, or the government to know his or her 
identity. Indeed, part of the current lure of the Internet and a reason for its popularity 
is that one can blend in and remain anonymous. 
B. Imposition of Royalties on Manufacturers of Portable MP3 Devices 
One possible way to guarantee that the record industry wi l l receive some economic 
6 Kristine J. Hoffman, op.cit at 169. 
7 Lawrence Lessig, op.cit at 515. 
8 Kristine J. Hoffman, op.cit at 169. 
9 ibid at 169. 
1 0 Kevin Davis, Fair Use on the Internet: A Fine Line Between Fair and Foul, 34 U.S.F. L . Rev. 129 
1999 at 163. 
'' Lawrence Lessig, Comment, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 
501 1999 at 533. 
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compensation for their copyrighted materials is to impose a royalty scheme on 
portable MP3 players.12 This would not be a novel concept. The AHRA already 
contains a royalty scheme that is targeted at DAT devices. 
Although its current incarnation does not necessarily encompass portable MP3 
players such as the Rio, the legislature could easily amend the AHRA to provide such 
coverage. For example, the legislature could update the definition of 'digital audio 
recording device' to specifically include devices without an independent recording 
function such as MP3 players. 
I f the legislature amends the AHRA to include MP3 player devices within its 
jurisdiction, it would ensure that music artists and the record industry are 
compensated in some manner with respect to the use of portable devices to playback 
MP3 copies of their work. 1 3 
However, the inclusion of Rio devices within the AHRA's royalty scheme would not 
produce the same level of compensation as with devices such as DATs. 1 4 First, the 
expansion of the AHRA royalty provisions would not include all users of MP3 files. 
For example, computer users do not need to purchase portable MP3 players to be able 
to listen to MP3 files. They could still download files from the Internet and play 
them through the speakers of their computers with the use of MP3 playing software. 
Additionally, since the AHRA imposes royalties on both recording and playback 
devices, and the media used with those machines, there would only be one source of 
income with MP3 player devices as compared to a traditional digital audio recorder.15 
This is because MP3 players don't use interchangeable media like cassettes or CDs 
used in cassette players and CD players. 
As a result, imposing royalties on MP3 players would not be a complete answer to 
Internet piracy of music files.16 However, it would ensure that the recording industry 
received some measure of compensation as far as portable MP3 players are 
1 2 Paul Veravanich, op.cit at 468. 
1 3 ibid at 469. 
1 4 ibid at 469. 
1 5 ibid at 469. 
1 6 ibid at 469. 
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concerned. Indeed, as the popularity of MP3 players increase, the corresponding 
royalties could add up to substantial amounts. 
Furthermore, it has also been suggested that PCs could be brought under the ambit of 
the AHRA. 1 7 The exemption of PCs from the AHRA, though perhaps of minor 
practical significance in 1992, has developed into a major loophole that has prevented 
the AHRA from having any meaningful impact on the digital piracy problem in 
recent years.18 It has been submitted that the statutory loophole should be closed thus 
leading to an increase to the amount of royalties available to compensate copyright 
holders and to the end of a legal absurdity. 
2. Technological Solutions 
Several technologies are available to prevent piracy in the dissemination of digital 
music. These are called 'Automated Rights Management' or 'Copyright 
Management Systems'. Under these headings, password protection, micropayment 
systems, and firewalls have all been suggested as means of protecting intellectual 
property on the Internet.19 However, at this time, the two most viable methods seem 
to be digital watermarking and encryption. 
A. Digital Watermarking 
Digital watermarking, also known as 'digital signatures' or 'digital fingerprints', 
allows copyright owners to mark their music files with an invisible "watermark" 
21 
containing the file's copyright information. While watermarking itself cannot 
prevent the duplication of files, music playing devices can be equipped to read these 
watermarks and react to them, preventing a user from reading a file, making second 
generation copies of a file, or even limiting the number of times a file can be 
accessed. 
1 7 David A. Hepler, Dropping Slugs In The Celestial Jukebox: Congressional Enabling Of Digital 
Music Piracy Short-Changes Copyright Holders (Fndl), 37 San Diego L . Rev. 1165 (2000) at 1194. 
See also Aaron L. Melville, op.cit at 401 - 404. 
1 8 David A. Hepler, op.cit at 1194. 
1 9 See, Barak D. Jolish, Scuttling the Music Pirate, 17 Ent. Sports L . 9 (1999) at 10. 
2 0 B.J. Richards, op.cit at 440. 
2 1 ibid at 440. 
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It has been suggested that it would be foolish for the recording industry not to adopt 
some form of digital watermarking.22 The watermarking itself is transparent to 
consumers and would not affect the playback of MP3 files. The major advantage of 
using watermarks is that they are encoded in such a way that they survive conversion 
from a CD to MP3 or other compressed audio formats. Thus i f a pirate were to try to 
copy a recording and post it on the Internet, the recording could still be identified 
despite the change in format. Furthermore, the DMCA contains measures that 
attempts to prevent any modification or deletion of copyright identification such as 
watermarks. 
Watermarks could just simply be used to indicate the origin of a specific file, making 
after-the-fact infringement investigations much easier.23 Although the record 
industry presumably knows which Internet sites contain authorised files, the presence 
of a watermark would aid the industry in policing the Internet by providing ways to 
distinguish between authorised and unauthorised MP3 files. 2 4 This is important 
because the DMCA effectively shifts the burden of monitoring the Internet to the 
copyright owners. Of course, watermarking itself would not prevent audiophiles 
from creating unauthorised copies of MP3s. 
Additionally, the legal remedy provided by the DMCA for copyright owners to use 
against people who tamper with watermarks would probably not deter pirates from 
tampering with such watermarks.25 On the other hand, since a digital watermark wil l 
not hamper the ability of a user to playback the file, pirates may be less inclined to 
remove or tamper with the watermark since they wi l l be able to accomplish their goal 
of distributing an unauthorised copy of a file by merely making it available on-line. 2 6 
So it seems that while not foolproof, digital watermarking has the potential of 
facilitating copyright holders' efforts to notify the ISPs of infringers. 
Liquid Audio recently introduced technology that enables artists to embed digital 
Paul Veravanich, op.cit at 470. 
2 3 B.J. Richards, op.cit at 440. 
2 4 Paul Veravanich, op.cit at 470. 
2 5 ibid at 471. 
2 6 ibid at 471. 
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watermarks within music files including MP3s. This digital mark, called the 
'Genuine Music Mark' is designed to prevent copying by consumers. Liquid Audio 
technology focuses exclusively on the needs of the music industry and allows users to 
preview sound files for free. 2 8 As such, users can purchase an authorised download 
of the music, which is both encrypted and traceable. 
B. Digital Encoding 
29 
Another possibility for a technological control on piracy is a system of encryption. 
While watermarks can be read and reacted to by the playing device, encryption 
encodes the music file itself. In encryption, the code of the compression software is 
programmed to prevent copies from being made of downloaded files. 
This would be a more aggressive response to the issue of digital music piracy because 
it attempts to stop users from making the initial MP3 copies of the original works. 3 0 
Such digital encoding can be accomplished in two main ways. The recording 
industry may attempt to encode CDs in a manner that would prevent users from 
producing copies of the original CDs. Alternatively, the industry could stop 
manufacturing CDs and switch to another format, for example Digital Versatile Discs 
'DVDs' , which already allow for special encoding. 
Current DVDs ship with settings for different regions around the world in order to 
restrict the geographical regions within which a consumer can use a particular 
D V D . 3 1 The DVD players themselves already contain anti-copying technology 
designed to prevent consumers from making copies of DVD movies. I f the record 
industry produced music DVDs rather than music CDs, the industry would be able to 
encrypt the discs to prevent copying fairly easily since DVD technology is already 
capable of various types of encryption. 
Although this sort of encryption would probably take away the average consumer's 
2 7 See Liquid Audio Extends Leading Internet Music Delivery System to Support New 'Genuine Music' 
Open Standard and MP3 Format, Business Wire, January 25 1999. 
2 8 Jessica Trivellini Toney, op.cit at 148-149. 
2 9 B.J. Richards, op.cit at 440. 
3 0 Paul Veravanich, op.cit at 471. 
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ability to make MP3 copies of copyrighted work, it is not guaranteed to completely 
succeed in stopping determined pirates.32 I f the past is any indicator of future 
developments, diligent hackers and pirates wi l l ultimately circumvent anti-copying 
technology. 
The DMCA already prohibits the sale of 'black boxes' designed to circumvent copy-
prevention technology. Consequently, copyright holders have a legal recourse 
available in order to prevent the distribution of physical devices that circumvent 
copy-prevention technology.33 However, it is conceivable that a sophisticated hacker 
could invent around a copy protection measure and distribute the music on-line in the 
same manner that is occurring today with unauthorised MP3s. 
As such it seems that physical deterrents to unauthorised copying of original 
recordings would prevent the average consumer from distributing unauthorised copies 
of original works. 3 4 Unfortunately, the encoding of original discs wi l l likely fail to 
prevent determined pirates from continuing to illegally distribute music files. 
C . Problems with Technological Solutions 
Of course rights-management technologies are not perfect.3 5 Rights-management 
systems change the nature of copyright entitlement by granting copyright owners 
extra-legal and absolute control over their material, thus reversing the Internet trend 
toward access rights and resetting the copyright balance in favour of exclusion. 
This shifting of rights may significantly restrict the three doctrines that have 
guaranteed access rights under US copyright law - public domain, first sale, and fair 
use. 
First, rights-management systems may constrict the public domain. Currently, the 
3 1 For example, DVDs sold in Europe are encoded "Region 2" and are only playable in D V D players 
that are able to read "Region 2" or "Multi-regional" discs. 
3 2 Paul Veravanich, op.cit at 472. 
3 3 ibid at 472. 
3 4 ibid at 472. 
3 5 Harvard Law Review Association, IV. Internet Regulation Through Architectural Modification: The 
Property Rule Structure Of Code Solutions, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1634 (1999) at 1651. 
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copyright holder loses exclusive rights to her work at the end of the copyright term. 
As rights-management technology provides direct control of access and its power 
depends not on the authority of law but on the strength of its technology, 
technologically protected works may never lapse into the public domain. 
Second, rights-management technologies may effectively nullify the 'first sale' 
doctrine.3 7 Currently, copies of a copyrighted work can be freely transferred after the 
initial purchase. The first sale doctrine permits books and music to be loaned or 
resold by limiting copyright holders' ability to control the distribution of copies of 
their works beyond the first sale. However, rights-management technology enables 
copyright holders to control access to the work beyond the initial distribution. As a 
38 
result, the first sale doctrine is effectively destroyed. 
39 
Finally, rights-management technologies may obliterate the fair use doctrine. 
Currently, fair use is an affirmative defence to copyright infringement. I f the issue of 
infringement is never reached - because rights-management protection prevents 
infringement before it can occur - then the fair use question never arises.40 Again, 
because information providers control access to the content, it would be within their 
discretion to grant or deny access for uses that might otherwise constitute a 'fair 
use'.4 1 
3. Other Solutions 
A. Allow MP3 Distribution to Maintain Its Current Course 
Another possible course of action for the recording industry may be to take no action 
at all and let the MP3 revolution take of f unhindered by any resistance on their part.4 2 
On many occasions the record industry has expressed concerns that the technological 
innovation of the day would undermine its business and result in mass copyright 
infringement. Two notable examples of this are the audiocassette and the DAT. 
3 6 Harvard Law Review Association, op.cit at 1652. 
3 7 S e e § 109. 
3 8 Harvard Law Review Association, op.cit at 1653. 
3 9 S e e § 107. 
4 0 Harvard Law Review Association, op.cit at 1653. 
4 1 ibid at 1653. 
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With the benefit of hindsight, today we know that neither the audiocassette nor the 
DAT caused irreparable harm to the record industry. The CD has effectively replaced 
audiocassettes, and the DAT is widely acknowledged as a commercial failure. 4 3 
Furthermore, while some consumers make unauthorised copies of music and refuse to 
purchase original copies, many consumers seem to prefer purchasing original musical 
works. 4 4 Consumers may want to own an authorised recording because they come 
packaged with artwork that is unavailable elsewhere. I f the recording industry were 
to exploit this 'edge' then they could keep a tight grip on their market share. For 
example, to entice consumers to buy original recordings it could provide promotional 
materials, such as stickers or photographs, or grant membership to a fan club. 
Moreover, it seems that loyal fans of certain musical artists wi l l usually show their 
support for these artists by purchasing only original copies of their works 4 5 
The record industry should further consider that by allowing people to sample 
individual songs through MP3 files, the industry could promote artists and possibly 
increase their fan base. It is possible that some consumers would never listen to a 
certain artist i f they were unable to sample their work for free and with such ease. 
With the enormous world-wide audience available over the Internet, recording artists, 
notably those that are not well established or that only have local followings, would 
gain exposure to listeners to which they would not otherwise have access to. The net 
result could be an eventual increase, rather than a decrease, in sales. 
B. Industry Supported Alternatives to Unauthorised Distribution of Music Files 
To supplement other measures the recording industry could implement its own 
distribution channels in order to make authorised copies of music files available to 
on-line consumers.46 This can be done by taking a progressive stance and setting up 
industry authorised web sites. 
43 
42 
ibid at 472-473 
ibid at 473. | 
ibid at 473. ' 
ibid at 474. 
Paul Veravafiich, op.cit at 473. t 
44 
45 
46 
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For instance, the recording industry could set up a site where they could offer 
authorised MP3 files from artists represented by the record company members. There 
are several means the industry could implement to control access to these files. In 
return for unlimited free downloading of any available titles, the record companies 
could charge a fixed membership fee. Alternatively, payment could be on a 'pay-as-
you-download' basis. Either way, any payment sum would have to be both 
reasonable to the consumer, and be able to generate enough return to make a blanket 
license fee appeal to a broad class of copyright owners. 
Maintaining sites to control the distribution of music over the Internet could help the 
record industry ensure that the artists receive some compensation for the downloading 
of their works. 4 7 However, a membership fee to access a MP3 web site or a charge to 
download a song may not be well received by the on-line community that currently 
trades in unauthorised MP3 files for free. With the proliferation of unauthorised MP3 
files, users of the Internet have already shown a preference for free materials and may 
be reluctant to pay for downloading songs that they may not like. 
4. Legal or Technological? 
With both legally and technologically viable options open to the legislature and 
recording industry, the question has to be asked which type of solution should be 
adopted. Taking into account that the law making process is notorious for being 
slow-moving and copyright protection technology is becoming evermore 
sophisticated, one might be tempted to opt for the technological solutions. 
Furthermore, in the long run, technological barriers to copyright infringement may 
prove much more valuable than statutory copyright protection.4 9 While statutory 
protection is generally only effective in punishing pirates after the fact, technological 
barriers can be erected to prevent piracy in the first place - or to take a pessimistic 
view - at least put it back in the realm of the technologically sophisticated hacker.50 
Paul Veravanich, op.cit at 475. 
ibid at 475. 
B.J. Richards, op.cit at 439. 
ibid at 439. 
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However, it is probably more likely that the most effective strategy wi l l be a marriage 
of technology and law, in which statutes are used to require the use of the 
technological copyright barriers.51 Co-operation between the law, the music industry, 
and hardware and software manufactures could ultimately mean that the technologies 
wi l l be successfully used to prevent large-scale Internet piracy. 
5. The Secure Digital Music Initiative 
The recording industry, it seems, has seen the light and has already started to take 
action. As the Diamond case was unfolding, the recording industry convened a 
meeting of interested parties from many affected industries, including consumer 
electronics, computer, online music distributors, and wireless device manufacturers, 
to form a coalition. 5 2 The coalition was formed to develop security measures in order 
to confront the issue of unauthorised music files on the Internet. 
Dubbed the Secure Digital Music Initiative ( 'SDMI'), the coalition hopes to create a 
method of delivering music over the Internet while still maintaining copyright control 
over the works. The SDMI is a consortium sponsored by the RIAA and the IFPI, and 
boasts a powerful group of members including Sony, Warner Brothers, IBM, 
Microsoft, America Online, and even Diamond Multimedia. The SDMI's stated goal 
was "to develop open technology specifications that protect the playing, storing, and 
distributing of digital music...". 
Ironically, Dr. Leonardo Chiarlglione, a key figure in the development of the 
notorious MPEG standards, was named as SDMI's Executive Director. The SDMI 
plan requires a two-phase implementation.54 Phase I , which is already complete, 
incorporated a screening device within portable players that determines whether or 
not music is appropriately watermarked, but does not prevent any file from being 
played. 
5 1 B.J. Richards, op.cit at 439. 
5 2 James M. Burger, op.cit at 33. 
5 3 See <http://www.sdmi.org>. For a detailed critical analysis of SDMI's initial proposals and possible 
alternatives see Ryan S. Henriquez, Facing The Music On The Internet: Identifying Divergent 
Strategies For Different Segments Of The Music Industry In Approaching Digital Distribution, 7 
U C L A Ent. L . Rev. 57 (1999). See also Tamara Milagros-Woeckner, Karma Or Golden 
Opportunity?: A New Business Model For The Music Industry Launching Into Cyberspace, 30 Sw. U. 
L. Rev. 295 (2001). 
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Phase I I involves the incorporation of watermarks within new digital music. These 
watermarks wil l be detected by portable players compliant with Phase I and prevent 
this new music from being played, while continuing to accept pre-SDMI files, until 
the user upgrades their device to one with Phase I I technology. The incorporation of 
Phase I I technology wi l l then prevent the playback of pirated files. 
Just as one would think that things were finally looking better for the recording 
industry, a potentially serious omen has appeared. The protection system used to 
encrypt DVDs has been broken. 5 5 A group of Norwegian programmers duplicated 
the software equivalent of a skeleton key, which is now on the Internet for anyone to 
download. The small program allows anyone using a PC with a DVD drive to unlock 
a DVD movie and record a perfect digital copy of it onto his or her hard-drive. 
Thus, the SDMI faces the same vulnerability to hackers cracking the system, and it is 
likely not a question of whether it wi l l be cracked, but when. 5 6 The members of 
SDMI apparently realise this. They asked hackers to enter an SDMI sponsored 
contest offering US$10,000 to anyone who could successfully hack any of the six 
57 
security systems SDMI was considering. 
However, the best of the hacking community refused to participate and urged others 
to do the same. They believed the contest was a publicity ploy and just a way to 
deprive consumers of what many hackers consider their right to copy and share music 
online. Jon Johansen, the programmer who unlocked the DVD encryption system, 
stated that he would not "contribute to enhance the same technologies that are 
designed to take our rights away".5 8 
See Peter Brown, SDMI Watermark Selected, Electronic News, August 16, 1999 at 22. 
5 5 Chris Oakes, DVD Hackers Hit With Lawsuit, Wired News, December 28, 1999 
<http://www.wired.eom/news/business/0,1367,33303,00. html>. 
5 6 Tamara Milagros-Woeckner, op.cit at 315. 
5 7 Greg Miller, Piracy Contest is Not Music to Hackers' Ears, L.A. Times, Sept. 25, 2000 at C I . 
5 8 See Don Marti, SDMI or Not?, Linux Journal, September 19, 2000 
<http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=5221>. 
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6. Conclusions 
Music piracy shows no signs of slowing down and it seems to be affecting music 
sales. Global music sales were down by 5% in 2001 and global sales of recorded 
music were down by 9.2% in the first half of 2002. 5 9 It seems clear that something 
needs to be done. The question is what and how. 
The Diamond case was very technical and involved applying an old piece of 
legislation to a new piece of technology. Ultimately it was found that the Rio and 
similar MP3 players were not covered by the AHRA and therefore manufacturers are 
not liable for any royalty payments. However, the decision was far from clear cut 
with both the District Court and Ninth Circuit applying different reasoning to their 
decisions. As such it was a case fraught with 'loopholes' and 'technicalities'. 
It must be questioned how differently the case would have been decided by a 
different court or even by a different judge on a different day. Such uncertainty and 
lack of clear legislation is not what is needed for MP3 and other related playing 
technology to advance. Such advancements are obviously beneficial to consumers 
and society at large. 
So, as the market for MP3 playing technology grows so does the need for clear 
legislation. A question that does not seem to have been answered fully by the 
Diamond case is that of the legal status of 'space-shifting', the predominant driving 
force behind the use of MP3 playing devices. 
The MP3.com case was straightforward - an Internet entity can not 'space-shift' for 
its users. As such there was clear direct infringement by MP3.com. However, the 
question that must be posed is what would be the legal status i f the users themselves 
could 'space-shift' on to a virtual hard-drive. I f permissible this allows for a new 
business model that effectively allows the same functionality as MP3.com's 'Beam-
it ' service. 
IFPI, Music Piracy Report 2002 <http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/antipiracy/piracy2002.html>. 
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Again questions remain unanswered. Taking a view with respect to the future, 
answers to such questions wi l l be very important. At a time where the general 
consensus seems to predict a future where everyone's software, data, music, movies 
and games wi l l be provided or streamed over the Internet, with more of an ASP 
(Application Service Provider) based business model, it seems that such questions 
need to answered. 
The Napster case was the more complicated out of the trilogy. Its complexities were 
no more so based on the importance of the decision in the case, than the simplicity of 
the idea behind it. The case involved an interpretation of the recently enacted DMCA 
and it may seem that it is already out of date. 
More importantly Napster involved applying traditional copyright concepts of direct, 
contributory, and vicarious liability to a new-age piracy machine of an unprecedented 
scale. Again, some issues need to be dealt with. It needs to be known with certainty 
when an ISP wi l l be liable for contributory and vicarious liability. Such certainty is 
important especially as the Internet is destined to play an even bigger role in our 
futures. 
The 'space-shifting' and 'sampling' issues seem to also have been left open. More 
importantly the use of legitimate 'peer to peer' systems seems to be hanging in the 
balance, with doctrines such as the 'staple article of commerce' being given an 
augmented application. There are a number of important uses for 'peer to peer' 
technology that justifies having clearly delineated law on how it can be utilised, or 
not. Important socially beneficial uses include using the system for collaborative 
working relationships in business, education, and research. 
Overall, there is a need for a definitive answer to the legal status of 'space-shifting', 
not just with in the context in which music was 'space-shifted' in the Diamond, 
MP3.com, and Napster cases, but also within a wider context. 
One of the inherent themes throughout this paper has been to consider the future. I f 
the questions and gaps highlighted can be answered and filled in a wider sense so as 
to encompass all such technologies and not be specific to just musical content, then 
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one of main aims of this paper has been fulfilled. That is to consider not just the 
current problems of digital distribution of music but the future digital distribution of 
all content. After all, it all boils down to the same thing - Is and Os. 
For example, it is not a far stretch to imagine handheld movie playing devices. I f 
movies were to be 'space-shifted' from DVDs on to such handheld devices how 
relevant would the analysis in the Diamond, MP3.com, and Napster cases and 
subsequent case law and legislation be? 
It seems that to deal with piracy and to protect the interest of copyright holders in 
relation to all types of digital content, immediate and forward-looking action is 
needed. A l l interested parties must come together and agree upon a solution that 
marries both the law and technology. Not only this but copyright holders must also 
embrace new technology instead of fearing it, even i f it means providing access to 
copyrighted material at a lower profit. 
To conclude: "Freedom and not servitude is the cure for anarchy; as religion, and 
not atheism, is the true remedy for superstition ".60 
Edmund Burke (1729-1797). 
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